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Abstract 
Market making is central to the study of market microstructure. Market makers stand ready to 
provide liquidity, market stability and price discovery, issues of great importance to regulators, 
practitioners and academics. This thesis contributes to the literature by studying four topical issues 
related to market making. 
The thesis consists of four essays. In the first essay we develop a simple multi-period model 
of market making for a monopolistic stock market maker. The market maker tries to solve simul-
taneously the problems of managing his inventory and trading with informed traders. He uses a 
Kalman filter to update his estimates of the unknown market prices through his noisy order flow 
observation. We analytically characterize the optimal bid and ask prices and find that they depend 
on the beginning inventory, the estimated price, and the market maker's prior estimation error of the 
price process for each time period. We obtain desirable numerical results by using properly chosen 
parameters. The extensions to the continuous time and a competitive market making environment 
are also discussed. 
The second essay extends the model in the first essay to consider the market making of multiple 
stocks. The market maker still does not know the true prices but is assumed to know the return 
covariance structure of these stocks. When the market maker considers the correlated order flow 
information, his knowledge of the return covariance improves his estimation of the unknown price 
processes, resulting in higher cumulative profits and lower risks of the profits. 
The third essay analyzes the effect of option market makers' hedging on the informed trading 
strategy and the subsequent changes in the costs of liquidity provision in both stock and option 
markets. In a sequential trading framework, an option market maker uses the stock market to hedge 
his option position. His hedging trade affects the way that informed traders submit their orders in 
both the stock and the option market, which in turn changes the informed trading pressure faced 
by the market makers in each market. Furthermore, information in the option trading is passed to 
the stock market through the hedging trade. Both stock and option spreads are wider with option 
market maker's hedging. The increase in the spreads is more significant when the option market 
maker hedges in the underlying market than when it hedges with different options. 
The fourth essay provides a model of bookmaking in a horse race betting market. The bookmaker 
observes the noisy public betting flow and faces the risk of trading with possible informed traders, 
as well as the risk of his unbalanced liability exposures. Even the noisy demand can unbalance the 
bookmaker's book. In our model, the bookmaker revises his odds to mitigate the risk. Allowing 
the bookmaker to set odds over several rounds of betting gives a clear view of the bookmaker's 
price setting strategy and its impact on the public betting flow over time. The study of horse 
race bookmaking provides useful insights into the market making of state contingent claims such as 
options. 
x 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Over the past 30 years, market microstructure has become an important research area 
in financial economics. It studies the process by which investors' latent demands are 
ultimately translated into transactions (Madhavan (2000)). Of particular interest in 
the market microstructure research is the study of market makers. l\Iaker makers are 
a special group of dealers and they playa central role in financial markets. They stand 
ready to buy and sell securities on a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted 
price. l Perhaps the most prominent example of market makers are the specialists at 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). A specialist performs five essential functions in 
the specific securities allocated to him at NYSE. He manages the auction process by 
establishing the opening price for his security every day and executes orders for floor 
brokers. He also serves as catalysts by bringing buyers and sellers together, enabling 
a transaction to take place that otherwise would not have occurred. He provides 
capital by trading against the trend of the market to minimize the order imbalance. 
1 http://www.sec.gov/answers/mktmakers.htm. 
1 
2 
and stabilizes prices to ensure smooth trading. 2 Market makers therefore play an 
important role in price discovery and market stability, issues of great interests to 
regulators, practitioners and academics. 
This thesis is differentiated from the previous studies on market microstructure 
in two aspects. First, we are mainly interested in the normative problem of how a 
market maker should behave; the answers are important guides to public and private 
decision makings. Second, we are particularly interested in how an option market 
maker should behave in setting his bid and ask prices. Options at different strike 
prices are a parameterized family of substitutable securities and the study of the 
relation among closely related option contracts poses challenges to researchers. The 
models in this thesis provide some foundations to understand the complexity of option 
market making in practice. 
1.1 The scope of the thesis 
This thesis contributes to the literature by investigating four issues related to the 
market making in various financial markets. The first issue is related to the well 
known literature on market makers' price setting strategies. Previous literature has 
documented that market makers generally face two problems: the inventory problem 
and the asymmetric information problem. Market makers face the risk of building 
up risky inventories in the market making business. They change their bid and ask 
2http://www.nyse.com/about/members;. 
3 
prices to elicit the unexpected imbalance of buy and sell orders, aiming to restore 
inventories to a preferre? position. In a market with asymmetric information, the bid-
ask spread arises from the existence of informed traders, who have better knowledge 
of the stock's future value. Market makers lose on average to informed traders but 
recoup their information loss from trading with uninformed traders. 
The literature however focuses on these two problems separately. In practice, 
market makers hardly face only one problem and not the other. It is of interest 
to integrate the two problems into one setting under which both problems can be 
analyzed simultaneously. In particular, a market maker's inventory positions should 
enter into the model explicitly so that his price setting strategy directly affects his 
inventory exposures. In addition, a market maker must be able to observe the noisy 
signal about the stock's true value, which only informed traders know exactly. 
These two ingredients are incorporated into our model in Chapter 3. In a Bayesian 
updating framework, a monopolistic market maker uses the order flow information to 
estimate the true value of a stock. The order flow conveys two pieces of information: 
first, the net order flow contributes to the net changes in his inventory, and second, 
the part of informed trading in the overall order flow provides a noisy signal of the 
true prices. Using Bayes rule, the market maker obtains optimal estimates of the true 
prices and sets optimal bid and ask prices to influence the public order flow so as to 
manage his inventory positions. 
I 
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The second issue of this thesis concerns the market making of multiple stocks. 
The traditional focus of market making research has been on the liquidity provision 
of an individual security. In practice, a market maker normally makes markets for 
more than one security. At NYSE, for example, there are currently 7 specialist firms 
making markets for approximately 2672 listed companies. It is therefore of interest to 
examine the implication of the multiple stocks market making on the market maker's 
price setting strategies and its impact on order flows. 
In Chapter 4, we extend our single stock market making model in Chapter 3 to 
incorporate multiple stocks. We assume that the market maker, still a monopolist, 
does not know the true prices but knows the return covariance structure of these 
stocks. He still uses order flow information to update his estimates of the true prices. 
His knowledge of the return covariance structure in this case affects order flows. We 
find that, by considering the correlated order flow information in his price estimation, 
the market maker obtains better estimates of the stocks' true values, which improves 
his market making profitability. 
A direct implication from the market maker's knowledge of the return covari-
ance is that order flows exhibit liquidity commonality. Liquidity commonality is 
important because systematic liquidity is most likely a priced source of risk (Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Pastor and Stambaugh 
5 
(2003)). Consistent with empirical findings of Coughenour and Saad (2004), our re-
sults provide another support to the claim that common market makers are a possible 
reason for liquidity commonality. 
Chapter 4 also serves as a first step for our study of option market making. An 
option market maker makes markets for a number of option contracts, in a much 
similar way as market making multiple stocks. Our assumption of the stocks' return 
covariance structure is also particularly suitable for analyzing option market making. 
Our model in Chapter 4 therefore provides insights into the market making of the 
parameterized family of substitutable securities such as options with different strike 
prIces. 
The third issue in this thesis concerns the informed trading across stock and its 
option markets. For stocks with their options traded, informed trading can take 
place in either the underlying stock market or the option market. There is a growing 
body of literature that provides evidence that informed traders do trade in option 
markets and the option market makers' hedging activities affect the costs of liquidity 
provision in both stock and option markets. Analyzing the option market maker's 
hedging therefore provides an important link of the liquidity in these two markets. 
Chapter 5 provides the first theoretical model that explicitly considers the op-
tion market makers' hedging activity and analyzes its effect on the informed trading 
strategies and the changes in the costs of liquidity provision in both the stock and the 
6 
option markets. We show that the hedging by market makers has a significant impact 
on the choice of the market that informed traders submit their orders to. Since infor-
mation that is channeled by options trading is passed on to the stock market through 
the hedging trade of the market maker, both stock and option spreads are wider with 
option market maker's hedging. The model is able to explain the recent empirical 
results of Kaul, Nimalendran, and Zhang (2004) and de Fontnouvelle, Fisher, and 
Harris (2003), that suggest that the cost of hedging has an important effect on both 
stock and option spreads. 
Chapter 5 also contributes to the literature that investigates how informed trading 
in the option market is distributed across strike prices. We study this problem by 
extending the model to include multiple options on the same underlying asset. We 
show that stock spreads are smaller when more options are traded. Compared to 
the case in which each option is the only traded option, the spreads of each option 
are smaller when multiple options are traded simultaneously. For the stock, we show 
that when informed traders have the choice of trading multiple options, there is less 
informational content in the option market maker's hedging trade. This eases the 
informed trading threat in the stock market and allows the stock market maker to 
narrow the stock spreads. Also, since options have a convex payoff structure, the 
combined hedge ratio of multiple options is smaller than the hedge ratio for each 
individual option. This reduces the option market maker's hedging cost, and in turn 
7 
narrows the option spreads. 
The fourth issue of this thesis concerns the bookmaking in a horse race betting 
market. Studying horse race bookmaking provides a way to understand the market 
making of state contingent claims such as options since a bookmaker and an option 
market maker share many similarities. For example, an option market maker's profits 
are contingent on the final value of the stock. Suppose an option market maker deals 
with butterfly spreads instead of a single option, there is one and only one option of 
the spreads that will payoff at expiry. It is exactly the same in a horse race: there 
is one and only one horse that will win the race eventually. Furthermore, an option 
market maker wants to have flat and positive positions over all option exposures, so 
that he could always have positive profits and avoid negative ones. Similarly in a 
horse betting market, a bookmaker sells liabilities over all horses and wishes to avoid 
large liability exposures. Since a horse betting market is an especially simple financial 
market, in which the complexity of the pricing problem is reduced, it provides a clear 
view of pricing issues which are more complicated elsewhere. 
Chapter 6 provides a simple model of bookmaking in a horse race betting market. 
The book is liable to become unbalanced because the betting demands are noisy 
and the bookmaker may not know the correct odds to quote. He has to worry about 
trading with informed traders. Furthermore, whenever his book becomes unbalanced, 
the bookmaker wants to re-balance it so that the problem of having extremely high 
liability exposures can be alleviated. Even random shocks from nOIse t radel's are 
costly to the bookmaker since his book could become less balanced. 
In our model, the bookmaker revises his odds to mitigate the risk. He influences 
the public betting flow by raising the normalized prices for horses with high initial 
liabilities and lowering the normalized prices for horses with low initial liabilities. 
Allowing the bookmaker to set odds several rounds before the race starts gin>s llS 
a clear view of the bookmaker's price setting strategy and its impact on the public 
betting flow over time. Our model helps to understand the complexity of managing 
a series of state contingent exposures such as options for a single expiry date. 
1.2 The organization of the thesis 
Following the introduction, the thesis is organized in the following way. In Chapter 
2, we review the literature that is related to our work in this thesis, namely, the 
literature on equity market making, the literature on option market making, and the 
literature on horse race bookmaking. Chapter 3 develops a simple multi-period model 
for a monopolistic market maker who tries to solve simultaneously the problems of 
managing his inventory and trading with informed traders. The market maker uses 
a Kalman filter to update his estimates of the true prices through his order flow 
observation. Chapter 4 extends the single stock model in Chapter 3 to consider the 
market making of multiple stocks. Gin>n the market maker's knowledge of the return 
(,O\'(ui<lIlCe structure. the market maker improves his market making profitabilitv hy 
9 
considering the correlated order flow information in his price estimation. Chapter 5 
studies the informed trading in the option market and the effect of the option market 
maker's hedging on the costs of liquidity provision in both stock and option markets. 
We find the option market maker's hedging trade conveys information and affects 
the informed traders' order placement strategy, which in turn changes the informed 
trading pressure faced by the market makers in each market. Chapter 6 provides a 
simple model of bookmaking in a horse race betting market. A bookmaker influences 
the public betting flow by setting appropriate odds for all horses to mitigate the 
risk of an unbalanced book. The bookmaker's odds setting strategy provides useful 
insights into the management of state contingent exposures such as options. Finally, 
Chapter 7 provides concluding remarks and indicates directions for future research. 
Chapter 2 
Literature review 
In the frictionless Walrasian models of trading behavior, perfect competition and free 
entry are typically assumed. Market microstructure studies what Walrasian mod-
els have ignored, yet an important aspect of financial markets: frictions (O'Hara 
(1995)). It examines the process of price formation in the presence of risks, costs and 
asymmetric information.! 
In this chapter, we discuss the literature that is relevant to our work in the thesis. 
We divide this chapter into three sections. The first section reviews the literature 
on equity market making, the traditional focus of the market microstructure study. 
Given its uniqueness, we review the literature on option market making separately in 
the second section. The last section reviews the literature on horse race bookmaking 
sincc we will develop some strong parallels between this and option market making. 
1 For a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature on market microstructure, see O'Hara 
(1995). I\Iadhavan (2000), Stoll (2003) and Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005) provide mon' recent 
surveys. 
10 
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2.1 Literature on equity market making 
Early literature on market microstructure focuses on the operations of dgents called 
market makers. They stand ready to buy and sell securities on a regular and contin-
uous basis at a publicly quoted price. Given the central role of market makers, it is 
a natural starting point to study how prices are determined inside the so-called black 
box of a security market (Stoll (1976) and O'Hara (1995)). 
Market makers quote bid and ask prices at which they buy and sell securities. The 
difference between the bid and ask prices is called the bid-ask spread. The analysis 
of how bid-ask spreads are determined provides insights of how market makers set 
prices in the market. 
The bid-ask spread reflects the difference between what active buyers must pay 
and what active sellers receive. It is an estimator of the cost of liquidity provision 
and the illiquidity of a market (Stoll (2003)). Demsetz (1968) observes that buyers 
and sellers may enter the market at different times and the bid-ask spread arises as 
the size of price concession needed for immediate transaction. Demsetz (1968) is the 
first to describe the specialists at NYSE as suppliers of immediacy: they passively 
provide liquidity to accommodate the transitory order imbalance by adjusting bid-ask 
spreads, and thereby stabilize prices. The bid-ask spread provides the specialists wi t h 
the appropriate return under competition. 
l\Iany empirical researchers analyze the cross-sectional variation in spreads and 
12 
find it can be explained by economic variables.2 In fact, the relation between the 
spread of a security and the trading characteristics of that security is one of the 
strongest and most robust relations in finance (Stoll (2003)). In a more recent study, 
Stoll (2000) finds over 79% of the cross-sectional variation in proportional spreads is 
explained by stock characteristics. The well-known key results are: spreads are lower 
for stocks with greater trading volume, with lower return volatility, with higher price, 
and with smaller trading imbalance. 
In the following sections, we discuss two general theoretical frameworks that deter-
mine the bid-ask spread of a security, namely, inventory risk models and asymmetric 
information models. 
2.1.1 Inventory models 
Inventory models focus on the issue that market makers must carry unwanted in-
ventories in order to perform their dealership functions. When there is an order 
imbalance that moves the market maker away from his desired inventory position, 
he adjusts the bid and ask prices to attract orders and re-optimizes his inventory 
position. Important pape~s of inventory models include Garman (1976), Amuhud 
and Mendelson (1980), Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983), O'Hara and Oldfield 
(1986) and Madhavan and Smidt (1993). 
2See, for example, Demsetz(1968), Stoll (1978), Branch and Freed (1977), Tinie (1972), Tinie 
and West (1974). 
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Garman (1976) is perhaps the earliest paper focusing on the market maker's in-
ventory risk. While Demsetz (1968) studies the trading desire of an individual trader, 
Garman (1976) focuses on the stochastic arrivals of order flows and how the market 
itself works to solve the clearing problem. He characterizes an exchange market by 
a flow of stochastic orders to buy and sell and the imbalance between supply and 
demand could temporarily arise. This imbalance gives an importance to the temporal 
microstructure, i.e., how the exchange between buy and sell actually occurs at any 
point in time.3 In his dealership structure, the single, monopolistic market maker's 
objective is to maximize his expected profit per unit of time, subject to the avoidance 
of failure (i.e., running out of cash or inventory). Central to the dealer's problem is 
therefore the asynchronism between the flow of buys and sells. Garman's analysis 
demonstrates that the inventory determines the dealer's viability. 
Garman's (1976) work stimulates the subsequent research in the inventory models. 
For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1980) explicitly incorporate inventory into the 
dealer's pricing problem and show that the dealer has a preferred inventory level 
because of the nature of the order arrival process. Optimal bid and ask prices exhibit 
a positive spread. Stoll (1978) examines the dealer's role as the supplier of immediacy. 
Different from the order-based analysis in Garman (1976) and Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980), Stoll's focus is on the portfolio risk that the dealer faces. The dealer is willing 
3Garman (1976) is the first to use the term microstructure, defined as the moment to moment 
trading activities. 
14 
to alter his desired portfolio position to accommodate other traders' trading needs. 
In the same way that any intermediary must be compensated, risk averse dealers4 
must be rewarded for the costs of providing their services. The market spreads reflect 
the cost of bearing the risk associated with the unwanted inventory. 
The inventory model in Stoll (1978) has been extended to account for multiple 
stocks, multiple time periods (Ho and Stoll (1981)) and multiple market makers (Ho 
and Stoll (1983)). The intertemporal model of Ho and Stoll (1981) differs from 
the risk neural intertemporal models of Garman (1976) and Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980) in that the market maker's attitude toward risk affects his optimal pricing 
policy. In solving the maximization problem of the market maker's expected utility 
of the terminal wealth, the authors find the spread is largely independent of the 
market maker's inventory position but depends on the fundamental characteristics 
of the stock (such as the risk of the stock) and the market maker (such as his risk 
aversion and the time horizon). The market Jllaker affects the order arrival processes 
by moving the placement of the spread rather than adjusting the size of the spread. 
The literature that we have reviewed so far focuses on a single, monopolistic dealer. 
Ho and Stoll (1983) examine the pricing setting strategy in a model of competitive 
dealers. They analyze two competing market makers each trading two stocks and 
choosing bid and ask prices to maximize his own expected utility. However their 
4In Garman (1976) and Amihud and Mendelson (1980), the dealer is assumed to be a risk neutral 
monopolist whose prices reflect largely his market power. 
15 
simple one-period model does not explicitly incorporate the intertemporal inventory 
position of the competing market maker, so the strategic element of market maker's 
price setting strategies is not considered. Since traders could trade with the market 
maker who has the best price, each market maker's pricing problem should depend on 
the actions of every other market maker (O'Hara (1995)). Modeling the competition 
among market makers is therefore more complicated. The formal treatment of the 
competitive dealership would require a careful game-theoretical analysis. 
In summary, central to inventory models are the uncertainties in order flows, which 
can result in inventory problems for market makers. Since unbalanced inventory 
carries risk, market makers have to moderate the random order flows according to 
their respective risk structure. The bid-ask spread arises either to reflect market 
makers' market power (Garman (1976) and Amihud and Mendelson (1980)) or to 
compensate market makers for bearing the risk of holding undesired inventories (Stoll 
(1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983)). In the long run order flows are balanced by 
assumption and they are irrelevant in determining security prices. But in the short 
run, they do affect the fine price behavior. Important empirical questions arise from 
inventory models include what a market maker's preferred inventory position is and 
whether the inventory level induces mean-reverting in security prices5 . These studies 
advance our knowledge of how prices are determined in the black box of a security 
5See, for example, Madhavan and Smidt (1991), Manaster and Mann (1996), Lyons (1995) and 
Laux (1993). 
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market. 
2.1.2 Asymmetric information models 
Recent literature on market microstructure applies the insights from information 
economics to study the dealer's behavior. The origin of asymmetric information 
models is usually attributed to an influential paper by Jack Treynor (writing under 
the pseudonym of Bagehot (1971)). Treynor suggests the presence in the market of 
traders who have superior information (informed traders) and who are liquidity moti-
vated (uninformed traders). In an anonymous market, dealers must lose to informed 
traders, for the informed traders are not identified.6 He notes that the losses to the 
informed must be offset by the profits from the uninformed traders if dealers are to 
stay in business. The spread therefore reflects a balancing of losses to the informed 
with gains from the uninformed. That is, adverse selection imposes a cost, which 
must be made up by a spread, even for a risk neutral, competitive market maker 
(Copeland and Galai (1983)). This provides a way to explain the market bid-ask 
spreads without relying on exogenous technological specifications of the transaction 
cost. Important theoretical papers that build on the adverse-selection cost of the 
spread include Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O'Hara (1987), and Kyle 
(1985). 
Since informed traders only buy when the price is low and sell when the price 
6Bagehot {1971} also argues that informed traders not only possess informational advantages, 
but also the option not to trade. 
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is high, the trades themselves could reveal the underlying information and therefore 
affect the price process. This is the insight of the sequential trading models of Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987) in which a rational market maker 
gradually learns this underlying information and sets ex post regret-free prices that 
converge to the expected value of the underlying asset. In Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985), the bid-ask spread is increasing in the information asymmetry (as measured 
by the percentage of informed traders in total trading popUlation) and in the degree 
of asset value uncertainty (as measured by the range of possible values of the asset). 
Easley and O'Hara (1987) allow for trades of different sizes and assume that traders 
with superior information prefer larger size transactions. Adverse selection arises 
because a rational market maker interprets large orders as a signal of informational 
trading and adjusts the price and spread accordingly. 
Kyle first characterizes the strategic behavior of informed traders who maximize 
the value of their private information before the information becomes common knowl-
edge. In a batch trading model, the market maker aggregates the orders and sets one 
price (instead of bid and ask prices) to clear the market. Kyle demonstrates the 
existence of a rational expectation equilibrium in his model in whieh the informed 
traders' conjecture of the market maker's pricing policy and the market maker's infer-
ence about the informed traders' information are both correct in the equilibrium. He 
shows that information is gradually incorporated into prices across time and market 
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prices eventually incorporate all available information. 
Kyle's (1985) model was further extended by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) 
and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) incorporate 
competition among multiple risk-averse insiders with long-lived private information. 
They demonstrate the existence of a unique linear equilibrium in which competition 
among insiders is associated with high trading volumes and rapid revelation of private 
information. In the limiting case in which the number of informed traders goes to 
infinity, all information is revealed in the first trading interval and the price equals 
the true value instantaneously. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) develop a model of 
strategic play by informed and uninformed traders. They allow some uninformed 
traders (called discretionary uninformed traders) to have discretion over which time 
period they want to trade in.7 The optimal behavior for an uninformed discretionary 
trader is determined by solving for the minimum cost trading period in which to 
transact. Admati and Pfleiderer show that in the equilibrium the discretionary traders 
choose the lowest-cost period in which the variance of the uninformed trade is highest. 
I t follows that to maximize the variance of the uninformed trade, discretionary traders 
all select the same period to transact, inducing the observed patterns8 that trades 
are concentrated in particular time periods within the trading day and the periods of 
high trading volume also tend to be the periods of higher return variability. 
7 Other papers that consider the uninformed strategic behavior include Foster and Viswanathan 
(1990), Seppi (1990), and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992). 
8See, for example, Jain and Joh (1988) and French and Roll (1986). 
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In summary, the key element of asymmetric information models is that trades 
convey information. A market maker, by observing trading activities, gradually learns 
the information held by informed traders. The market maker adjusts prices so that, at 
any point in time, the prices reflect the expectation of the security's value, conditional 
on all public information, including the prior trades. The price dynamics are therefore 
derived from the mechanism of the market maker's learning process. Most asymmetric 
information models basically solve this dynamic learning problem via an application 
of Bayes rule.9 The strategic traders models of Kyle (1985) and subsequent papers 
(e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)) link the 
market microstructure research to the rational expectation literature to allow better 
characterization of the trading behavior of different market participants. 
2.2 Literature on option market making 
Literature on option market making focuses on the informational role of option trad-
ing. In a complete market, an option is a redundant asset: its prices are determined 
unilaterally by the price of its underlying asset and do not convey information (Black 
and Scholes (1973)). If, however, the market is not complete and market frictions 
do exist, an option is not redundant and an option trading process contains infor-
mation about the underlying asset prices. Back (1993) shows that, with continuous 
trading and asymmetric information, an option can no longer be priced via simple 
9Notable exceptions are the earlier papers such as Bagehot {1971} and Copeland and Galai {1983}. 
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arbitrage. The option market therefore provides another channel through which in-
formed traders can profit from their information. Black (1975) argues that the option 
market is an ideal venue for informed trading because of its leverage advantages, low 
transaction costs, less stringent margin conditions, and the absence of the up tick rule 
for shorting. 
One way to study the informational effect of option trading on the underlying 
market is to examine which market leads the other in information discovery (the 
lead-lag effect). The empirical findings are however inconclusive. The results of 
Manaster and Rendleman (1982), and Anthony (1988) suggest that the price changes 
in option markets lead the price changes in stock markets. However, Stephan and 
Whaley (1990), Chan, Chung and Johnson (1993) and others find no evidence that 
supports such lead. These conflicting results may due to the particular time frame or 
the market structure that the data set has been drawn from. 
With the increasing availability of data sources, researchers are able to make better 
inference of informed trading in option markets. For example, Chakravarty, Gulen, 
and Mayhew (2004) find direct evidence that the option market contributes about 
17% on average in price discovery; indirectly, Mayhew, Sarin, and Shastri (1995) find 
that informed traders ,migrate between stock and option markets in response to the 
changes in the option's margin requirements. Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas (1998) and 
Pan and Poteshman (2005) find signed option trading volume helps to forecast stock 
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returns. Cherian and Weng (1999) investigate the presence of volatility informational 
trading in the option market and its implications for option bid-ask implied volatility 
spread. They find a positive correlation between option volume and implied volatility 
spread given the presence .of directional and volatility informational traders, a result 
consistent with that of Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas (1998). Cao, Chen, and Griffin 
(2005) observe abnormal option trading volume prior to takeover announcements. 
Another line of empirical research examines the factors that are significant in de-
termining the option spread. Vijh (1990) finds that the adverse-selection component 
of the option spread on Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) is very small. Lee 
and Yi (2001) investigate the extent of information-motivated trading conditional on 
the trade size in the option and stock market. They show that the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread decreases with option delta, implying that options 
with greater financial leverage attract more informed investors. Jameson and Wilhelm 
(1992) provide empirical evidences that option market makers face risks in managing 
inventory that is unique to option markets. They show that risks associated with 
the inability to rebalance an option position continuously and the uncertainty about 
the return volatility of the underlying stock each accounts for a statistically and eco-
nomically significant proportion of the bid-ask spreads quoted for a sample of CBOE 
options. Mayhew (2002) examines the effects of competition and market structure 
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on equity option spreads and find that options listed on multiple exchanges have nar-
rower spreads than those listed on a single exchange, but the difference diminishes as 
the option's volume increases. 
Compared to many empirical studies, theoretical works on this area are however 
surprisingly sparse. Papers by Biais and Hillion (1994), Easley, O'Hara, and Srini-
vas (1998), and John, Koticha, Narayanan, and Subrahmanyam (2003) suggest that 
the amount of informed trading in the option market depends on the relative liquid-
ity in the option and its underlying market. Biais and Hillion (1994) analyze the 
effects of introducing options when information may be asymmetric. Although the 
option mitigates the market breakdown problem created by market incompleteness 
and asymmetric information, the market maker finds more difficult to interpret the 
informational content of trades and consequently the introduction of options reduces 
the information efficiency of the market. 
Both Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) and John, Koticha, Narayanan, and Sub-
rahmanyam (2003) use a sequential trading approach to address the similar question. 
Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) specify the importance of the volume in the price 
discovery process and the information transmission between cash and option markets. 
They develop a model of the informational role of the signed options trading volume 
in predicting future stock prices. John, Koticha, Narayanan, and Subrahmanyam 
(2003) consider a one-trade model in which traders can trade either a stock or a put 
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option and they allow a single wealth-constrained informed trader. They analyze the 
impact of option trading and margin rules on the behavior of informed trading and 
on the market microstructure of both stock and option markets. 
Analyzing option market maker's hedging activities provides another important 
way to understand the informational linkage between the option and its underlying 
. . 
market. Cho and Engle (1999) propose a derivative hedge theory and argue that in a 
perfect hedge world, option spreads arise from the illiquidity of the underlying market, 
rather than from inventory risk or informed trading in the options itself. Spreads in 
the derivative markets exist because market makers in those markets find it difficult 
to hedge their position given an illiquid underlying market. Their paper provides 
insights that adverse selection in the underlying market arises from the possibility of 
the option market maker's inability of executing his initial delta hedge at the level he 
wants to. 
This insight has been investigated by an increasing number of empirical researchers 
recently. Kaul, Nimalendran, and Zhang (2004) find that the underlying stock's 
spread has an important impact on the option spread due to option market maker's 
hedging activities. de Font nouvelle , Fishe, and Harris (2003) show that the option's 
delta and the underlying stock's effective spread are significantly related to the size of 
option spreads. Petrella (2001) proposes an empirical model that explicitly considers 
the hedging costs faced by option market makers to minimize delta risk exposure, 
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the order processing costs and other factors that affect the market makers' gross 
profit. His model shows that the option spread is positively related to the spread of 
the underlying assets. The reservation spread, computed as a linear combination of 
the option delta and the underlying asset's tick size, plays a very important role in 
explaining the option spread. 
In summary, an option market provides another channel through which informed 
traders can profit from their informational advantage. The unique features of the 
option market, in particular, issues like optimal hedging, risk exposure, and the link-
age between derivatives and underlying markets give rise to much interesting research 
recently. However how exactly an option market maker should behave in setting bid 
and ask prices remains unclear and r:epresents challenges to researchers, partly due to 
the complexity of the close relation among substitutable securities that options pose. 
Options with the same underlying asset but different strikes and maturities are some 
examples. Market making of these options is affected both by the market maker's 
information set and by his inventory positions. The market maker's information set 
is enriched by more information generated from his order flow observations on dif-
ferent strikes / maturities. The inventory problem becomes more complex because 
the market maker's risk exposure of substitutable options may change depending on 
the correlations among these options. Addressing option market making therefore 
requires a careful formulation and analysis of option market makers' information set 
and risk exposure. 
2.3 Literature on horse race bookmaking 
There are some important parallels between how a horse race bookmaker in the CK 
manages his book and how an option market maker does. For this reason, we include 
a chapter on the former even though extending it to a comprehensive model of option 
market making would be rather difficult. 
The British horse betting system provides a convenient way to study the market 
making of state contingent claims such as options. In a n horse race, each horse 
corresponds to each future state of the world. When the ith horse wins the race, the 
ith state obtains. Furthermore, the odds determine the prices of the basic Arrow-
Debreu securities that pay a dollar if a particular state obtains and nothing otherwise. 
Since a bookmaker sets odds for each horse, all basic securities are priced and traded 
(Shin (1992)). A horse race betting market also has a well-defined termination point at 
which each asset (bet) possesses a definite value. Horse betting markets are especially 
simple financial markets, in which the complexity of the pricing problems is reduced. 
In addition, a horse race bookmaker and an option market maker share many 
other similarities. In each case there is a clear maturity date (end of race vs. expiry 
of options) at which thE' profits can be unambiguously counted. In each case too, the 
payoff at maturity it) known beforehand as a outcome which is contingent on a single 
obsE'rvation (name of the winning horse vs. ('xpiry date \"CLlue of the underl.ving). 
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The analogy would be particularly perfect if an option market maker simply accepts 
orders from butterfly spreads: there is one and only one option of the spread that 
will payoff at expiry. It is exactly the same as in a horse race: there is one and only 
one horse that will win the race. Moreover, an option market maker wants to have 
some flat, positive positions over all option exposures, so that he could always have 
positive profits and avoid negative ones. Similarly, a bookmaker sells liabilities over 
all horses and wishes to avoid large liabilities. Both an option market maker and a 
bookmaker therefore wish to obtain a more balanced book in which large exposures 
can be avoided. The bookmaker's strategies can therefore be represented as one of 
meeting this contingent profile as satisfactorily as possible. 
Wagering markets have long been a focus of economic research.lO The early work 
applies the advances in utility theory to examine investors' risk-taking behavior in 
gambling markets. ll Recent focus of the academic research is on the testing of in-
formation efficiency in betting markets.12 Much of the academic attention has been 
devoted to examine whether there are significant differences in the expected return 
to wagers placed on those possible outcomes judged by the market to possess a high 
likelihood of occurring compared with those judged to possess a low likelihood of 
occurring. Empirical evidence tends to suggest that betting level stakes in the lower 
lOSauer (1998) is a recent survey of the economics literature on gambling market. 
llSee, for example, Friedman and Savage (1948), Hirshleifer (1966), Markowitz (1952), Samuelson 
(1952), among many others. 
12See, for example, Hausch, Ziemba and Rubinstein (1981), Hausch and Ziemba (1994). Vaughan 
Williams (1999) surveys information efficiency in betting markets. 
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range of odds produce a significant higher return than betting the same stake in the 
higher ranges of odds, a phenomenon usually known as the favorite-longshot bias (see, 
for example, Dowie (1976), as presented by Crafts (1985)). When a favorite-longshot 
bias exists, the percentage mark-ups in the prices over the true liabilities are generally 
not uniform. In particular, normalized prices on the favorites of the race understate 
the winning chances of these horses, while the normalized prices on the longshots 
exaggerate their winning chances. 
In a series of papers, Shin (1991, 1992, 1993) uses game theoretical models to 
provide an explanation of the favorite-longs hot bias from the supply side of the mar-
ket, i.e., the bookmaker. He studies how the bookmaker sets prices against punters 
who may have insider information. In his model, asymmetric information creates the 
favorite-Iongshot bias through the optimal pricing response by the bookmaker. In or-
der to recover sufficient revenue from outsiders to pay the insider their winnings, the 
bookmaker deliberately raises the odds offered against favorites winning the race and 
lowers those on longshots, whilst ensuring at the same time that their profit margin 
is sufficient to protect them against the expected proportion of insiders amongst their 
customers.13 Subsequent empirical works find evidence in support of Shin's models.14 
There has been rather limited academic attention devoted to the study of book-
making. Broadly speaking, the bookmaker's problem is analogous to that faced by 
13Shin (1993) empirically estimates the probability that the bookmaker encounters an insider to 
be a statistically significant 0.02. 
14See, for example, Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997) and Gabriel and Marsden (1990, 1991). 
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the market makers in setting bid and ask prices in financial markets. Most literature 
on horse race betting markets deals with the parimutuel system where the book-
maker's strategy is defined for him and is trivial. Shin's work is based on the British 
betting system and can be seen as a model of bookmaking where the bookmaker faces 
asymmetric information. 
In summary, bookmaking in a betting market provides an useful channel to study 
market making of state contingent claims such as options. A bookmaker faces prob-
lems of managing his odds across different horses and trading with possible insiders, 
in a much similar way as those faced by an option market maker. A betting market 
however is a simple financial market in which the complexity of the pricing problem is 
reduced. It allows us to focus on the essential features of the market making problem 
and provides insights into the market maker's price setting strategy. 
Chapter 3 
Market making with inventory 
uncertainty and information 
asymmetry 
3.1 Introduction 
Ever since the study by Demsetz (1968), market making has been an important area 
of market microstructure research. In short, market makers are a special group of 
dealers responsible for providing a continuous market by quoting bid and ask prices for 
investors to buy and sell securities. Previous research has documented that market 
makers generally face two problems: the problem of accumulating unwanted risky 
inventories (the inventory problem), and the problem of trading with informed traders 
(the asymmetric information problem). This chapter provides a normative analysis 
of a monopolistic market maker's strategy when he considers these two problems 
simultaneously. 1 
1 The assumption of monopolistic market making can be justified by institllt ional features in some 
major ('xcliclllges such as New York Stock Exchange ,vhere there is currently one specialist, or market 
maker, per stock. The specialist's main responsibilit,· is to maintain a fair and orderly TTlllrkl'f. For 
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Previous literature focuses on the inventory problem and the asymmetric infor-
mation problem separately. It is well known that market makers change their bid 
and ask prices in order to elicit unexpected imbalance of the buy and sell orders, in 
order to restore their inventories towards a preferred position. In a market with asym-
metric information, the bid-ask spread arises from the existence of informed traders, 
who have better knowledge of the future value of the stock. The market makers lose 
on average to informed traders but recoup their information loss from trading with 
uninformed traders. 
In our model we put both the inventory and asymmetric information problems 
into a single framework and analyze the market maker's pricing strategy under such 
a framework. We model a monopolistic market maker similar to a specialist at NYSE. 
He has the perfect knowledge of his inventories and the order flow information, but 
does not know the true value of the stock. Given a constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) utility function, the market maker maximizes his expected utility of per 
period profits, which comprise two parts: the incremental value of his inventories, and 
the instantaneous cash flow from his trading with the public buy and sell demands. 
Neither the order flow nor the inventory alone provides a sufficient statistic for him to 
set optimal bid and ask prices. He must use these two pieces of information together 
to estimate the true price in order to set the optimal prices. We obtain the closed 
a detailed description of the background on NYSE, see Hasbrouck, Sofianos and Sosebee (1993) 
and Teweles and Bradley (1998). The specialist participation rate, (specialist purchase + specialist 
sales)j(2 x total volume), is about 15% (NYSE Fact Book). 
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form solutions of the optimal bid and ask prices that the market maker sets of every 
time period. 
Our model is related to the seminal paper of Kyle (1985). Kyle considers the 
problem of trading with informed traders explicitly and managing the order imbalance 
implicitly. The net order flow from both informed and noise traders affects the market 
maker's inventory position in the Kyle's model. Kyle derives one price that clears all 
market orders. In contrast, our model considers the trading with informed traders 
implicitly and the inventory problem explicitly. We also take Kyle's analysis one step 
further by characterizing the optimal bid and ask prices set by the market maker to 
manage the problems of inventory and asymmetric information simultaneously. 
Central to our model is a Bayesian updating framework that the market maker uses 
to update his estimates of true prices over time. The framework can be summarized 
in a particular state-space form called the Kalman filter. 2 The market maker uses the 
Kalman filter to continuously update his belief of the true market prices through the 
noisy order flow observation. The Kalman filter has been widely used in economics 
and finance studies.3 In the related market microstructure literature, Madhavan and 
Smidt (1991) apply the Kalman filter algorithm to develop a model of intra-day price 
2The Kalman filter is described in Kalman (1960) and Anderson and Moore (1979). Harvey 
(1989) and Hamilton (1994) provide nice treatment in the context of econometrics and time series 
analysis. 
3See, for example, Fama and Gibbons (1982) on the study of the relationship between expected 
real rates of return and expected inflation, Hsieh and Kulatilaka (1982) on the modeling of primary 
metals markets, and Wolff (1987)'s work on the foreign exchange behavior. 
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movements. In their model, a representative market maker uses Bayes rule to update 
his belief. The purpose of their paper is to find an econometric model to test the 
empirical data. Our model has a simpler construction compared to theirs. More 
recently, Koopman and Lai (1999) use the Kalman filter to smooth the estimates of 
the fundamental prices and spreads of three liquid stocks on London Stock Exchange. 
As in many market microstructure models, order flows play an important role in 
this model. 4 All information is aggregated in the order flow and the market maker 
processes this information through the Kalman filter so that he learns the non-public 
information. In particular, the order flow in this model conveys two pieces of infor-
mation. First, the net order flow is the net change in the market maker's inventory 
levels; and second, the part of informed trading in overall order flow provides a noisy 
signal of the true prices. 
In this chapter, we first find that the optimal bid and ask prices are linear functions 
of the beginning inventory of each period. The parameters of the price functions are 
themselves functions of known variables generated by the Kalman filter algorithm. Of 
particular importance is that some parameters contain the market maker's estimation 
variance from his noisy order flow observations. We then define the pricing bias (PB) 
as the difference between the market maker's mid-quote and his prior estimate of the 
4In inventory models, order flow alters equilibrium risk premia (Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll 
(1981)). In asymmetric information models, order flow observation provides information about 
payoffs (Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985)). In foreign exchange market, order flow also 
conveys information of short term variation of exchange rates. Evans and Lyons (2002) find that 
macroeconomic variables and order flow together significantly improve the explaining power. 
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true price. The PB measures the deviation of the quotes from the markpt maker~s 
prior belief of the price. We find that the PB is linearly related to the beginning 
inventory of each period and is negatively correlated with the market maker's relative 
risk aversion parameter. Intuitively the more risk averse the market maker is, the 
stronger mean reverting effects of the inventory on positioning the quotes are. \ re 
also consider a special case of the PB when the total spread is constant. 
In the numerical work that follows, we simulate a sample price process together 
with the optimal bid and ask prices for 100 time steps. \Ve are interested in the 
market making profitability in our model. We calculate the summary statistics of 
the cumulative profits of the market making over a number of time periods. In 
general, our model gives reasonably good numerical results using properly chosen 
model parameters and initial values. 
We then consider the extension of the monopolistic model to the continuous time. 
We summarize the model into a system of three state variables, namely, the market 
maker's estimation error, the change in the market maker's inventory, and the change 
in the market maker's cumulative profit. We show that the system has nice economic 
interpretations and provides further insights into the model. Finally, we discuss the 
extension to the competitive market making in which market makers compete for 
order flows. We argue that the equilibrium bid-ask spread is the smallest possible 
one when each market maker has a zero expected utilit~·. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes our basic model of 
market making. Section 3.3 provides the main solutions, followed by numerical results 
in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 extends the model to the continuous time. Section 3.6 
discusses the competitive market making and Section 3.7 concludes this chapter. All 
proofs are presented in Appendix A. 
3.2 The model 
3.2.1 Assumptions 
The market for a risky security operates over an indefinite number of short time 
periods. Prices are set at points in time t, t = 1,2, ... , T. We refer to the time interval 
between time points t and t + 1 as period t. Order flow Qt occurs during period t. 
There are three types of market participants: a risk-averse monopolistic market 
maker, many informed traders and many uninformed, liquidity traders. The market 
maker knows neither whom he is trading with, nor any trader's trading activities. 
The only information that the market maker has is his order book. We assume that 
all orders are market orders and submitted to the market maker so that he has perfect 
knowledge of the order flow information. We do not explicitly characterize the trading 
behavior of informed and uninformed traders. Their existence however gives rise to 
the market maker's noisy order flow observation of the stock's true value, which we 
define as the price at which the expected net order flow is zero. 
The timing of the events and the information structure are as follows. At the 
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beginning of period t, the market maker has a prior belief, denoted as ilt, of the true 
price Pt, based on his information up to and including period t - 1. The noise of 
his belief is St = Vart-I[Pt]. He sets the bid (bt) and ask (at) prices for traders to 
sell and buy securities. Traders submit orders during period t at the bid and ask 
prices and the net order flow observed by the market maker is Qt. With the net order 
flow information, the market maker updates his belief through the Kalman filter and 
obtains a posterior belief PHI with noise St+I at the beginning of next period t + 1. 
The public demand for buying (Q Bt) and selling securities (Q St) are represented 
by the following two equations: 
(3.2.1) 
(3.2.2) 
where a and f3 are positive constants. Note that when at = bt = Pt, E[QB - Qs] = 0, 
i.e., the expected net order flow is zero with cleared demands Qo. The noise of the 
market demands are UB€B and usgs, where UB and Us are the standard deviations of 
the public buy and sell orders, respectively.5 We assume that noise represented by € 
with various subscripts is normal LLd. with zero mean and unit variance. 
There are two themes from the ,market demand functions (3.2.1) and (3.2.2). First, 
the average level of orders depends on the difference between the market maker's bid 
50ne can also think that the demands for order flows come from two sources. The orders sub-
mitted by informed traders are linear in mispricing (Clt - Pt and Pt - bt ). Uninformed traders create 
noise in the order flow (Qo + USES and Qo + uses). 
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(ask) price and the true market price. Second, the market maker sets his bid and ask 
prices using his information set, which includes both his estimate Pt and his beginning 
market maker follows a linear pricing rule according to at(pt, It) = Pt + bat (It) and 
The market demand functions now become: 
(3.2.3) 
(3.2.4) 
From the market maker's viewpoint, the sell orders (l:jSt) he receives increase his 
inventory and buy orders (QBt) reduce it. Given the market demand functions (3.2.3) 
and (3.2.4), the net orders are given by: 
(3.2.5) 
where O'QeQ = O'ses - O'BeB and O'Q is the standard deviation of the net order flow. 
Note that a positive value of Qt indicates more public sell orders than public buy 
orders, which contributes to an increase in the market maker's inventory level (D.I > 
0). The net order flow (Qt) is the only information that the market maker observes 
from the market.7 
6In fact, we will solve a quadratic optimization problem for the market maker and the optimal 
solution is linear. 
7Clearly our model is a batch trading model similar to Kyle (1985), in which informed and 
uninformed orders are lumped together. 
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We note that the buy and sell orders are crossed first before they are submitted 
to the market maker, in a much similar way as in Kyle (1985). So the market maker 
only knows the net order flow information but not the order flow information on each 
side of the market. The simulations in Section 3.4 are consistent since the market 
maker only uses the net order flow information when he updates his beliefs. 
Finally we assume that the true value of the stock follows a simple random walk, 
defined as: 
(3.2.6) 
where a fJ, is the standard deviation of the true price. 
Figure 3.1 shows the assumptions of the market demand functions. E[QB] and 
E[Qs] are the expected public buy and sell demands which intersect at point A, at 
which the market clears at price Pt, with the cleared demand of Qo. The slopes of 
E[QB] and E[Qs] are a and {j, respectively and Pt is the market maker's prior estimate 
of Pt before he observes the order flow during period t. The market maker's bid and 
ask prices are bt and at and E[Qst] and E[QBt] are the corresponding demands for 
public sell and buy orders at time t. Note that in this particular case, E[QBt] exceeds 
E[QsJ We call the difference between at (bt) and Pt as the ask (bid) component 8at 
(8bt ) of the spread. 
It is worth noting that we put the price on the horizonal axis and the quantity on 
the vertical axis in Figure 3.1, different from the conventional way of drawing figures 
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Figure 3.1: Market demand functions: the model of monopolistic market 
making. The expected buy and sell order flows are E[QB] and E[Qs]. The true 
market price is Pt, and Pt is the market maker's prior estimate (somewhere different 
from Pt). Note bt (at) is bid (ask) price quoted by the market maker and Ob
t 
(oaJ is 
the bid (ask) component of the spread. 
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in economics. The reason is the following. In this model, the public demands for , 
orders depend on the prices set by the market maker. 'fraders choose the sizes of 
their buy and sell demands in responds to the perceived difference between the true 
price Pt and market maker's quotes. Figure 3.1 demonstrates this relation. 
3.2.2 The Kalman filter updating 
In this model the market maker updates his estimates of the true value of the stock 
under a Bayesian framework. Given the market maker's prior estimate Pt, he observes 
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the order flow information and updates his belief to PHI. Specifically, this Bayesian 
framework can be summarized in the state-space form of the Kalman filter. The 
Kalman filter extracts the information of the state variables from the noisy observation 
and provides the optimal estimates of the state variables. 
According to Harvey (1989), equation (3.2.5) is the measurement equation and 
equation (3.2.6) is the transition equation of the Kalman filter in our model. The 
transition equation describes how the system evolves over time. Since the state vari-
abIes are not directly observable, the measurement equation provides the link between 
the state variables and the observations. 
Define PHI as the market maker's optimal estimate after observing order flows 
Qt during time period t. Applying the Kalman filter algorithm, the market maker's 
belief is updated through the following equation: 
(3.2.7) 
It follows that with the information from the new net order flow observation Qt, 
the market maker updates his estimate for true price PHI in the next period t + 
1. The noise of the optimal estimation in equation (3.2.7) comes from the order 
flow observation Qt, which contains the noisy signals from traders, and the previous 
estimation variance St. The estimation variance itself is updated through the following 
Riccati equation: 
(3.2.8) 
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One important feature of the Kalman filter algorithm is its convergence to the 
steady state where the estimation variance St becomes time-invariant. From equation 
(3.2.8), the speed of convergence depends on the parameters we choose, in particular, 
{j J.L and {jQ. In the numerical experiments reported in Section 3.4, the Riccati equation 
actually converges to the steady state very quickly, in just a few time steps. 
3.2.3 The market maker's optimization problem 
We consider a myopic market maker who maximizes his expected utility of per period 
profit.8 The market maker's objective function is given by: 
(3.2.9) 
where 7rt is the profit during time period t, defined as: 
(3.2.10) 
Equation (3.2.10) shows that, for each trading period t, the market maker's profit 
comes from two sources: the incremental value of his inventory (lIt) and the cash flow 
('ft ). The incremental value of his inventory is defined as the difference between the 
value of the ending inventory, IHI . PHI, and the value of the beginning inventory, 
It . Pt. The ending inventory (IH1 ) is defined as the sum of the beginning inventory 
It plus the net order flow Ot that the market maker obtains during the period, i.e., 
, 
IHI = It + Ot = It + Alt. The cash flow part is simply obtained from the marker 
8Similar to our model, Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994) and Brown and Jennings (1989) also 
consider a myopic market maker who maximizes per period expected utility. 
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maker's trading activity with the public buy and sell demands, QBt and QSt' evaluated 
at respective ask and bid prices.9 
We assume that the market maker has a negative exponential utility function of 
the form 
where A is his risk aversion parameter. Under the assumption of normality, 7ft is also 
normally distributed so the maximization of the above utility function is equivalent to 
the usual mean-variance optimization problem after some monotonic transformation. 
The objective function, therefore, can be written as: 
(3.2.11) 
Equation (3.2.11) shows that the market maker's objective is to maximize his ex-
pected profit (E[7ft]), taking into account of the risk of obtaining this profit {var[7ftD, 
which is adjusted by his risk aversion parameter A. That is, the market maker maxi-
mizes his risk adjusted expected profit. 
It is worth mentioning that although the market maker could not observe the profit 
1ft directly (since Pt is unobservable), he still has sufficient knowledge to optimize his 
expected utility. It is because that given the negative exponential utility function, all 
9We assume that although the market maker calculates his cash flows on both buy and sell side of 
the market, he chooses to only update his belief from the net order flow. Of course, it will be a nicer 
model if the market maker could update his information on both sides of the market. But in our 
model, we want to have simple and closed-form solutions to the market maker's pricing problem and 
therefore we assume that the market maker only uses the net order flow information in his Kalman 
filter updating. 
-L? 
that matters are basically the mean and the variance of the profit. which are functiolls 
of the market maker's estimates Pt and the estimation variance St. 
3.3 The solutions 
3.3.1 The optimal bid and ask prices 
We first calculate the expectation and the variance of the market maker's profit 7r, 
using equation (3.2.10) and obtain: 
(3.3.1) 
(3.3.2) 
where ilt,2t (6at) 6bt) Pt) are time varying functions of 6at) 6btl Pt and other parameters 
such as a, {3 and the state variable It. 
Equation (3.3.1) has a straightforward economic interpretation. It shows that the 
expected per period profit is reduced (-(a + (3)St) by the market maker's prior esti-
mation variance St, further adjusted by a scalar (a + (3). This is, in fact, the amount 
of money that the market maker loses due to the presence of market asymmetric 
information. Notice that the noise is St, the square of the standard deviation of prior 
estimation error. It follows that the market maker has enormous incentive to process 
information correctly to reduce this estimation error. If the market maker uses some 
non-optimal lllcthods to process information, or if he inrorrectl~' knO\\'s the St, the 
market making business would be much less profitable. Under the assumptions of 
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this model, the Kalman filter is the optimal method for the market maker to process 
his information. 
We substitute equations (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) back into the market maker's opt i-
mization equation (3.2.11). We then have a quadratic optimization problem with 
8at and 8bt as decision variables. The optimal values of 8at and 8bt are obtained by 
taking the first order conditions. We then have a system of linear equations with un-
known variables 8at and 8bt , which can be solved through substitution. The following 
proposition gives the optimal bid and ask prices. 
Proposition 3.1. The optimal bid and ask prices that a monopolistic market maker 
sets at time t are given by: 
at = fit + AltQO - A2Jt 
bt = fit - B1tQo - B2Jt 
(3.3.3) 
(3.3.4) 
where A 1t ,2t and B lt ,2t are strictly positive time varying functions obtained from the 
Kalman filter and they depend on the model parameters and in particular, the prior 
estimation variance St. 
Proposition 3.1 shows that the optimal bid and ask prices depend on the market 
maker's prior estimate fit and the amount of the cleared demand, Qo, which is the 
expected order flow when the bid and ask prices equal to Pt. More importantly, 
the prices explicitly depend on the beginning inventory level It of the time period 
t. The bid and ask prices are both monotonically decreasing functions of It. This 
relation agrees with one's intuition. For example, if the market maker has a higher 
beginning inventory holding It, he would like to sell more of his inventory and buy 
fewer securities. According to Proposition 3.1, the market maker lowers both bid and 
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ask prices by lowing the position of his spread. The traders observe more favorable 
price for buying securities and less favorable price for selling securities. Through this, 
the market maker is able to get rid of his excessive inventories. 
It is common in the inventory models of the market microstructure literature that 
bid and ask prices explicitly depend on the inventory levels. Inventory is generally 
mean reverting, reflecting the fact that the market maker wishes to maintain it at 
some preferred level. It can also be interpreted as that the market maker hedges his 
inventory through setting appropriate bid and ask prices. What is special of this 
model is that our optimal bid and ask prices depend on two things explicitly. First, 
as in most inventory models, they depend on the market maker's inventory. Second, 
as a result of the market maker's learning of the true prices, the bid and ask prices 
depend on his prior estimation variance (St). 
As a special case of Proposition 3.1, if the market maker is risk neutral, I.e., 
he is only concerned about the expected profit, then his risk aversion parameter, 
A, becomes zero. Setting A = 0 in equations (3.3.3) and (3.3.4), we have at = ~ 
and bt = ~. In this case, the bid and ask prices are constant and independent of 
inventory fluctuations. Risk neutrality can be found in most asymmetric information 
models where the inventory problem is generally ignored. However, by considering 
the inventory; a very important source of risk for the market maker, our model gives 
a richer characterization of his pricing strategy. 
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The bid-ask spread is given by the following Corollary 3.2. 
Corollary 3.2. The spread that the market maker sets at time t is given by: 
f(St)Qo + )..2O'~(/3O'~ - o:O'~)It 
where f (St) is a strictly positive time varying function obtained from the Kalman filter 
and depends on the model parameters and in particular the prior estimation variance, 
St. 
As we expect, the spread is related to St and It. Furthermore, the total spread 
is a monotonic function of It given the parameters of the model. However, it is not 
obvious whether it is a monotonically increasing or decreasing function and it depends 
on the parameter values. When we have QO'~ = /3O'~, the total spread is independent 
of the inventory levels. 
3.3.2 The market maker's pricing bias 
We define the market maker's pricing bias (PB) as the difference between the quoted 
mid-price, ~(at + bt ), and his prior estimate Pt of the true value of the stock (Pt). To 
focus on the economic intuition, we make further assumptions that the buy and sell 
demands are perfectly symmetric, i.e., Q = /3, O'~ = O'~ and EB = ES. Proposition 3.3 
summaries the market maker's pricing bias. 
Proposition 3.3. When the buy and sell orders are perfectly symmetric, we denote 
Q = /3 = 8, O'~ = O'~ = 0'2 and EB = ES. The market maker's pricing bias is given by: 
(3.3.5) 
where f ()..) is a strictly positive and monotonically decreasing function in )... 
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The pricing bias basically measures the deviation of the mid-quote from the market 
maker's prior estimate of the true price. The market maker concerns the PB because 
it tells the position of his quotes relative to his prior belief. A big PB indicates that 
either there is a high concentration of orders on one side of the market, or there is 
a big movement in the true market price. In both cases, the market maker's prior 
estimates might be so wrong. 
Equation (3.3.5) shows that this pricing bias depends on the market maker's 
inventory positions through a function of A. The higher the inventory level, the 
bigger the absolute value of the bias is and the higher incentive that market maker 
has to revise his price to restore his inventory to the desired level. Furthermore, this 
bias is related to the market maker's risk preference A. When the market maker is 
risk neutral (A = 0) and does not care about the risk of his inventory, he has no 
inventive to deviate his price from his prior estimate fit so the pricing bias is zero. 
For a risk averse market maker, f(A) is a monotonically decreasing function in A. As 
the market maker becomes more risk averse with increasing A, he puts more bias on 
positioning his quotes and has stronger incentive to revise his quotes to restore his 
inventory to the preferred position. 
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3.3.3 The market maker's prIcIng bias when the spread is 
constant 
N ow let's look at a special case of the pricing bias when the spread is constallt. 
Constant spreads have been frequently observed in practice. Although the market 
maker could adjust bid and ask prices continuously, he often tends to quote a relati\"el)" 
stable or even constant spread. There are at least two reasons for this. First, it is 
the direct result of the competition among market makers. Competition reduct's the 
spread to a particular level that every market maker has to follow. Second, h)" quoting 
a constant spread, the market maker is able to hide certain information since traders 
could infer the information when they observe the changing spread sizes. For example, 
the widening (narrowing) of spreads probably means high (low) market demands for 
the security. By quoting a relatively constant spread, the market maker does not 
reveal such information to traders and other competing market makers. 
We assume that the constant spread is exogenously given as 2m where m is a 
positive real number. The bid and ask prices therefore have the relation of at - bt = 
2m. The mid-price is given by at -m or bt+m. Following the same line of calculation, 
we obtain the market maker's PB as stated in the following Corollary 3.4. 
Corollary 3.4. Given a constant spread of 2m, the market maker's pricing bias is 
given by the following expression: 
(3.3.6) 
where 1\1, and Nt are the time-varying functions of model parameters and the prior 
estimation varianc('. S,. /l.loreou(T. lUt is strictly posztll'f'. 
When a constant spread is used by all market makers, the only important thing 
for individual market maker is how to position his quotes. The P B' in Corollan' :3.4 
gives such a position. Again, the P B' is a monotonically decreasing function of It, as 
is in the more general case described in Proposition 3.3. It is also linearly related to 
m, the half spread. 
The equation (3.3.6) of P B' is clearly mean reverting and tends to reduce the 
inventory position given different beginning inventory levels. For example, a high 
beginning inventory tends to decrease the market maker's P B' (note the negative 
sign) by lowering the position of the whole spread. As a result. the market maker 
encourages traders to buy securities and discourages them from selling securities. In 
this way, the market maker is able to reduce his inventory. 
3.4 Numerical experiments 
3.4.1 Parameter values 
There are seven parameters and four initial values in this model. The seven param-
eters are Q r., (3 \ IT IT and IT The cour initial values are Po, P~o, Io,and So· 0, LX , ,/\ , v p" v S vB· l' 
Let's discuss their values separately. 
We first consider the seven parameters in the model. Without loss of generality. 
we assume ex = (3 = 1. We assume Qo = 4, so that the bid and ask spread is around 
1 to 2. \Ve choose (}B = (}S = 2.5, and (}p, = 0.03. The reason for choosing this 
particular value for () p, is the following. \ Yr would like to treat each time step in our 
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Table 3.1: Parameter and initial values used in the simulation. This table 
reports the parameter and initial values used in the simulation. Qo is the expected 
order flow when at = bt = Pt. Q and f3 are positive constants in the public demand 
functions (3.2.1) and (3.2.2). A is the market maker's risk aversion parameter. (jJ.L 
is the standard deviation of the true price process. (j Band (j s are the standard 
deviations of public buy and sell demands. Po is the initial price and Po is the market 
maker's initial estimate of Po. 10 is the initial inventory and So is the market maker's 
initial estimation variance. 
Qo a f3 Po A Po 10 So 
4 1 1 0.5 0.03 2.5 2.5 100 100 o steady state value 
simulation as one trading day. Since the standard deviation of a typical stock price is 
about 40% per year, the corresponding daily standard deviation is about ~ if the 
number of trading days per year is 252. This makes the daily standard deviation of 
the stock price process, (J' J.L' of about 0.03. We assume the risk aversion parameter A 
equals 0.5. 
For the four initial values, we assume that the true value of the stock starts from 
100 at time 0 (Po = 100) and the market maker has zero initial inventory (Io = 0). 
At the beginning of the first period, the market maker's estimate (Po) of the stock's 
true value Po is normally distributed with mean Po = Po = 100 and some noise So· 
We use the steady state estimation variance for this So. As we state in Section 3.2.2, 
the Kalman filter in our model converges to the steady state fairly quickly. 
Table 3.1 summaries the parameter and initial values that we use in the numerical 
experiments. 
Figure 3.2: Simulated prices and quotes The figure shows one simulation of the 
processes of the true prices and the bid/ask prices for 100 time periods. The olid 
line is the true price process Pt and the dashed line is the market maker· e timate 
Pt· Two boundary dotted lines are the bid (bt ) and ask (at) prices set by the market 
maker. 
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3.4.2 Simulated prices and quotes 
Figure 3.2 shows one simulation of the processes of the true price and bid and ask 
prices for 100 time steps (t = 100). 
Overall the model gives reasonable bid and ask prices using the parameters and 
initial values discussed in Section 3.4.1. The solid line is the true price process Pt. It 
starts from 100 with the highest value at about 104 and the lowest value at about 96. 
The dashed line is the market maker)s estimates Pt· Except at t = 0 at which Pi = Pt 
by as umption) the estimates Pt generally lack the true price Pt by one time tep. Thi 
agree with one)s intuition becau e the market maker can only update hi e timate 
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after observing Qt during time period t, and the new information is only reflected 
in the market maker's next estimate PHI. The effect of this timing difference is not 
very damaging as long as the true price moves in the same direction. But when there 
is a sharp turn of the direction, the market maker's estimate could be very wrong, 
resulting in bid and ask prices not containing the true price and in that case, the 
market maker would lose money to informed traders. The two boundary dotted lines 
are the market maker's bid and ask prices. In this particular simulation, true price 
process generally ru'ns within the bid and ask bounds so overall the market maker 
makes profits. Occasionally the prices fluctuate outside the bid-ask bounds, as during 
the time periods 68 to 73. These are the situations when the market maker is likely 
to lose to informed traders. 
3.4.3 The effect of risk aversion on the pricing bias 
In Proposition 3.3, we state that under perfect symmetry, the market maker's pricing 
bias (PB), which is the difference between his mid-quote and the prior estimate Pt, is 
a linear function of the beginning inventory It of period t. The coefficient f (A) is a 
monotonically decreasing function of the market maker's risk aversion parameter 'x. 
Figure 3.3 shows this function f(,X) for different values of ,x ranging between 0.001 
and 1, with each increment being O.OOl. 
At least two points are clearly shown from Figure 3.3. First, the function f(,X) is 
indeed a monotonically decreasing function of 'x. With increasing ,x, f(,X) decreases 
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Figure 3.3: The effect of risk aversion on the pricing bias The figure shows the 
coefficient of inventory f(A) for different A values. As predicted in Proposition 3.3, 
f(A) is a monotonically decreasing function in A and it starts from the origin. 
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ata decreasing rate. Second, the function f(A) starts from the origin: when A is 
zero, f(A) equals zero. Since our model considers the risk of holding inventory, the 
risk aversion parameter A directly affects the market maker's pricing bias. If the risk 
aversion parameter is zero, the inventory risk is not reflected in the model. 
3.4.4 The market maker's cumulative profit 
Here we consider the market maker's cumulative profits over time since they repre-
sent the market maker's profitability in our model. We do the calculation in three 
steps. First, for each simulation of the true price and the bid/ask price processes, 
we calculate the cumulative profits for 25 and 100 periods. Second, we repeat this 
calculation for 1000 simulations. We then have 1000 cumulative profits for 25 time 
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periods and for 100 time periods, respectively. To obtain the statistical properties, 
we calculate the mean and the standard deviation of these two groups of cumula-
tive profits. Finally, to show the importance of the risk aversion parameter A in our 
model, we repeat the first two steps for different values of A ranging from 0.001 to 
0.9. We then plot these means against standard deviations of the cumulative profits 
for different values of A. 
We expect two properties from the figure. First, we expect that, for each A, the 
means of the cumulative profits of 100 time steps are about the 4 times of those of 
25 time steps. Similarly, the standard deviations of the cumulative profits of 100 
time steps are about the twice of those of 25 time steps. Second, we expect that, 
for respective 25 and 100 time steps, the means and standard deviations are both 
monotonically decreasing in the risk aversion parameter A. These two properties are 
clearly shown in Figure 3.4. Note also that the smaller dashed line is the normalized 
mean and standard deviation of 100 time periods when we take the ~ of the mean and 
the ~ of the standard deviation of the cumulative profits of 100 periods. Obviously 
the smaller dashed line and the solid line (for 25 periods) are independent of but close 
to each other. 
We can also observe from Figure 3.4 that the market maker in our model generally 
makes profits over both 25 and 100 time steps. For 25 time steps, the market maker's 
cumulative profits range between 100 and 200, and the standard deviations range 
·")--1 
Figure 3.4: Means and standard deviations of the cumulative profits of 25 
and 100 time steps for different .\ over 1000 simulations. Both means and 
standard deviations are decreasing in.\. The solid (dashed) line is for the means 
and the standard deviations of 25 (100) time steps. The smaller dashed line is the 
normalized mean and standard deviation of 100 time steps. 
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between 15 and 45. For 100 time steps, his cumulative profits range between 300 
and 750, and the standard deviations range between 35 and 80. Of course, these 
particular numbers depend on the parameter and initial values we choose. But the 
clear property that both means and standard deviations decrease with increasing .\ is 
exactly as we have expected. This in fact explains how much profits that the market 
maker prepares to give up in order to control his acceptable level of risk. For example. 
at high level of risk aversion, the market maker is willing to accept a dramatically 
reduced level of expected profits in an effort to achieve a lower level of the standard 
deviation of the exppcted profits. 
.J.) 
3.5 The continuous time extension of the monop-
olistic model 
In this section, we consider the continuous time extension of the monopolistic model 
of market making that we have analyzed so far. When the time between trading 
intervals becomes very small, our model can be generalized into a s~"stem of three 
state variables, namely, the market maker's estimation error, the change in the market 
maker's inventory, and finally, the change in the market maker's cllmulative profit. 
The system of these three variables provides nice economic intuitions and insights. 
Again, we assume that the demands for buying and selling securities are perfectly 
symmetric. The results of the asymmetric case, although more algebraicall:v compli-
cated, are found to be qualitatively the same as the symmetric case. As in Proposition 
3.3, we assume: 
{3 e 2 2 2 a= = ,aB=aS=a ,EB=ES=E (3.5.1) 
Also, we define it = Pt - Pt. Recall that Pt is the true value of the stock at time 
t, and Pt is the market maker's prior estimate of Pt before observing the new order 
flow during time period t. it therefore measures the the difference between the true 
price and the market maker's estimate of this price. We call it the market maker's 
estimation error. Furthermore, between time t and t - 1, let dlt be the change in the 
market maker's inventory and d7rt be the change in the market maker's cumulative 
profit. 
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The following proposition summarizes the continuous time system of three state 
variables: 
Proposition 3.5. When the buy and sell demands are perfectly symmetric as defined 
by equation (3.5.1), the continuous time system of our monopolistic model of market 
making can be summarized in the following three state variables: 
-Wtftdt + a JLdWt 
-2()(ft + Btlt)dt 
2[At(1 - ()At)Q~ - ()(ft + Btlt?]dt 
+{[l- 2()(ft + Btlt)]aJL + 2Ata}dWt 
(3.5.2) 
(3.5.3) 
(3.5.4) 
where At and B t are non-negative time varying functions generated from the Kalman 
filter and depend on the model parameters and estimation variance St. Furthermore, 
Wt = (28~~~CT2)' and dWt is the standard Brownian motion with unit variance. 
Proposition 3.5 has nice economic interpretations. First, equation (3.5.2) describes 
the evolution of the market maker's pricing error, i.e., the difference between the true 
price and the market maker's estimate of this price. It is clearly a mean reverting 
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with zero mean. As the market maker observes more 
information from order flows, his estimates are more close to the true value and his 
estimation error approaches zero. Note that dft is normally distributed with zero 
mean and variance (T~. 
Equation (3.5.3) describes the evolution of the market maker's inventory positions. 
It is useful to state the following relationship: 
The right hand side of the equation (( ~ (at+bt) -Pt)) is our definition of the pricing bias 
(PB) in equation (3.3.5). Therefore, the market maker's pricing bias directly affects 
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his inventory positions and drives his inventory to its long run mean of zero. Note 
that dlt is a mean reverting process which itself is driven by the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
process of dft. 
The last equation (3.5.4) is more complicated. We can show that the first dt term, 
2At(1 - OAt)Q6dt , is strictly positive. It comes from the steady liquidity trading 
. . 
component or the pure noise trading. It is the positive profit that the market maker 
can make for sure. The second dt term, -20(ft + Bt1t)2dt, can be thought of as 
the market maker's expected loss due to his mis-pricing. Recall that (ft + Btlt ) is 
equivalent to the market maker's pricing bias. This is the part that the market maker 
loses to informed traders because informed traders have better knowledge of the true 
price than he does. Note that the market maker's loss is quadratic in this pricing bias. 
Therefore the market maker has great incentives to estimate the price as accurate as 
possible. The last term is the noise in the market maker's profit. Although the noise 
has a zero expectation, it certainly complicates the market maker's profit estimation. 
In summary, the change in the cumulative profit comprises three parts: a sure profit 
part due to steady liquidity trading, a sure loss part due to the market maker's pricing 
error, and finally the noise due to the random components in the order flows and the 
price process. 
3.6 The extension to competitive market making 
In this section we consider the extension of the original monopolistic market making 
model into the competitive environment in which market makers compete for order 
flows. The examples of the competitive dealership markets include NASDAQ and the 
London Stock Exchange, among many others. Competition can be in the form of real 
quotes competition among market makers. 
In competitive dealership markets, traders transact with dealers who set the best 
prices, and each dealer's pricing problem in principle depends on the actions of every 
other dealers (O'Hara (1995)). Therefore, to solve a general case of competitive 
market making is complicated since each dealer's optimal strategy depends on his 
expectations of other dealers' actions. 
In the early inventory literature, Ho and Stoll (1983) provide a simple one period 
model of competitive market making. They analyze two competing market makers 
each trading two stocks and choosing bid and ask prices to maximize his respective 
expected utility. Ho and Stoll analytically characterize the pricing strategies for each 
market maker under competition. However, their model does not explicitly consider 
.the inventory of the competing market maker, so the strategic component of the 
market makers' price setting strategies is not considered. 
In the asymmetric informat.ion literature, competitive market making equilibrium 
is generally obtained by the market maker's zero expected profit condition under a 
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rational expectations framework (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). The reason for this 
zero-profit condition is that competition and risk neutrality remove all economic rent 
earned by any competitive market maker. If each market maker starts with the same 
prior belief and trading information is common knowledge, all competing market 
makers would quote the same bid and ask prices. 
In our model of monopolistic market making, the spreads result from the market 
maker's market power of observing both the market buy and sell demands. How-
ever, competition among market makers forces the bid-ask spread to be the smallest 
possible since otherwise one market maker could undercut the other market makers' 
quotes to obtain order flows. This will give each market maker the highest trading 
volume. Unlike previous models with a zero expected profit condition for the compet-
itive equilibrium, a market maker in our model is affected by his respective inventory 
risk, adjusted by his risk aversion parameter. Therefore, we require a zero expected 
utility condition as the necessary condition for our competitive equilibrium. 
More formally, the objective function for the market maker i is given by: 
(3.6.1) 
S.t.Zi = E[U(1i";)l = 0 
where b: and a: are the bid and ask prices for market makeri. 10 
lOWe note that the risk aversion of each individual competitive market maker has not been spec-
ified. We would like to treat that the aggregate risk aversion of the multiple competitive market 
makers is the same as the risk aversion of the monopolistic market maker. It is not the case that the 
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This constrained optimization problem can be solved by the Lagrange method. 
By forming the Lagrangian and taking the first order derivatives with respect to a~ 
and b~, we have: 
8a~ (3.6.2) 
which gives a linear relation in a~ and b~. Note also that the constrain 
E[U(irDl = 0 (3.6.3) 
is a quadratic function in a~ and b~.l1 By simultaneously solving equations (3.6.2) 
and (3.6.3), we obtain two pairs of optimal a~ and b~. The optimal spread is given by 
the pair with the smallest difference. 
The following proposition summarizes the competitive bid-ask spread for market 
maker i: 
Proposition 3.6. The competitive bid-ask spread is the solution to the constrained 
optimization problem {3.6.1}, which is obtained by simultaneously solving the equa-
tions {3.6.2} and {3.6.3} and taking the pair of a~ and b~ which gives the smallest 
difference. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Market microstructure has recognized the inventory risk and asymmetric informa-
tion as two important factors affecting a market maker's price setting strategy. In 
each competitive market maker has the same risk aversion as the monopolistic market maker since 
in that case, the overall risk aversion of the market makers would be different. 
llThis is clearly true by observing the equations of the expected profit (equation (3.3.1)) and the 
variance of the profit (equation (3.3.2)) 
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this chapter, we develop and analyze a simple model of market making in which a 
monopolistic market maker considers these two problems simultaneously. 
There are two distinctive features in this model. First, the market maker in this 
model is exposed to the inventory risk. He tries to manage his inventory to an accept-
able level. Second, the market maker is exposed to market asymmetric information. 
Without knowing whom he is trading with, the market maker updates his estimates 
of the stock's true value through his order flow observation. In a Bayesian updating 
framework, our market maker's estimation problem can be summarized in a partic-
ular state-space form called the Kalman filter. The Kalman filter describes how the 
information in the market maker's order flow observation is impounded into his price 
setting process. We contribute to the literature by combining the inventory risk and 
asymmetric information into a simple dynamic setting and analyzing the properties 
under such a setting. 
We analytically characterize the optimal bid and ask prices that the market maker 
sets over time. We also find that the market maker deliberately biases his quotes to 
manage his inventory. Of particular importance is our numerical results of the effects 
of risk aversion on the market making profitability. We show that, with increasing 
risk aversion parameters, both the means and the standard deviations of the market 
maker's expected cumulative profits decrease. Therefore the market maker in our 
model prepares to give up much of his profits to control the risk of his inventory. 
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Inventory is risky and consumes capital. Our model provides a simple way for market 
makers to optimally process information to control inventory. 
The extension of the model to the continuous time provides useful insights. The 
system of three state variables describes the process of how the market maker's esti-
mation error changes his inventory positions and reduces his cumulative profits. In 
particular, the market maker deliberately biases his bid and ask prices to move his 
inventory to the long run mean of zero. His pricing bias also greatly reduces the 
market maker's profitability. The market maker therefore has enormous interests to 
process information correctly, and under the assumptions in this model, the Kalman 
filter provides the optimal method to estimate the true price. 
The Kalman filter in this chapter has a nice structure capable of analyzing more 
complicated questions. Of particular interest is to apply the technique to model 
option market making. Options are closely related securities. In an option market, 
how information is generated and disseminated at different strike levels and how 
market makers manage the inventory of portfolios of different option contracts remain 
important research topics. In the next chapter, we will extend the model to examine 
the market making of multiple stocks. The correlation among stocks would provide 
some useful insights into the market making of the closely related securities such as 
options. 
Chapter 4 
Market making with return 
commonality 
4.1 Introduction 
The traditional focus of the research on market making has been on the liquidity 
provision for an individual security. In practice, however, a market maker hardly 
only makes a market for one security. At NYSE, for example, there are currently 7 
specialist firms that make markets for approximately 2672 listed companies. l It is 
therefore of interest to examine the implications of the market making of multiple 
stocks on the market maker's price setting strategies and its impact on order flows. 
In this chapter, we consider a monopolistic stock market maker who sets optimal bid 
and ask prices for multiple stocks while these stocks' price processes have the known 
variance-covariance structure. We argue that the market maker's knowledge of the 
stocks' return structure improves his estimation of the unknown price process for each 
IThe data is as the end of December 31. 2005 (http://www.nyse.com/about). 
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stock and his overall market making profitability. 
Admati (1985) is an early analysis of an equilibrium market with multiple risky 
securities. In her model, the information possessed by heterogeneous agents is par-
tially revealed by the equilibrium prices. The rich correlation structures of payoffs, 
supplies and the error terms in each information signal give various interactions be-
tween assets and consequently create phenomena that are impossible in models with 
a single risky asset. 
Other early theoretical literature on the market making of multiple stocks in-
cludes Subrahmanyam (1991), Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) and Caballe and Krish-
nan (1994). These models extend the ideas of Kyle (1984 and 1985) and Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988) to analyze the strategic trading behavior of informed or uninformed 
traders. Subrahmanyam (1991) observes that information asymmetry is mainly a 
problem of an individual stock and hence provides a rational for trading a stock in-
dex. Both Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) argue that the 
welfare of uninformed traders improves when they trade the composite of securities 
since their trading losses are reduced. 
Examining the market making of multiple stocks, Caballe and Krishnan (1994) 
suggest that the specialist learns from order flows in other stocks, and in particu-
lar, the incremental explanatory power of the aggregate order flow affects his price 
setting strategy. Under their setting, a market maker can potentially learn about 
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every security from each order flow information given correlated fundamentals. As 
an example, if a market maker can observe the order flow of a market index he can , 
infer the informativeness of the order flows of index constituent stocks. 
In this chapter, we consider how a monopolistic market maker sets prices for 
multiple securities. The market maker faces two risks. The first risk comes from the 
inventories of stocks that he makes the market for. His price setting strategies affect 
the market demands and hence the order imbalance of every stock, contributing 
to his inventory management problem. The market maker also faces the risk of 
trading with informed traders. He does not know the true price process for each stock 
but is assumed to know the variance-covariance structure of these stocks' returns.2 
His knowledge of the stocks' return covariance structure affects the order flow of 
all stocks through his optimal price setting strategy. Compared to only using the 
individual order flow information to update his estimation of the true value of that 
stock, when the market maker considers the correlated order flow information in his 
price estimation, he obtains better estimates for every stock. The improved estimates 
help to mitigate the problem of information asymmetry. 
One interesting phenomena arising from the model is that the market maker's 
2This assumption is not unrealistic in practice. For example, a specialist firm often employs a 
number of specialists each making a market for a stock. The specialists know the historical return 
covariance of the stocks that the firm makes markets for, but each specialist does not know the true 
value of the stock allocated to him. We will show that when the specialists consider the correlated 
order flow information of every stock from their knowledge of the return covariance structure of 
these stocks, the specialist firm improve its overall market making profitability. 
66 
knowledge of the return covariance structure gives rise to liquidity commonality of 
stocks' order flows. Liquidity commonality is important because systematic liquidity 
is most likely a priced source of risk (Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)). This topic has been stud-
ied extensively in recent years. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) first use 
the term commonality in describing the common underlying determinants of liquid-
ity, trading costs, and other individual microstructure phenomena. They find that 
individual liquidity co-moves with market liquidity, and that liquidity commonal-
ity remains significant even after controlling for individual liquidity determinants. 
Using a Principle Component Analysis approach, Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) docu-
ment the existence of a single common liquidity factor of Dow 30 stocks, though the 
commonality is not very strong. Coughenour and Saad (2004) analyze the cause of 
liquidity commonality and argue from a liquidity supply perspective that common 
market makers are one reason for liquidity commonality. For markets without any 
designated liquidity suppliers, Brockman and Chung (2002) and Bauer (2004) find 
that liquidity commonality also exists in the purely order-driven settings of the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong and the Swiss Stock Exchange respectively. Domowitz, Han-
sch and Wang (2005) further examine the linkage between liquidity commonality that 
is due to cross-sectional correlation in order types (market and limit orders), and re-
turn commonality that is caused by correlation in order flows (order direction and 
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size). These empirical works demonstrate the increasing importance of understanding 
common liquidity effects in financial markets. 
We set up our model in a Kalman filter updating framework. The state vector 
is the stocks' unknown price processes which evolve linearly. The market maker can 
only observe the order flows of all stocks and use this noisy observation to estimate 
the true price processes. By setting the optimal bid and ask prices for each stock, 
the risk averse market maker maximizes his expected profit per time period, subject 
to the risk of the profit. We obtain a closed form solution of the optimal prices that 
the market maker sets. Two factors affect these prices in particular: the covariance 
structure of the stocks' returns, and the market maker's inventory positions. Since 
inventory carries risk, the market maker generally keeps minimum inventory levels of 
all stocks. 
With the help of the analytical solution, we ask the question: how much does 
the market maker benefit from his knowledge of the return covariance structure? We 
analyze two different cases. In the first case, the make maker treats the individual 
stock's order flow information on its own and does not consider the correlation in 
order flow information when he updates his beliefs of the true price processes of every 
stock. In the second case, the market maker learns from order flows in other stocks 
and updates his estimates using the order flow information of all stocks together. 
We simulate the market maker's estimated price processes under these two cases 
" 
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and calculate his cumulative profits over some time periods in each case. Numerical 
results show that the market maker obtains higher expected cumulative profits and 
lower standard deviations of profits in the second case compared to those in the first 
case. These results demonstrate the benefit of integrating order flow information of 
all stocks in price estimations. 
The model in this chapter serves as a first step of our study on option market 
making. An option market maker makes markets for a number of option contracts, in 
a much similar way as market making multiple stocks. Furthermore, our assumption 
of the stocks' return covariance structure in this chapter is intended to represent 
the correlation in volatilities. It is a common view that an option is a claim on its 
underlying asset and an option market maker uses the underlying market to hedge 
his risk exposure. In fact, at least from our conversation with some practitioners, in 
market making options, where the underlying or its futures is liquid, option market 
makers consider themselves to be trading in implied volatilities on different strike 
prices of options, rather than the underlying, which is hedged virtually automatically. 
Our model therefore provides insights into the market making of the parameterized 
family of substitutable securities such as options. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe our model of the 
market making of multiple stocks. In Section 4.3 we show numerically the benefits of 
taking the return covariance into price estimation. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 The model 
4.2.1 Assumptions 
We follow the similar model settings as in Chapter 3 except that we introduce stocks 
with the known covariance structure.3 We analyze the general case with n stocks and 
obtain the optimal bid and ask prices that the market maker sets. 
We consider a risk-averse, monopolistic market maker who is trading with both 
informed and uninformed traders. The market maker does not know whom he is 
trading with, nor the traders' trading activities. The only information he has is from 
his order book, and in this case, the order flow information of all stocks. We assume 
that all orders are submitted to him so that he has the perfect knowledge of all order 
flow information. 
The market demands for buying and selling n stocks, <iB and <is, respectively, are 
(n x 1) vectors and given by: 
where a and {3 are positive definite (n x n) diagonal matrices. The market maker 
sets the bid (bt ) and ask (at) prices (both n x 1 vectors) for n stocks according 
to at = Pt + dat and b t = Pt - dbt· dat and dbt are (n x 1) vectors of ask and 
3To avoid duplications, we briefly discuss the model assumptions in this section. Most assum~ 
tions are generally the multivariate extensions of the assumptions of the single stock market making 
model in Chapter 3. 
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bid components of the spreads and Pt is the market maker's prior estimate at the 
beginning of time period t. 
Clearly the market demands depend on the difference between the prices quoted 
by the market maker and the unobservable true price vector Pt, which we define as 
the price at which E[qB - qs] = 0 if at = b t = Pt. Note that qo is a (n x 1) vector 
, , 
of the expected order flows when at = b t = Pt; also ~B~~ and ~s~~ give (n x n) 
covariance matrices of the public buy and sell order flows. We assume that €B and €s 
are (n xl) normally distributed vectors with zero mean vectors and identity variance 
matrices. 
Given the equations (4.2.1) and (4.2.2), the pet orders from the market maker's 
viewpoint are given by: 
(4.2.3) 
where ~q€q = ~S€s - ~B€B and ~q~~ is a (n x n) covariance matrix of the net 
order flows. Likewise, we assume €q is a (n xl) normally distributed noise vector 
with a zero mean vector and an identity covariance matrix. 
We assume that the true price processes of n stocks are given by: 
Pt = Pt-l + C,." (4.2.4) 
where CC
' 
= V is and V is a (n x n) positive definite covariance matrix of n stocks. ,." 
is the standard system noise, normally distributed with zero mean vector and identity 
covariance matrix. 
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The entry on the ith row and the J·th column of matrix V v·· is gIven by 
, t,J' 
Vi,j = a8i ,j + be1i- jl where 8i ,j is the Kronecker delta (8i ,j = 1 for i = j, else 0), and 
a, band e are positive constants. More specifically, the covariance matrix V is given 
a+b be be2 ben - 2 ben - l 
be a+b be ben - 3 ben - 2 
be2 be 
V= 
a+b ben - 4 ben - 3 
ben - 2 ben - 3 ben - 4 a+b be 
ben - l ben - 2 ben - 3 be a+b 
It is worth noting that the assumption of the structure of V is intended to rep-
resent the correlation in volatilities. It is known that the correlation of the implied 
volatilities between options with different strikes is related to the difference between 
4In Appendix B, we show how to simulate random variables that has a covariance in the form of 
matrix V. The assumption of the structure of matrix V is intended as appropriate for options where 
the correlation between option i and j depends on Ii - jl. For equities, we could use the Sharpe 
diagonal model (or single index model) where matrix V is generated by 
{31 a 2 1 0 0 
0 '2 0 
V=a2 [ {31 {3N ] + 
a2 
m 
{3N 0 0 a'jy 
where a~ is the market variance, a? , ... ,a'jy are residual variances, and {31. ... , {3N are market factor 
loadings. In this case, matrix C can be generated from the following N x (N + 1) matrix: 
Our results are qualitative the same given this alternative assumption of V. 
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their exercise prices. This correlation is captured by the assumption of L'I,j, where 
the relation between option i and j is related to eli - jl . \Vhen e = 1, V breaks dowll 
to the correlation structure in a Sharpe model where t he covariance among stocks is 
a constant b. 
4.2.2 The Kalman filter updating 
We set up our model under the standard Kalman filter framework. Following Harvey 
(1989), equation (4.2.4) is our stochastic system's transition equation which describes 
how the state vector (Pt) evolves. Equation (4.2.3) shows how the state vector is 
observed with noise and is our measurement equation. Applying the Kalman filter 
algorithm, we obtain the following equation that describes how the market maker 
updates his estimates (Pt) of the true price vector (Pt): 
where ~t is the prior estimation variance at the beginning of time t and is updated 
through the following Riccati equation: 
Note that in equation (4.2.5), the market maker's next period price estimates, 1>1+1, 
illclude his noisy order flow observation Qt. He puts a weight (given b:v ~t(a+.B)'[(a+ 
.B)~f(a+.B)'+~q~q']-l, denoted as WI) on this observation in updating his belief of 
the true price PI' This weight WI essentially involves the market maker's ('stimat ion 
\'nliance ~t, which itself evolves under equation (-:1.2.6) through time. EX<1l11ining 
equation (4.2.6) shows that the return covariance matrix V plays an important role 
in updating the precision of the market maker's forecast of Pt. 
Since the return covariance matrix V affects the market maker's estimate Pt 
through ~h V also affects the market order flows Cit (equation (-:1.2.3)), i.e., the 
net order flows exhibit some common effects due to the structure of V. It is therefore 
important for the market maker to recognize the correlation among the order flows 
of all stocks. If he considers this correlated order flow information, his price estima-
tion will be more accurate than if he only uses individual order flow information in 
estimating the prices of the specific stock. 
We make further assumptions here to simplify the calculation. We assume that 
over the time we use the steady state estimation variance instead of the time-varying 
~t since the Kalman filter converges 'to the steady state quite quickly. Denote the 
steady state estimation variance as ~ with ~ = ~t = ~t+l' ~ is obtained by solving 
the Riccati equation (4.2.6) and is the solution of the following equation: 
(4.2.7) 
The Kalman filter updating equation can now be written as: 
(-:1.2.8) 
7--1 
Furthermore, we can write the true price vector Pt as 
(--1.2.9) 
where e is a (n xl) vector, normally distributed with a zero mean vector and an 
identity covariance matrix and M t is a (n x n) matrix that summarizes the estimation 
error of Pt. It can be shown that MtM~ = ~t. Given the steady state ~. we have 
MM' =~. Equation (4.2.9) will be useful in the market maker's optimization 
problem in the next section. 
4.2.3 The market maker's optimization problem 
The market maker is assumed to set his optimal bid and ask prices to maximize his 
expected utility of per period profit. His objective function is given by: 
max E [U ( 7r t) 1 
at,bt 
where 7rt is his profit at time t and given by 
(4.2.10) 
Equation (·1.2.10) is our definition of the market maker's profit at time t. His 
profit comes from two sources: the incremental value of his inventory (lit) and the 
cash flow (1ft ). The end of the period inventory (It+l) is the sum of the beginning 
inventory (It) plus the net order flow that the market maker obtains during the period 
(Q,). The incremental value of t he inventory is defined as the difference between the 
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value of the end of the period inventory (P~+l . It+l), and the value of the inventory 
at the beginning of the period (p~ . It). The cash flow is simply obtained from the 
marker maker's trading activities with the public buy and sell demands, qB and qs, 
evaluated at respective ask and bid prices. 
We assume that the market maker has a CARA utility function with risk aversion 
. . 
parameter A. Since 7rt is multivariate normal, the objective function is equivalent to: 
(4.2.11) 
That is, the market maker's objective is to maximize his expected profit (E[7rt]), 
taking into account of the risk of obtaining this profit (var[7rt]) , which is evaluated 
according to his risk aversion parameter A. 
Note that given unobservable Pt, the market maker can not directly observe his 
profit from equation (4.2.10). He however is still able to maximize the profit 7rt since 
the profit is normally distributed and given his CARA utility function, he only needs 
to compute the mean and the variance of the profit, which the market maker has 
sufficient knowledge to calculate. 
4.2.4 The results 
Our main result is summarized in the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.1. The market maker's optimal bid (bt) and ask (at) prices for multiple 
stocks with known covariance structure are given by: 
bt = Pt - dbt 
at = Pt + dat 
16 
where Pt is the market maker's estimate of the unknown true price Pt at the beginning 
of time period t. Let x = [t5at t5bl J' and it is given by 
(-1.2.12) 
where A, E, F, J, and b are vectors and matrices obtained from the Kalman filter 
and they depend on the parameters of the model and in particular, the retll rn co-
variance matrix V. Specifically, we have b = [Qo Qo J', J = [ - ~a _ ~f3 ], 
E = [ -";~ ], 
_ [ a'MM' a -a'MM' j3 ] 
A - _ j3'MM' a j3'MM' j3 , 
and 
F = [ a'Va +, ~B~'a -a'V j3 ] 
-j3 Va j3'Vj3 + ~s~s . 
Theorem 4.1 gives the optimal bid and ask prices that the market maker sets at 
each time t. The return covariance matrix V of the system transition equation (4.2.4) 
gives the market maker extra information, which is embedded in the Kalman filter 
updating equation from Pt to Pt+l and in the steady state estimation variance ~. 
Matrix V affects the prices directly through matrices E and F. It also affects the 
market maker's estimation error M, which enters into the pricing strategy through 
matrix A. Note that A is time invariant under the steady state~. In fact, under 
the steady state, the optimal prices at and h t only change with the market maker's 
estimated prices Pt and his inventory It· 
The market maker's optimal bid and ask prices are linear in his beginning inven-
tory le,'cl It. Since the inventory carries risk, the risk averse market maker in this 
I I 
model tries to keep minimum levels of inventory positions. Consistent \\'ith the lit-
erature on inventory models, he influences the market demands by adjusting his bid 
and ask prices, 
4.3 The benefit of knowing return covariance 
We are interested in how much the market maker can benefit from considering the 
correlated order flow information when he updates his estimates of the unknown price 
processes for all stocks. In this section, we show numerically how the market maker's 
knowledge of return covariance improves his overall market making profitability. 
4.3.1 Parameter values and simulation design 
We follow the similar assumptions of parameter values as in Chapter 3 except now 
these parameters are vectors and matrices. 5 First we assume the number of stocks 
that the market maker makes markets for is n, Let qo be a (n xl) vector of 4's so 
that the bid-ask spread for each stock is around 1 to 2. a and {3 are (n x n) identity 
matrices, and :EB and :Es are also (n x n) diagonal matrices with diagonal entries of 
2.5. 
For all stocks, the initial values and the market maker's initial estimates of the 
true prices are assumed to be the same and equal to 100's, so Po and Po are both 
(n x 1) vectors of 100's. \Ve assume that the market maker does not have an:v initial 
5The assumptions of parameter values here are intended to be consistent with those in the single 
stuck market making model in Chapter 3. 
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inventories for all stocks, so 10 is a (n x 1) vector of D's. 
The variance of the market maker's forecast, :Et , converges to the steady state 
quite quickly, only after a few time steps. So we use the steady state :E for all 
calculations. The matrix C in equation (4.2.4) is calculated from our assumption of 
the return covariance matrix V. Appendix B describes a method to simulate matrix 
V. 
To study the effects of the market maker's knowledge of the return covariance 
structure on his market making profitability, we perform the calculation under two 
different cases. In Case 1, although the market maker observes the order flows of all 
stocks, he does not update his estimates using the correlated order flow information. 
He simply treats the order flow information of each individual stock on its own and 
does not consider any correlation among the order flows of different stocks. In this 
case, the covariance structure of V in the Kalman filter updating equation (4.2.8) and 
Riccati equation (4.2.6) is diagonal. In Case 2, the market maker recognizes that, for 
a specific stock, the order flow information of other stocks provides useful information 
for him to update his estimates of the value of that stock. In this case, the return 
covariance matrix V has a full structure as we have defined and the market maker 
uses this matrix V in his price estimation. 
We note that the market maker in this model also has a problem of portfolio 
maximization in which the structure of V is an important factor. When we do the 
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comparison, however, we are mostly interested in how the structure of V affects the 
market maker's price estimation. In Case 1, the market maker only uses the diagonal 
entries of matrix V in price estimation while in Case 2, he use the full structure of 
matrix V. 
Our calculation follows the following three steps: 
(1) For each simulation, we assume there are 100 time steps, i.e., the market maker 
has 100 chances to set bid and ask prices. At each time t, we calculate the market 
maker's estimated prices (Pt) as well as the bid and ask prices he sets for each stock. 
Given these prices, we calculate his cumulative profits as given by equation (4.2.10) 
over these 100 time steps. 
(2) We repeat the simulation described in step (1) for 1000 times and calculate 
the means and standard deviations for these cumulative profits. 
(3) Since 'the market maker is risk averse, we repeat the calculation in step (1) -
(2) for a range of risk aversion parameters to examine the effects of risk aversion on 
the market maker's cumulative profits. 
4.3.2 The simulation results 
Figure 4.1 gives a time series plot of one stock price process and the market maker's 
estimates under Cases 1 and Case 2. The solid line corresponds to the true prices. The 
dashed line under Case 2 is for the case when the market maker uses the correlated 
order flow information in his price estimation. When the market maker only uses the 
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Figure 4.1: The time series of prices. This figure shows the time series plot of the 
true price (the solid line) and the market maker's estimates under Case 1 and Case 2 
(dashed lines as indicated). 
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order flow information of an individual stock to estimate the prices of that stock, his 
estimates correspond to the dashed line under Case 1. Generally, the market maker's 
estimates are more close to the true prices under Case 2 than those under Case 1. 
Therefore when the market maker considers the correlated order flow information in 
his price estimation for every stock, he obtains better estimates. 
Figure 4.2 shows the result of the means and the standard deviations of market 
maker's cumulative profits for 100 time steps, with increasing risk aversion parame-
ters. Here we assume that the market maker makes markets for 10 stocks, so n = 10. 
The solid line is the result for Case 1 and the dashed line is the result for Case 2. 
First we observe that, with increasing risk aversion parameters, both the means 
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Figure 4.2: The benefit of knowing return covariance. This figure shows the 
benefit of the market maker's knowledge of return covariance structure in price es-
timation. The solid line is the means and standard deviations of market maker's 
cumulative profits when he only uses the order flow information of an individual 
stock to estimate the prices of that stock (Case 1). The dashed line is the result when 
he uses the correlated order flow information in his price updating (Case 2). The 
market maker's knowledge of the return covariance increases the means of cumulative 
profits and reduces the standard deviations of these profits. 
The benefit of knowing return covariance 
8000 
" ,-
" 7500 
" ,-
/ , 
" 
c: 7000 I , 
cu 
" Q) .-
~ , , 
6500 , 
" , 
, 
6000 
5500 
800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 
Standard deviation 
and the standard deviations of profits for the two cases decrease monotonically. It 
is not surprising since the more risk averse the market maker is, the more he cares 
about the risk of his profits. Given the market maker's mean-variance utility function 
(equation (4.2.11)), increasing risk aversion parameters reduce his expected utility, 
so both the means and the risks of the profits are smaller. 
It is interesting to compare these two lines. When the market maker considers 
correlated order flow information in his price estimation, there are small increases 
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Figure 4.3: The contribution of correlated order flow information in price 
estimation Panel A shows the 3-D plot of the return covariance matrix V. Panel 
B shows the weight W t that the market maker puts on his price updating equation 
when using correlated order flow information. 
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in the average levels of these cumulative profits, but relatively big reductions in the 
standard deviations of these cumulative profits. Intuitively, in this case, his estimates 
are more accurate and close to the true prices. He cannot achieve much higher 
expected profits since both the incremental value of his inventory and the cash flow 
of his profits do not change much. He can however estimate his inventory positions 
more accurately, which contributes to the relatively big reductions in the risks of his 
cumulative profits. So by considering the correlated order flow information in his 
price estimation, the market maker improves his market making profitability. 
Examining the numbers in Figure 4.2 shows that the average of the cumulative 
profits of 10 stocks over 100 time periods are around 6000 to 8000, with the standard 
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deviations around 1000 to 2000. Considering the number of stocks (10), the contribu-
tion of each stock in reducing the risk between the two cases is not that great. In fact, 
in the price updating equation (4.2.5), the weight (Wt ) that the market maker puts on 
his observation of the order flow Qt (given by :Et ( a+,8),[( a+,8):Et ( a+,8)' +:Eq:Eq']-l) 
has strong diagonal terms. Figure 4.3 shows the contribution of the correlated order 
flow information in the market maker's price estimation. Panel A is the 3-D plot 
of the return covariance matrix V. Panel B is the plot of the weight W t that the 
market maker puts on his price estimation when using correlated order flow infor-
mation. Clearly, similar to the structure of matrix V, the weight also has strong 
diagonal terms. The off-diagonal terms are relatively small and this is shown by the 
clear discrete jump from the diagonal terms. It follows that although the market 
maker considers the correlated order flow information in his price estimation, the 
improvement on his market making profitability is limited. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we consider a model of the market making of multiple stocks by a 
monopolistic market maker. The market maker does not know the true prices for 
each individual stock but knows the return covariance structure of these stocks. His 
knowledge of the return covariance affects his price estimation, which in turn affects 
the order flows. When the market maker does not isolate the individual stock's order 
flow information but integrates the correlated order flow information of all stocks, his 
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knowledge of the return covariance improves his price estimation. 
The market maker in this model faces both the problems of managing his inventory 
and trading with informed traders. By considering correlated order flow information, 
the market maker achieves better estimation of the true prices. This allows him to 
obtain better estimates of his future inventory positions, which helps to mitigate the 
inventory management problem. Better estimation of the true price processes also 
reduces the information asymmetry. The market maker's knowledge of the return 
covariance structure therefore increases his expected cumulative profits and reduces 
the variance of these profits, as shown by our numerical results. 
Our model also leads to liquidity commonality, an important topic on its own. 
Liquidity commonality arises from the market demand functions which depend on 
the market maker's estimation of the true price processes. Since the market maker's 
knowledge of the return covariance structure affects his price estimation, it in turn 
affects the market demands. The commonality in market demands further improves 
the market maker's price estimation when he integrates full order flow information. 
Consistent with the empirical findings of Coughenour and Saad (2004), this chapter 
provides another support to the claim that common market makers are one reason 
for liquidity commonality. 
This chapter provides insights into the market making of state contingent claims 
such as options. In essence, options are a parameterized family of substitutable 
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securities. In particular, an option market maker's information is enriched by the 
correlation among option contracts. We enjoy some success in this model by showing 
that the market maker's knowledge of the correlation structure improves his price 
estimation. This chapter therefore offers a useful structure and indicates a promising 
direction for future study on option market making. 
Chapter 5 
The role of market makers' 
hedging on the spreads in options 
and stock markets 
5.1 Introduction 
Market making in derivative securities raises important considerations that are absent 
in market making of cash securities. By virtue of the replicating argument, which 
establishes a no arbitrage relationship between the value of the derivative and the 
value of its underlying asset, liquidity in the underlying market must be linked to 
the liquidity in the derivative asset. Cho and Engle (1999), Kaul, Nimalendran, and 
Zhang (2004) and de Fontnouvelle, Fishe, and Harris (2003) have all found this to be 
the case in option markets. 
One aspect that has been ignored in the academic literature but is part of the 
daily routine of market makers in derivative assets is hedging. An option market 
maker (OI\II\I). for example, as the implicit counter-party in a transaction involving 
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the option, must decide whether a delta hedge needs to be set up to reduce the risk of 
an unfavorable price movement. Since hedging involves trading, how easy and cheap 
it is for the market maker to carry out his hedging trades must impact the bid-ask 
prices posted by the OMM. Also, if the option market maker quotes prices for a range 
of options, cumulative hedging combined with the no arbitrage pricing relationships 
. . 
must affect the relative spreads in different option contracts. 
In this chapter we analyze these issues in a model where some traders have the 
advantage of possessing private information and trade either in the stock or in the 
option market. In doing so, informed traders face market makers who in the course of 
their activities explicitly take into consideration the effects of hedging. We show that 
hedging by market makers has a significant influence on the magnitude of the bid-ask 
prices in the various markets - option and the underlying stock -, and because of 
that drastically affect the actions of superiorly informed traders. The result that an 
important source of liquidity in the option market is strongly linked to the liquidity 
in the underlying cash market through the hedging of market makers is acknowledged 
by Cho and Engle (1999), who aptly put it: " The traditional focus of most liquidity-
building activity at derivatives exchanges has been directed at locals: the traditional 
market makers and the source of capital in derivatives markets. However, there is 
another source of liquidity for derivatives markets: the already existing liquidity of 
other deeper markets that can be tapped through hedging." We corroborate their 
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conjecture by finding that hedging by market makers is an important factor in ex-
plaining the provision of liquidity in the various markets. In addition, we show that 
because hedging by market makers is informative, hedging contributes decisively to 
explain why all spreads, but especially those in options, are in reality so high. 
Much academic literature has suggested that informed trading takes place in the 
option market. Theoretical works by Biais and Hillion (1994), Easley, O'Hara, and 
Srinivas (1998), and John, Koticha, Narayanan, and Subrahmanyam (2003) suggest 
that the amount of informed trading in the option market depends on the relative 
liquidity in the option and its underlying markets. More recently, there have been 
several empirical studies that uncovered findings related to the hedging activities of 
option market makers. For example, Cho and Engle (1999) argue that if an option can 
be perfectly hedged, the option spreads arise from the illiquidity of the underlying 
market, rather than from inventory risk or informed trading in the option market 
itself. The underlying spreads and hedging parameters, such as delta and gamma from 
the option's pricing model, are expected to affect the option spreads. We corroborate 
the conjecture of Cho and Engle. Kaul, Nimalendran, and Zhang (2004) find that the 
underlying stock's spread has an important impact on the option spreads and th~t this 
is due to the hedging activities of OMMs. We show that this adverse selection that 
results from private information is a component that explains an important fraction 
of the spreads. Finally, our results are consistent with the work of de Fontnouvelle, 
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Fishe, and Harris (2003 ), who find that the option's delta is significantly related 
to the size of the option spreads, suggesting that the cost of hedging plays a role in 
setting the spreads. 
Despite the mounting evidence that the option market maker's hedging trades 
affect both stock and option spreads, there is no theoretical work that explicitly 
models how option market makers' hedging strategies affect the actions of informed 
traders, and the costs of providing liquidity. Our model builds on the sequential trad-
ing framework of Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas (1998) and John, Koticha, Narayanan 
and Subrahmanyam (2003)1. In these sequential trading models, informed and unin-
formed traders interact through risk neutral competitive market makers, that stand 
ready to trade. What distinguishes our model from the previous literature is that 
the option market maker actively hedges his option position. We consider two cases: 
hedging in the underlying stock and hedging with another option written on the same 
underlying. The OMM forms this hedge ratio based on his perception of the expected 
stock and option payoffs after observing the option's order flow. In equilibrium, com-
petition forces the OMM to zero expected profits both from market making and from 
trading for hedging reasons. 
lSimilar to our work, a number of authors have studied option market making with a sequential 
trading approach. For example, Biais and Hillion (1994 ) analyze the pricing of state contingent 
claims in option and stock markets and show that the option mitigates the market breakdown 
problem created by the combination of market incompleteness and asymmetric information; Easley, 
O'Hara and Srinivas (1998) develop and test a model of the informational role of the signed options' 
transactions volum~in predicting future stock prices; and John, Koticha, Narayanan and Subrah-
manyam (2003 ) analyze the impact of option trading and margin rules on the behavior of informed 
traders and on the microstructure of stock and option markets. 
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This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the 
surprisingly sparse theoretical literature2 on option market making by adding delta 
hedging by OMMs. If an option's payoff can be replicated by continuously rebalanc-
ing a portfolio composed of the underlying stock and the risk free asset (Black and 
Scholes (1973)), an option is a redundant asset and therefore its price conveys no addi-
tional information. Since market frictions exist and in reality continuous replication 
is not feasible, replication is not redundant and the option price conveys valuable 
information. Theoretical studies on option market making try to prove this point 
and to provide insights about the informational link between the various securities 
markets. 
Using the case where the option market maker does not hedge as a benchmark, 
we find that the option market maker's hedging trade contains relevant information. 
When the informational content is high, the option market maker's hedging trade 
constitutes an additional important source of information trading in the underlying 
market. The increased threat of informed trading from the option market maker's 
hedging leads the stock market maker to respond by setting wider spreads for the 
stock. This, in turn, widens the spreads in the option, simply because of the additional 
transaction costs that hedging imposes. Interestingly, we find the benefits of imitating 
an informed trade through hedging do not compensate the additional costs of hedging, 
2See, for example, Back (1993), Brennan and Cao (1996), Biais and Hillion (1994), Easley, O'Hara 
and Srinivas (1998), and John, Koticha, Narayanan and Subrahmanyam (2003). 
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thus the result of larger option spreads when the OMM hedges. That is, hedging by 
OMMs raise the costs of trading both in stocks and in options. 
The model in this chapter also shows what OMM hedging does to the distribution 
of informed trading across options that differ in their strike prices. In general, spreads 
in the underlying stock go down when a second option is introduced. Also, compared 
. . 
to the case of a single option, the spreads for each option go down when there are 
several options trading simultaneously. Why? Because when informed traders have 
the choice to trade in several options, there is less informational content in the hedging 
trades of each option market maker. If the delta hedge is carried out in the underlying 
stock, this eases the information threat to the stock and allows the stock market 
maker to narrow the spreads. Moreover, since options have convex payoff structures, 
the effective combined hedge ratio is smaller when there are several options. This 
helps to reduce the option market maker's hedging cost and contributes to narrow 
the option spreads. 
We also consider the alternative case of OMM hedging using options offered by 
other OMMs. When this is the case, we find that, in comparison to the case of 
hedging using the underlying stock, the spreads for both the stock and the option 
that has lower exercise price are further reduced, while the spread of the option with 
the higher exercise price widens. This finding helps to understand why option market 
makers often prefer hedges that use other options. 
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Our model is also related to the literature on market fragmentation (see, for ex-
ample, Pagano (1989) for a model without information asymmetry and Chowdhry 
, 
and Nanda (1991) for a model in the presence of asymmetric information). We ba-
sic ally study the question of price setting in two related markets in the presence of 
asymmetric information. Although we explicitly model the option market and its 
underlying market, the idea can be extended to the cases where two closely related 
assets are traded in different and imperfectly integrated markets. In fact, in our 
model, a trader can get a delta exposure by trading in the primary market (the un-
derlying market) or by buying a call in the option market with the OMM hedging in 
the underlying market. What makes our model interesting is that we explicitly ana-
lyze the OMM's hedging activities which link the liquidities of these two imperfectly 
integrated markets. 
Finally, the issue of arbitrage arises if there are multiple trading venues. Inter-
estingly, Kumar and Seppi (1994) show that while arbitrage would ultimately draw 
futures and its underlying markets together, its immediate impact is to increase the 
bid-ask spread in both markets, thus reducing the liquidity in each market, a result 
similar to ours. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the model. 
Section 5.3 discusses the benchmark results when an OMM does not hedge. Numerical 
solutions are discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 extends the basic model to consider 
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a market for several options when hedging is done in the underl~'ing market. In Sect ion 
5.6, the OM11 hedges with options offered by other OT\lT\ls. Empirical implications 
are discussed in Section 5.7. Section 5.8 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 The model 
5.2.1 Assumptions 
Consider an economy with two financial markets: an option market where an Euro-
pean call option is traded, and a stock market where its underlying asset is traded. 
Later we will consider the case of several options traded on the same underlying as-
set. The state of nature is denoted by (), () E {H, L} with equal probability. The true 
value of the underlying asset is V, with v E {VH' VL} corresponding to the two states 
of nature. The exercise price of the call option is K E [VL' VH]' There are two types 
of traders: informed traders and uninformed traders. Informed traders comprise 0' % 
of the total trading population and the rest (1 - 0')% are uninformed traders. Un-
informed traders trade in both stock and option markets for unspecified, exogenous 
reasons, such as portfolio rebalancing, hedging, etc. Specifically, {3% of them trade 
stocks and the rest (1 - {3)% trade options. Informed traders privately observe an 
identical informative signal of the final value of the underlying asset. They randomize 
their trades in stock and option markets to exploit their information advantage. The 
signal they receive is denoted by S where S = G(B) indicates a good (bad) signal. 
The precision of the signal is measured by 1', the probability that the signal is correct 
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about the state of nature, i.e., Pr(8 = GIB = H) = Pr(8 = BIB = L) = /-l and 
Pr(8 = BIB = H) = Pr(8 = GIB = L) = 1 - /-l. We assume /-l > 0.5, so that the 
signal is informative. 
There is one representative, competitive market maker in the underlying mar-
ket (SMM) and one representative, competitive market maker in the option market 
(OMM). Each market maker observes the order flow in his own market. They do 
not know the realization of the underlying asset v but use Bayes rule to update their 
beliefs of v. Each market maker randomly selects a single order from the pool of 
orders submitted to him.3 All agents are risk neutral and there is no discounting. 
There are four time points (t = 0,1,2,3). At time 0, informed traders observe a 
private signal. At time 1, market makers post prices for traders to buy or sell one unit 
of stock or call option. Informed traders submit orders according to the signal they 
observe. If the signal is good (8 = G), they buy either one stock, with probability 
v, or one call, with probability (1 - v). If the signal is bad (8 = B), they sell either 
one stock, with probability w, or one call, with probability (1 - w). Both v and w 
are endogenous variables and will be determined in equilibrium. It is reasonable to 
assume that uninformed traders buy and sell securities with equal probability in each 
3It is, therefore, possible that an order submitted by traders might not be filled in this round of 
trading. In particular, if the OMM chooses to hedge in the spot market, the chance that his order 
is selected is the same as other traders' orders. The OMM's order does not have any preference 
over other orders. Therefore there is a finite probability that the OMM's hedging trade may not be 
filled. However since the OMM calculates his option prices based on expected zero profit condition 
(Section 5.2.4), this should not affect the equilibrium prices he sets. 
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market. 
At time 2, the OMM observes the state of nature. What distinguishes our model 
from the previous literature, in particular the work of Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas 
(1998) and John et al. (2003), is that, at time 2, the OMM trades in the underlying 
market at the stock's bid and ask prices set by the SMM at time 1 to hedge his option 
position.4 The OMM's hedging position depends on the hedge ratio, which is based 
on his observation of the option order flow (to be discussed in section 5.2.4).5 We 
note that in this sequential trading model, the OMM's hedging trade might not be 
executed by the stock market maker. However, the OMM has taken this possibility 
into account when he sets his optimal options prices. That is, the optimal options 
prices correctly reflect the expected hedging costs incurred by the OMM. It is also 
worth noting that although the OMM knows the state of nature before the SMM, 
he is only allowed to do a hedging trade at time 2; he could not trade more in the 
underlying market. 
4In section 5.6 we analyze hedging with another option. 
5In this model, traders are only able to submit an order of unit size, in both stock and option 
markets. The OMM, however, will submit orders exactly according to his hedge ratio. The OMM's 
hedging trade could be easily spotted by the SMM since an order of a size different from one could 
only be the OMM's hedging trade. 
One question, therefore, that needs to be addressed is whether the SMM charges different stock 
spreads to the OMM's hedging trade. If the SMM believes that the OMM is uninformed and OMM's 
hedging trade contains no information, the SMM would charge an arbitrarily small spread, say c to 
the OMM's hedging trade. It is because the competition in stock market making implies that each 
SMM is always willing to trade with uninformed traders and earn the spread. In the limit, this c 
could be very small and approach zero. However, if the SMM believes that the OMM's hedging trade 
contains information, he would charge the same spreads as to the orders submitted by informed or 
uninformed traders. As we show in Section 5.4, the OMM's hedging trade does contain information, 
which constitutes an additional source of informed trading threat. We therefore argue that, in this 
model, the SMM quotes the same spreads to every stock order. 
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Finally, at time 3, all other market participants observe the state. The call option 
expires at time 3 when the option's payoff is realized. If the OMM hedges at time 2, 
his hedging position is liquidated at time 3. 
We assume that there is competition in market making for both the stock and the 
options. Therefore, at time 1, the SMM makes zero expected profits in equilibrium 
in his stock market making. Also, at time 1, the OMM makes zero expected profits 
when he takes into account his option market making and his trading for hedging 
reasons (at time 2). Figure 5.1 shows the information structure of the model. The 
probabilities of informed and uninformed trading in both stock and option markets 
are shown to the left of the vertical dashed line. This part of the figure corresponds to 
the scenario where the OMM does not hedge in the underlying market. Special in our 
model, are the OMM's hedging activities, shown to the right of the vertical dashed 
line. These nodes correspond to the cases where the OMM hedges in the underlying 
market. 
5.2.2 Bid and ask prices in the stock market 
We first derive the bid and ask prices when the SMM makes zero expected profits 
in making a competitive market for the stock. The bid and ask prices are equal to 
the expected values of the underlying stock, conditional on the SMM observed order 
flow. Denote Sb(a) as the stock bid (ask) price, we have Sb = E[V'IStock Sale) and 
Sa = E[V'IStock Buy), respectively. Expanding the expectations and taking the two 
, 
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Figure 5.1: Information Structure of the model. The information tree shows the 
probabilities of informed and uninformed trading in both stock and option markets. 
The probabilities shown to the left of the vertical dashed line correspond to the case 
of 01llM not hedging. The probabilities from the 01\11\1's hedging trades are shown 
to the right of the vertical dashed line. 
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possible states into account, we have: 
Sb E[vlStock Sale] = vHPr(B = HIStock Sale) + vLPr(B = LIStock Sale) 
Sa E[vlStock Buy] = vHPr(B = HIStock Buy) + vLPr(B = LIStock Buy) 
Note that the OMM's hedging trade affects the above conditional probabilities and 
hence the stock bid and ask prices. 
Let's consider the bid price here (the ask price can be obtained in a similar fashion). 
Using Bayes rule, we have: 
P (B LIS k S I ) Pr(B = L)Pr(Stock SalelB = L) r = toc ae =--~--~--~----~~~~~------~--~------------
Pr(B = L)Pr(Stock SalelB = L) + Pr(B = H)Pr(Stock SalelB = H) 
We first look at Pr(Stock SalelB = L), the probability of a stock sale, given that 
the state of nature is low. This probability may come from three possible sources: 
an informed stock sale, an uninformed stock sale, and an OMM's hedging sale. From 
Figure 5.1, when the state is low, the probability of an informed sale is ClJ.LW, and an 
uninformed sale is (1- Cl).B~. The OMM's hedging sale depends on how he perceives 
the moneyness of his position in the option, given the current state. When the state 
is low (0 = L), his long call position is always out of the money and therefore needs 
to be hedged. The probability that the OMM's sells in hedging is equivalent to the 
probability that the OMM has a long call position.6 This probability equals the sum 
6Note that we only say that the OMM would sell stocks in the underlying market if he knows 
that the state is low. We do not say anything about how much he would sell. In fact, the OMM 
would hedge according to his optimal hedge ratio, which is less than 1 (to be discussed in Section 
5.2.4). 
99 
of the probabilities of an informed call sale (ap,(l - w)) and an uninformed call sale 
((1 - a)(l - /1)~). To summarize, we have: 
Pr(Stock SalelO = L) Pr(Informed Stock SalelO = L) 
+Pr(Uninformed Stock SalelO = L) 
+Pr(OMM Hedge SalelO = L) 
1 
ap,w + (1 - a)/12 + Pr(Informed Call SalelO = L) 
+Pr(Uninformed Call Salel'O = L) 
1 1 
ap,w + (1 - a)/12 + ap,(l - w) + (1 - a)(l - /1)2 
1 
ap,+(l-a)-
2 (5.2.1) 
When the OMM observes a sale and the state is high (0 = H), the OMM's long 
position in the call is in the money and he does not need to hedge. Hence, the 
probability in a sale that the OMM would hedge when the state is high is zero. We 
have: 
Pr(Stock SalelO = H) Pr(Informed Stock SalelO = H) 
+Pr(Uninformed Stock SalelO = H) 
+Pr(OMM Hedge SalelO = H) 
1 
- a(l - p,)w + (1 - a)/32 + 0 
1 
a(l - p,)w + (1 - a)/3"2 (5.2.2) 
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Since the OMM only hedges when he perceives that he might lose money in his 
position in the option, the probabilities that he would hedge in different states are 
therefore different. This difference directly impacts the stock bid and ask prices. 
From equations (5.2.1) and (5.2.2), we obtain 
ap+(1-a)! Pr(B = LIStock Sale) = 2 
ap + a(1-p)w + (1 - 0)(1 + J3H 
Pr(B = HIStock Sale) = a(1 - p)w + (1 - Q)J3~ 
ap + a(l - p)w + (1 - a)(1 + !3H 
The following proposition summaries the bid and ask prices in the stock market 
when the OMM hedges. 
Proposition 5.1. When an OMM hedges in the underlying market. the stock's bid 
and ask prices are given by: 
Sb = vH[a(1 - p)w + (1 - a)J3~] + vdap + (1 - aH] 
ap + a(1 - p)w + (1 - a)(1 + !3H 
vH[ap + (1 - a)~] + vda(1 -p)v + (1 - a)J3~] Sa=------------~--------------~~--=-
ap + a(1 - p)v + (1 - a)(1 + J3H 
5.2.3 The informed traders' trading strategy 
(5.2.3) 
(5.2.-1) 
Informed traders attempt to exploit their information advantage by trading either in 
the stock, in the option, or in both markets. If they concentrate on trading in one 
market, they will be more likely identified by market makers in that market. i\Iarket 
makers would then set the widest possible spreads to protect themselves against 
trading by informed traders. Therefore, we conjecture that informed traders choose a 
mixed st rategy by randomizing their trades in both stock and option markets. while 
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the pure strategies of trading in a single market are also feasible. Informed traders 
will mix their trades in two markets to maximize their total expected profit. In 
equilibrium, they are indifferent between the two pure strategies of trading in either 
market that they mix. 
Recall that if informed traders receive a good signal, they buy either a stock with 
probability v, or a call option with probability (1 - v); if they receive a bad signal, 
they sell either a stock with probability w, or a call option with probability (1 - w). 
Their expected profit (7r) from the two strategies of trading only in the stock or the 
option market, conditional on receiving a good or bad signal, is given by 
and 
{ 
E[vIS = G] - Sa : 7rS-G -(- )- E[(v-K)+IS=G]-Ca : 
{ 
Sb - E[vIS = B] 7rS-B -( - ) - Cb - E[(v - K)+IS = B] 
where Cb(a) is the bid (ask) price of the call option. 
If buying a stock 
If buying a call 
If selling a stock 
If selling a call 
Expanding the conditional expectations, we have E[vIS = B] = vH(1 - J.L) + VLJ.L, 
E[vIS = G] = VHJ.L + (1 - J.L)VL and E[(v - K)+IS = B] = (VH - K)(1 - J.L), 
E[(v - K)+IS = G] = (VH - K)JL. The indifference condition of trading in either the 
stock or the option market yields that 
(5.2.5) 
- Cb - (VH - K)(l - 1-') 
, # 
v 
(5.2.6) 
Trading Options 
H)] 
The next proposition states the bid and ask prices in the option market when the 
OM1\1 hedges in the underlying market. 
Proposition 5.2. From equations {5.2.5} and {5.2.6}, we obtain the call option's hill 
and ask prices: 
Sb - VLf.1 - K(l - /1) 
Sa - K/1 - vL(l - /1) 
Equations {5.2.7} and {5.2.8} also imply that 
(5.2.7) 
(5.2.8) 
(5.2.9) 
Since /1 > 0.5 and K > VL, we have (K - vd(2/1 - 1) > O. Consistent with 
the derivative hedge hypothesis presented in Cho and Engle (1999), equation (5.2.9) 
shows that an option spread is positively related to a stock spread. 
Finally, informed traders maximize their total expected profit in both stock and 
option markets by choosing the probabilities (v and w) of trading in each market. 
The informed traders' maximization problem can be expressed as: 
max{v[E(vIS = G) - Sa] + (1 - v)[E((v - K)+IS = G) - Cal 
v,w 
+W[Sb - E(vIS = B)] + (1 - w)[Cb - E((v - K)+IS = B)]} (5.2.10) 
5.2.4 The OMM's hedging strategy 
The 01\11\1 provides a market for options and also trades for hedging reasons. In this 
section we construct a delta hedging strategy using the stock. Later. we analyze the 
case of hedging with different options. 
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The market maker's delta hedge is given by: 
~ = ac = Pr(Call Buy)E[(v - K)+ICall Buy] - Pr(Call Sell)E[(v - K)+ICall Sell] 
as Pr(Call Buy)E[vICall Buy] - Pr(Call Sell)E[vICall Sale] 
(5.2.11) 
Equation (5.2.11) conveys two pieces of information. First, the OMM estimates 
the stock and option payoffs by looking at the direction of the orders he receives. 
He is able to calculate the expected stock and option payoff, conditional on the 
probabilities associated with the occurrence of different option order flows. Second, 
the OMM estimates the ratio of the expected option payoff to the expected stock 
payoff. This is how much the OMM thinks his option's position changes given a 
small, instantaneous change in the stock. We note that this hedge ratio is based on 
the OMM's estimates, which might be different from the hedge ratio used by other 
traders. 
As usual, we expand the expectation functions and have E[(v - K)+ICall Buy] = 
(v-K)Pr(O = HICall Buy) and E[(v-K)+ICall Sale] = (v-K)Pr(O = HICall Sale). 
Similarly, E[viCall Buy] = vHPr(O = HICall Buy) + vLPr(O = LICall Buy) and 
E[viCall Sell] = vHPr(O = HICall Sale) + vLPr(O = LICall Sale). Substituting these 
conditional probabilities and applying Bayes rule, we obtain 
Il = _~( v...:.:.H~K~)...:..:[ (_2 _v-:---w....:...;.) 11--:--..:.-( l_w~)]:..-­
(VH - vL)[(2 - v - w)p, - 1] + VHW - VLV (5.2.12) 
Next, competition imposes that the OMM must expect to make zero profits both 
from making a market for options and from trading for hedging reasons. Competition 
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in the business of option market making reduces any positive expected profit to zero, 
including the results from trading that occur because of market making, for otherwise 
if an OMM had zero expected profit in making a market for options, but expected 
positive profits from hedging, he could narrow the options' spreads and attract ad-
ditional options' orders. Conversely, if he expected losses from hedging, he would be 
forced to widen his options' spreads to stay in business. 
We can now calculate the OMM's expected profit in making a market for options 
and in trading for hedging reasons, over three periods. At time 1, his expected profit 
comes from his option market making. At time 2, his expected profit comes from the 
construction of his hedging position in the stock market. At time 3, it comes from 
his expected option payoff and the stock value when the hedging position terminates. 
More specifically, we have: 
E[7r~~M] = 
E[7r~~M] = 
Pr(Call Sale)Cb + Pr(Call Buy)Ca 
Pr(Call Buy)Pr(O = HICall Buy)~Sa 
+ Pr(Call Sale)Pr(O = LICall Sale)~Sb 
E[7r~~M] = - Pr(Call Buy)E((v - K)+ICall Buy) 
+ Pr(Call Sale)E((v - K)+ICall Sale) 
+ Pr(Call Buy)E(vICall Buy)~ 
Pr(Call Sale)E(vICall Sale)~ 
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where ~ is given by equation (5.2.12), Sa and Sb are given by equations (5.2.4) and 
(5.2.3), Ca and Cb are given by equations (5.2.7) and (5.2.8). 
The OMM's zero expected profit condition implies that E[7r~'YM] + E[7r~¥M] + 
E[7r~~M] = O. Calculating the probabilities using Bayes rule, we have: 
1 1 
2(a(1 - w) + 2p)Cb + 2(a(1 - 11) + 2p)Ca 
1 
2(VH - K)[a(l - 1L)(1 - w) ~ alL(l - 11)] 
1 1 
+ 2~[alL(1- w) + p]Sb - 2~[alL(1- 11) + p]Sa 
1 
+ 2~[alL(1- 11) - a(l -1L)(1 - W)]VH 
1 2~[alL(1- w) - a(l -1L)(1 - 1I)]VL 
o (5.2.13) 
where p = (1 - a)(l - ,B)~. 
5.2.5 The general problem 
The general problem in our setting consists of a system of three conditions that can 
be solved using the Lagrange method: 
1. Informed traders choose the probabilities of trading in either the stock or the 
option market to maximize their total expected profit (equation (5.2.10)); 
2. In equilibrium, informed traders are indifferent between the pure strategies of 
trading the stock or the options, conditional on receiving a good or bad signal 
(equations (5.2.5) and (5.2.6)); 
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3. The OMI\I earns zero combined expected profits (equation (5.2.13 )). 
To focns on the economic intuition rather than algebraic manipulations, we present 
the numerical solutions in Section 5.4. Before that, in Section 5.3, we analyze, as a 
benchmark case, the situation where the OMM does not hedge. 
5.3 When the OMM does not hedge: the bench-
mark case 
For the purposes of comparison, we briefly present here the bid and ask prices in both 
the stock and the option markets when the OMM does not hedge his market making 
trades in the underlying market. The results are similar to those in John et al. (2003), 
except that we consider a call option instead of a put option. These benchmark results 
are then compared with the results when the OMM hedges, allowing us to understand 
the effects of market maker's hedging strategies both on informed trading, as well as 
on the costs of providing liquidity in the two markets. 
When the OMM does not hedge, there is no trade by the option market maker in 
the underlying stock market. Informed traders continue to randomize their trades in 
the two markets to exploit their information advantage. In Figure 5.1, the information 
structure to the left of the vertical dashed line corresponds to the case when the 01\11\1 
does not hedge. 
~ 
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5.3.1 The bid and ask prices in the underlying market 
The S1\IM makes a zero expected profit in the underlying market. This implies 
that the stock bid and ask prices are the expected values of the underlying asset. 
conditional on the stock order flow that observed by the S1\I1\1. 
Denote S~(b) as the stock ask (bid) price when the OM1\I does not hedge. \\'e hm'e 
S~ = E[vlStock Sale] and S~ = E[vlStock Buy]. Note that now in the underlying 
market, there is no order flow caused by the OMM's hedging trade. In other words, 
the probability that a stock order comes from the OMM is simply zero. Using Bayes 
rule, we can show that the stock bid and ask prices when the 01\11\1 does not hedge 
are given by the following equations: 
S~ 
S' = a 
vH[a(l - jJ)w + (1 - a),6~] + vdajJw + (1 - a),6~] 
aw + (1 - a),6 
vH[ajJv + (1 - a),6~] + vda(l - jJ)v + (1 - a),6~] 
av + (1 - 0:),6 
5.3.2 The option bid and ask prices 
(5.3.1) 
(5.3.2) 
Since the OMM makes the option market and does not hedge the incoming order 
flow, competition in the option market making implies that he makes a zero expected 
profit. The option bid and ask prices are then equal to the option's expected payoffs, 
conditional on the option order flow. 
Denote C~(b) as the option ask (bid) price when the OM1\1 does not hedge, we 
hav(' C~ = E[(Z;-K)+ICall Sale] and C~ = E[(~-K)+ICall Buy]. Simple derivations 
using Bayes rule give the option bid and ask prices as follows: 
G' b 
G' = a 
( )0:(1 -/L)(1- w) + (1 - 0:)(1 - (3H VH - K -0:(1 - w) + (1 - 0:)(1 - (3) 
( )0:/L(1- v) + (1- 0:)(1,- (3)~ v H - K --;----;-----:-------:---:-----=-0:(1 - v) + (1 - 0:)(1 - (3) 
5.3.3 The informed trading in equilibrium 
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(5.3.3) 
(:3.3.--1 ) 
Informed traders randomize their trades in both the option and the underlying stock 
markets. Their expected profits from trading only in the stock or the option market 
is that already described in Section 5.2.3. 
Substituting the bid and ask prices of the stock and the option (equations (5.3.1) 
- (5.3.4)) into the expected profits indifference condition (5.2.5) and (5.2.6), we are 
able to calculate the equilibrium probabilities that informed traders randomize their 
orders between the two markets. Specifically, the equilibrium probabilities (denoted 
by v' and w') that informed traders trade in the underlying market, conditional on 
receiving a good or a bad signal, are the same and given by: 
, , (3[O:(VH - VL) + (1 - 0:)(1 - (3)(K - vL)l 
v =w = ~---------------
O:[VH - K + f3(K - vdl 
5.4 When the OMM hedges: the regular case 
5.4.1 Parameter values 
\Vhen the 01\11\1 hedges - we call this the regular case to emphasize that this is the 
most natural situation - tIl(' positions t helt result from making a markeL there are no 
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Table .S.1: Parameter values and variables' ranges used in the numerical 
calculations. The parameter values and variables' ranges are shown in Table ;).1. 
The high and low prices of the stock in the future are denoted by l'H and L'L. d 
indicates the percentage of uninformed traders who trade in the stock market. I' 
indicates the precision of the informed traders' private signal. ()i is the percentage of 
informed traders in the trading population. K is the call option's exercise price. 
Parameters Values Variables Ranges 
VH 50 11 0.85-0.99 
VL 30 ()i 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 
(3 0.5 K 35, -10. -15 
closed form solutions and the problem must be solved numerically. In the numerical 
calculations, we will show the effects of OMM's hedging on the informed traders 
trading strategies, as well as the effects on the costs of providing liquidity in both 
the stock and the option markets. We first fix the option's exercise price (K) and 
present simulations using different values for the precision of the signal observed by 
informed traders (11), and for the percentage of informed traders (()i). We then repeat 
the calculations for in the money, at the money and out of the money options with 
different exercise prices. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the parameter values and the ranges of variables used in 
the calculations. 
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5.4.2 What happens when the OMM hedges? 
We first ask how, in general, stock and option spreads7 change when the OMM hedges, 
relative to the case of no hedging. What we find is that both spreads become wider 
with hedging. Therefore, hedging by the OMM results in higher transaction costs for 
traders in the cash and in the option markets. Figure 5.2, Panel A(B) graphically 
presents the stock (option) spreads when the percentage of informed traders is Q = 
0.25, and the exercise price of the option is K = 35. The vertical distance between 
the base line and the solid lines corresponds to the spreads without hedging, and 
the vertical distance between the base line and the dashed lines corresponds to the 
spreads with hedging. Both spreads are dearly wider when the OMM decides to 
hedge. Comparatively, option spreads widen by more than stock spreads. 
Why do the spreads widen significantly when the OMM hedges? When the OMM 
hedges, he must consider the following three effects in setting the option spreads: 
First, due to bid-ask spreads in the underlying stock market, hedging incurs transac-
tion costs. To cover this cost the OMM must set wider spreads in the option market. 
Second, trading for hedging reasons unintendedly conveys private information to the 
stock market. This information spillover effect occurs only when the OMM hedges. 
To see this, suppose that the OMM faces an option sell order. If this order comes from 
7We use quoted spreads as the measure of liquidity cost. Cho and Engle (1999) use percentage 
spreads, defined as the spread divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask prices (spread/mid-quote) 
in their paper. Our qualitative findings do not change if we use different measures. 
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Figure 5.2: Stock and option spreads when an OMM does and does not 
hedge in the underlying market Panel A shows stock spreads in the cases of 
OMM's hedging (the dashed line) and not hedging (the solid line). Panel B shows 
options spreads in the cases of OMM's hedging (the dashed line) and not hedging 
(the solid line). Panel A and B are both for option with K = 35 and Q = 0.25. 
Stock spreads in the cases of OMM's hedging and not hedging Option spreads in the cases of OMM's hedging and not hedging 
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an informed trader and the market maker decides to hedge his resulting long position 
in the option with the underlying stock, the hedge requires him to sell stocks. Doing 
so is precisely what the informed trader would have done if he traded in the stock 
market. In other words, by hedging, the OMM trades exactly in the same direction 
as an informed trader. Therefore, hedging allows the OMM to recover some of his in-
formation loss in trading with informed traders, and this narrows the option spreads. 
Third, if this option order comes from an uninformed trader and the OMM already 
makes money by trading with the uninformed trader, he incurs additional transaction 
costs in hedging in the stock market. The net overall effect of wider option spreads 
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in the case of hedging means that the transaction costs incurred in hedging are more 
important than the informational spillover gains. 
In the underlying market, the OMM's hedging trade constitutes an additional 
stock order flow that, as discussed, might contain information. Thus, the S.rvIM L:lCes 
a higher probability that a stock order might contain superior information. Not 
knowing the informational content of the OMM's hedging trade. the Sl\UvI protects 
himself by setting wider stock spreads. 
The reason that option spreads widen comparatively more is because the OMl\I's 
hedging cost is of the same magnitude as stock spreads, and, therefore, affects option 
spreads disproportionately. 
In summary, the OMM's hedging imposes higher transaction costs in both the 
stock and the option markets. As a result, both informed and uninformed traders are 
worse off with OMM's hedging. For informed traders, hedging makes their private 
information less profitable. For uninformed traders, hedging puts a higher constrain 
for liquidity trading. Hedging has negative welfare implications on traders. 
5.4.3 Informed traders response to OMM's hedging 
Next we look at how informed traders respond to the OMM's hedging by changing the 
probability of stock buying (v) (selling (w)) when they receive a good (bad) signal. 
Table 5.2 presents the comparative statics of signal precision (1-11 the pcrccntage of 
informed traders (n ), and exercise price (]{) on v and w, in t he cases of hedging and 
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Table 5.2: The effect of j.L, 0:, and K on the informed trading strategy This 
table shows how informed traders would change their trading intensity in the stock 
market (v and w) in response to the changes in the parameter values of j.L, Q, and K, 
in both cases of OMM's hedging and not hedging. The +(-) sign indicates a positive 
(negative) relationship between v and wand parameter j.L, Q, and K. 
OMM hedging OMM not hedging 
v=/=w v=w 
j.L + independent 
Q + 
K + + 
not hedging, respectively. Table 5.3 reports these probabilities in more detail, with 
panel A for the case of hedging, and panel B for the case of not hedging. 
When the OMM does not hedge 
In section 5.3.3 we have concluded that when the OMM does not hedge, the 
probabilities of stock buying (v) and selling (w) are the same. However, looking more 
closely, it appears that informed traders favor trading more in stocks than in options.8 
This is because the range of possible values that give informed traders a profit is larger 
in the case of the stock (v H - V L) than in the case of the option (v H - K). In the 
words of John et al. (2003) stocks are more information-sensitive than options. The 
equality between v and w comes from the assumption that high and low states occur 
equally likely, and also the precision of the private signal is the same in both states. 
8This may seem in contradiction to the conventional wisdom that options provide leverage, see 
Black (1975). In this section, we are comparing unit trades (one stock or one call). In section 5.4.5, 
we will discuss expected returns on trading stocks or options and show that option trading provides 
better returns. 
Table 5.3: Informed trading intensity in stocks in the cases of OMM's hedging and not hedging in 
the stock market. Panel A reports the informed trading intensity in stocks (v and "",,) \vhen the Ol\U\! hedges ill 
the stock market. We divide the table for different K. For the same K, we then calculate v and w for different 0, 
in the increasing order of signal precision 11. Panel B reports the similar results \X/hell the OMl\I does not hedge ill 
the stock market. 
Panel A: Informed trading intensity in stocks when the 01\111 hedges 
0:86 1:55 5:35 
..L.\.J\.J 
5:71 1:55 5:88 1:55 5:75 1:55 5:78 1:55 5:89 1:55 1:55 1:55 1.00 1.00 1.00 1. ()O 
0.87 1.00 0.37 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.88 1.00 0.39 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.89 1.00 0.40 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.90 1.00 0.42 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.91 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.92 1.00 0.45 1.00 0.73 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.91 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1. 00 1.00 
0.93 1.00 0.46 1.00 0.73 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.94 1.00 0.47 1.00 0.73 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 l. ()O 1.00 
0.95 1.00 0.49 1.00 0.73 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 I.U() 1.00 
0.96 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 . ()() 1.00 
0.97 1.00 0.51 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1. ()() 1. ()O 
0.98 1.00 0.52 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 I .00 I ()() 
0.99 1.00 0.53 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1. ()() I . ()() 
Panel B: Informed trading intensity in stocks when the OM1\1 do~s not hedge 
.~U V.I v U. I.J U.U-Z V.V-::I: V.VV V.VV ..I...vu ....... vv 
5:83 5:83 5)2 0.86 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 LOU (). !)() (). !)() 
0.87 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 O. qO (l. q() 
0.88 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 1. ()O ().9() (). !)() 
0.89 0.79 0.79 ().64 0.64 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 O. <)() 
0.90 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 1.00 I .00 1.00 l. ()O ().q() (). !)() 
0.91 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 l.00 1.00 1.00 1. 00 O. !)() O. !lO 
0.92 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 l. 00 (l. qO (l. !)() 
0.93 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.04 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 1.00 l.O() 1.00 1.00 O. !)() O. !)O 
0.94 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 l.00 l.OO 1.00 1.0() (l.!)() (). <)() 
0.95 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.61 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 l. ()() (). !)() ().!lO 
0.96 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.61 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 1. ()() 1.00 l.OO l. (J() Il.!)() O. <J() 
0.97 0.79 0.79 0.64 O.G4 O.GO 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 l. 00 1 . ()() l.OO 1 I)() () < J( ) (). <)( ) 
0.98 0.79 0.70 O.G4 0.64 O.tiO 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 1 .O() 1 . ()() 1. ()(J 11)( ) ().<II ) ()<)() 
0.99 0.79 0.79 O.G4 O.G4 o .rj() 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.72 1. ()() I . (J(J 1. ()() 11)() ( ) <)( ) I)()() 
---- -
f-' 
f-' 
.+-
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Comparative statics shows that these probabilities are both decreasing in the 
number of informed traders, a, are increasing in the exercise price of the option, K, 
and independent of the signal precision, J.L. 
A higher a increases the threat of informed trading in both the stock and the 
option markets, which reduces the expected profit to informed traders. Since the 
information is more sensitive in the stock market, this reduction is also larger in that 
market. Consequently, informed traders migrate to the option market, so both v and 
w decrease. 
Also, as K increases, the option becomes less information sensitive (VH - K). As 
a result, informed traders increase their trading in the stock market, and both v and 
w increase. 
The independence of v and w from J.L comes from two offsetting effects: first, 
because of the stock's higher information sensitivity, a more precise information gives 
informed traders greater incentive to trade stocks, which increases v and w; and, 
second, the relatively higher stock spreads compared to option spreads reduce such 
incentives, thus decreasing v and w. 
When the OMM hedges 
When the OMM hedges, v and ware no longer the same. Recall that the OMM 
optimally hedges according to his perceived moneyness of the option's position, and 
this means that he does not hedge every time. This asymmetry in.the OMM's hedging 
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behavior breaks down the equality between 1) and w. 
The comparative statics also changes. Now both probabilities 1) and ware increas-
ing in a and K, and non-decreasing in J-L. Since the effect of K is the same with and 
without hedging, the previous intuition still applies. In what follows, we discuss the 
intuition for the different effects of a and J-L when the OrvIM hedges. 
First recall that hedging increases spreads in both markets but option spreads go 
up significantly more than stock spreads (Section 5.4.2). Informed traders, therefore, 
find it relatively cheaper to trade stocks, so both 1) and w increase with hedging. 
As the proportion of insiders, a, increases, the OMM will more likely trade with 
informed traders using the option market. Hence, hedging trades contain more infor-
mation. Consequently, informed traders find it easier to hide their identities in the 
stock market and as a result increase their probability of trading the stock. In fact, 
in the stock market, the marginal contribution of an OMM's hedging trade in helping 
informed traders disguise their identity goes up with a higher a. To see this, let us 
consider two possible compositions of the trading population. (i) There is 1 OMM, 
1 informed trader, and 100 uninformed traders. (ii) There is 1 OMM, 99 informed 
traders and 100 uninformed traders. In case (i), the probability that a stock order 
might come from an informed trader is 1~1 when the OMM does not hedge, and 1~2 
when he hedges. In case (ii), these two probabilities are 19:9 and ~~~, respectively. 
Clearly in case (i), the informed trading pressure faced by the Sf\Ud almost doubles 
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(1b1 to 1~2)' while in case (ii), it only increases by merely 0.5% (19:9 to ;~~). So when 
a is high, the OMM's hedging trade does not change much the pressure on SMM 
by informed trading, and therefore the stock spread is also not adjusted by much. 
Informed traders take this opportunity by increasing the intensity of stock trading as 
a mcreases. 
Both lJ and ware non-decreasing in the precision of the signal, J-t. This is because, 
with hedging, the percentage increase in option spreads is much higher than that in 
stock spreads. Together with the fact that the higher information sensitivity in the 
stock attracts informed traders with higher J-t, both lJ and ware non-decreasing in J-t 
when the OMM hedges. 
5.4.4 The effects of Q, K and J-l on stock and option spreads 
After reviewing the results of the informed traders' actions from the option market 
maker's decision to hedge, we are now in a position to compare the effects of the 
various parameters - the signal precision (J-t), the percentage of informed traders (Q), 
and the option exercise price (K) - on the stock and on the option spreads, with and 
without hedging by the OMM. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 report the results for different K 
and a with increasing J-L. In both tables, Panel A reports the results in the case of 
the OMM hedging, and Panel B the results in the case of the OMM not hedging. 
Table 5.6 provides the summary of the comparative statics, with + (-) sign indicating 
a positive (negative) relationship. 
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Table 5.4: Stock spreads in the cases of OMM's hedging and not hedging in 
the underlying market Panel A reports the stock spreads when the OMM hedges 
in the stock market. We divide the table for different K. For the same K, we then 
calculate the stock spreads for different Q, in the increasing order of signal precision 
J.l. Panel B reports the similar results when the OMM does not hedge in the stock 
market. 
Panel A: Stock sEreads when the OMM hedges 
0.86 9.46 11.46 13.07 9.20 11.36 13.05 9.05 11.09 12.85 
0.87 9.55 11.66 13.38 9.30 11.56 13.36 9.17 11.31 13.17 
0.88 9.6~ 11.86 13.68 9.40 11.77 13.66 9.29 11.54 13.49 0.89 9.7 12.06 13.99 9.50 11.97 13.97 9.42 11.77 13.81 
0.90 9.81 12.26 14.29 9.60 12.18 14.28 9.54 12.00 14.13 
0.91 9.90 12.46 14.60 9.71 12.39 14.58 9.66 12.23 14.45 
0.92 9.99 12.66 14.90 9.82 12.60 14.89 9.78 12.46 14.77 
0.93 10.08 12.86 15.21 9.91 12.80 15.19 9.91 12.69 15.09 
0.94 10.18 13.07 15.51 10.03 13.01 15.50 10.03 12.91 15.41 
0.95 10.27 13.27 15.81 10.15 13.22 15.80 10.15 13.14 15.73 
0.96 10.37 13.47 16.12 10.28 13.44 16.11 10.28 13.37 16.05 
0.97 10.47 13.68 16.42 10.40 13.65 16.42 10.42 13.60 16.37 
0.98 10.57 13.88 16.73 10.52 13.86 16.72 10.55 13.83 16.69 
0.99 10.67 14.08 17.03 10.65 14.07 17.03 10.66 14.06 17.01 
Panel B: Stock sEreads when the OMM does not hedge 
0.86 4.95 8.10 11.25 5.76 9.00 11.70 5.76 9.60 12.15 
0.87 5.09 8.33 11.56 5.92 9.25 12.03 5.92 9.87 12.49 
0.88 5.23 8.55 11.88 6.08 9.50 12.35 6.08 10.13 12.83 
9.89 5.36 8.78 12.19 6.24 9.75 12.68 6.24 10.40 13.16 
0.90 5.50 9.00 12.50 6.40 10.00 13.00 6.40 10.67 13.50 
0.91 5.64 9.23 12.81 6.56 10.25 13.33 6.56 10.93 13.84 
0.92 5.78 9.45 13.13 6.72 10.50 13.65 6.72 11.20 14.18 
0.93 5.91 9.68 13.44 6.88 10.75 13.98 6.88 11.47 14.51 
0.94 6.05 9.90 13.75 7.04 11.00 14.30 7.04 11.73 14.85 
0.95 6.19 10.13 14.06 7.20 11.25 14.63 7.20 12.00 15.19 
0.96 6.33 10.35 14.38 7.36 11.50 14.95 7.36 12.27 15.53 
0.97 6.46 10.58 14.69 7.52 11.75 15.28 7.52 12.53 15.86 
0.98 6.60 10.80 15.00 7.68 12.00 15.60 7.68 12.80 16.20 
0.99 6.74 11.03 15.31 7.84 12.25 15.93 7.84 13.07 16.54 
The tables show that when the OMM does not hedge, spreads in the stock increase 
with J-l, el, and K, while option spreads increase with J.l and el, but decrease with K. 
On the other hand, when the OMM hedges, stock spreads increase with J.l and Q, 
but decrease with K; option spreads increase with el, decrease in K, and have an 
ambiguous relationship with J.l. In the remaining part of this subsection, we discuss 
these effects in more detail. For each effect, we separate the discussion in the stock 
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Table 5.5: Option spreads in the cases of OMM's hedging and not hedging 
in the underlying market Panel A reports the option spreads when the OMM 
hedges in the stock market. We divide the table for different K. For the same K, 
we then calculate the option spreads for different 0, in the increasing order of signal 
preCISIOn fl. Panel B reports the similar results when the OMM does not hedge in 
the stock market. 
Panel A: 0Etion sEreads when the OMM hedges 
0.86 5.86 7.86 9.47 2.00 4.16 5.85 0.01 0.29 2.05 
0.87 5.85 7.96 9.68 1.90 4.16 5.96 0.01 0.21 2.07 
0.88 5.83 8.06 9.88 1.80 4.17 6.06 0.01 0.14 2.09 
0.89 5.82 8.16 10.09 1.70 4.17 6.17 0.01 0.07 2.11 
0.90 5.81 8.26 10.29 1.60 4.18 6.28 0.01 0.02 2.13 
0.91 5.80 8.36 10.50 1.51 4.19 6.38 0.01 0.01 2.15 
0.92 5.79 8.46 10.70 1.42 4.20 6.49 0.01 0.01 2.17 
0.93 5.78 8.56 10.91 1.31 4.20 6.59 0.01 0.01 2.19 
0.94 5.78 8.67 11.11 1.23 4.21 6.70 0.01 0.01 2.21 
0.95 5.77 8.77 11.31 1.15 4.22 6.80 0.01 0.01 2.23 
0.96 5.77 8.87 11.52 1.08 4.24 6.91 0.01 0.01 2.25 
0.97 5.77 8.98 11.72 1.00 4.25 7.02 0.01 0.01 2.27 
0.98 5.77 9.08 11.93 0.92 4.26 7.12 0.01 0.01 2.29 
0.99 5.77 9.18 12.13 0.84 4.27 7.23 0.01 0.01 2.31 
Panel B: 0Etion sEreads when the OMM does not hedge 
0.86 1:35 4.50 7.65 0.00 1.80 4.50 0.00 0.00 1.35 
0.87 1.39 4.63 7.86 0.00 1.85 4.63 0.00 0.00 1.39 
0.88 1.43 4.75 8.08 0.00 1.90 4.75 0.00 0.00 1.43 
0.89 1.46 4.88 8.29 0.00 1.95 4.88 0.00 0.00 1.46 
0.90 1.50 5.00 8.50 0.00 2.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 1.50 
0.91 1.54 5.13 8.71 0.00 2.05 5.13 0.00 0.00 1.54 
0.92 1.58 5.25 8.93 0.00 2.10 5.25 0.00 0.00 1.58 
0.93 1.61 5.38 9.14 0.00 2.15 5.38 0.00 0.00 1.61 
0.94 1.65 5.50 9.35 0.00 2.20 5.50 0.00 0.00 1.65 
0.95 1.69 5.63 9.56 0.00 2.25 5.63 0.00 0.00 1.69 
0.96 1.73 5.75 9.78 0.00 2.30 5.75 0.00 0.00 1.73 
0.97 1.76 5.88 9.99 0.00 2.35 5.88 0.00 0.00 1.76 
0.98 1.80 6.00 10.20 0.00 2.40 6.00 0.00 0.00 1.80 
0.99 1.84 6.13 10.41 0.00 2.45 6.13 0.00 0.00 1.84 
and in the option market, both when the OMM hedges and does not hedge. 
The effect of an increase in 0 
This effect is pretty obvious. Stock and option spreads always widen when the 
proportion of insiders increases. When the OMM hedges, the higher the 0, the more 
information contain his hedging trades, and therefore the SMM adjusts even more 
upwards the spread in the stock. 
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Table 5.6: Summary of the effects of /-L, Q and K on stock and option spreads 
in the cases of the OMM's hedging and not hedging. This table sllmmarizt's 
the effects of /-L, ex and K on stock and option spreads. The +(-) sign indicates a 
positive (negative) relationship. The ambiguous relationship between p and option 
spreads when the OMM hedges is indicated by a? sign where Table 5.1 provides 
detailed analysis. 
Stock spreads Option spreads 
OMM not hedge OMM hedges OMM not hedgeO~l1\I hedges 
/-L + + + ? 
ex + + + + 
K + 
The effect of an increase in K 
When the OMM does not hedge, an increase in K reduces the information sensi-
tivity of the options, causing informed traders to migrate to the stock market, leading 
to wider stock spreads. When the OMM hedges, however, spreads in option markets 
widen more than spreads in stocks, and there is less informed trading in options with 
a higher K (section 5.4.3). Proportionally more trades in the option market come 
from uninformed traders, and consequently the OMM's hedging trades contain less 
information. In equilibrium, the spreads in the stock market decrease as K increases, 
when the OMM hedges. This also explains why the difference in stock spreads nar-
rows between the case of the OMM hedging and the case of the OM1\1 not hedging as 
1\ increases. A higher K means less informed trading in the call option, so lower in-
formation content in the OMM's hedging trade, moving the stock spreads in the case 
of hedging closer to the spreads when the 01\11\1 does not hedge. It should be obvious 
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that as K increases, option spreads decrease regardless of whether the OMM hedges 
or not. When options are deeply out of the money, both the stock and option spreads 
decline and the cases of the OMM's hedging and not hedging tend to converge.9 
The effect of an increase in f-l 
A higher f-lmeans a more accurate signal and the higher threat of losses ·from 
informed trading. The SMM protects himself by setting wider stock spreads, in both 
cases of hedging and not hedging. 
In the option market, the effect of f-l is ambiguous, and depends on the interaction 
of several factors. An increased signal precision increases the expected losses from 
informed trading, and therefore to a response by the OMM of widening the option 
spreads. However, a higher f-l translates into higher gains from hedging to the OMM, 
since a hedging trade contains more information. Since hedging helps the OMM to 
recover some of the losses to informed traders, the OMM sets a narrower spread 
relative to the case of no hedging. Finally, in Section 5.4.3 we saw that informed 
traders migrate to the stock market as f-l increases, and this also helps to reduce the 
option spreads. Table 5.7 summarizes the effect of f-l on option spreads: the +( -) sign 
corresponds to a positive (negative) relation between the option spread and f-l. When 
the threat of informed trading is less significant (relatively small Q) option spreads 
decrease as f-l increases. On the other hand, when the threat of informed trading is 
90ur results that out of the money options have narrower spreads are consistent with the empirical 
findings of Kaul et a1. (2004). 
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Table :).7: The effect of f-1 on option spreads when the 0 MM hedges This 
table summarize the effect of f-1 on option spreads when the 0I\111 hedges. \Ve divide 
the table into ITM, ATI\L and OTM options. In each category. for different lc\"pls of 
0', the +(-) sign indicates a positive (negative) relationship. 
In the money At the money Out of the moncy 
0'= 0'= 0'= 
0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75 
+ + + + + 
more significant (relatively high 0'), option spreads increase as f-1 increases. 
5.4.5 The expected return on investment in stocks and op-
tions 
In this section, we calculate the returns that informed traders expect when they trade 
in stocks and in options. We then compare the effects of OMM's hedging on these 
expected returns. 
The expected returns in stocks and options are defined as the expected profit of 
trading in each market, divided by the mid-quote of the bid and ask prices in that 
market. Specifically, we have 
v[E(vIS = G) - Sal + W[Sb - E(1)IS = B)l 
Stock return = (Sa + Sb)/2 (5.-1.1 ) 
Option return = (5.4.2) 
(1 - v)[E((1) - K)+IS = G) - Cal + (1 - w)[Cb - E((1) - K)+IS = B)l 
(Ca + Cb)/2 
First. we discuss the returns when the 0I\1I\1 does not hedge. Examination of Table 
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5.8-Panel A shows a few unsurprising facts. Both stock and option returns are in-
creasing in f..L and decreasing in Q : a higher f..L gives informed traders higher expected 
returns; a higher Q leads market makers in both stock and option markets to set 
wider spreads, resulting in smaller returns from trading. 
Perhaps more important, option returns are in general higher than stock returns. 
This is consistent with Black's (1975) intuition that informed traders prefer to trade in 
the option market because of the leverage effect. The fact that options have relatively 
smaller spreads gives informed trade~s a form of implicit edge, which helps to increase 
the returns from trading. 
Note that in certain cases, e.g., when K = 40, Q = 0.25; and K = 45, Q = 0.25 
and 0.50, the returns from trading options are actually zero. At first this may seem 
strange, but a closer examination explains the reason. The returns are directly related 
to the probability of informed trading in one market. The cases of zero returns from 
trading options correspond to precisely those situations when informed traders prefer 
to pursue a (pure) strategy of only trading stocks (Le., v = w = 1). 
A natural question that arises is why, for at the money (K = 40) and out of the 
money (K = 45) options, informed traders do not trade options when a is low, and 
as a increases, they then start to trade options. This is related to the information 
sensitivity of stocks over options that we discussed earlier. Informed traders only 
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choose a mixed strategy of trading both stocks and options when the stock's infor-
mation advantage is not too large. When the stock's information advantage exceeds 
a certain threshold, informed traders switch to a pure strategy of only trading stocks. 
This threshold increases with 0:. Why? A higher proportion of informed traders re-
sults in wider stock and option spreads, with stock spreads widening more due to the 
stock's higher information sensitivity (see Section 5.4.3). Consequently, at a higher 0:, 
informed traders are more likely to trade options, leading to positive option returns 
at higher levels of a and zero option returns at lower levels of 0:. 
The returns for stock and option trading when the OMM's hedges are reported 
in Table 5.B-Panel B. First, returns are generally lower when compared to the case of 
not hedging, since hedging by the OMM raises the spreads in both markets. 
Perhaps more striking is that now option trading returns are not always greater 
than stock trading returns. Does Black's intuition no longer hold here? In what fol-
lows, we will argue that his intuition still holds. Recall that returns explicitly depend 
on the probability of informed trading in one market. Close examination of informed 
trading intensity (1.1 and w) with hedging (Table 5.3) reveals that when informed 
traders receive bad news they always sell stocks and never trade call options (i.e., 
w = 1). This is why informed traders' returns from trading option are significantly 
lower when compared to the no hedging case. In other words, because there is no 
profit on the sale of the option, this drives down the returns from trading options. 
Table 5.8: The expected returns on investment in stocks and options This table reports the returns on 
investing in stocks and options for informed traders. The returns are defined by equations (5.4.1) and (5.4.2). 
Panel A reports the results when the OMM does not hedge in the underlying market. We divide the table for 
different K and for each K, we further divide the column for different levels of 0::. We report the stock returns and 
option returns under column marked by S and 0, respectively, in the increasing order of signal precision p,. Panel 
B reports the similar results when the OMM hedges in the underlying market. 
Panel B: Returns on investment when the OMM does not hedge 
·VV' v_,£,v ....,.61" ", • ..LV V.(f.Jv ",.vv v • ..a.. V.~.I.. v_vv v . .L.I. .., • ..LV v.vu ", • ..LV V.IJ..L v.vv V • ..L~ v.vv v.vv (f09 0.86 0.19 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.11 0.18 0.05 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.05 
0.87 0.19 0.28 0.10 0.31 0.05 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.12 0.19 0.05 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.09 
0.88 0.20 0.29 0.11 0.32 0.05 0.18 0.23 0.00 0.12 0.19 0.05 0.16 0.23 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.10 
0.89 0.20 0.29 0.11 0.32 0.05 0.18 0.23 0.00 0.12 0.20 0.05 0.16 0.23 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.10 
0.90 0.21 0.30 0.11 0.33 0.05 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.12 0.20 0.05 0.17 0.24 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.10 
0.91 0.21 0.31 0.12 0.34 0.05 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.21 0.06 0.17 0.25 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.10 
0.92 0.22 0.32 0.12 0.35 0.05 0.20 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.21 0.06 0.18 0.25 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.11 
0.93 0.22 0.32 0.12 0.36 0.06 0.20 0.26 0.00 0.13 0.22 0.06 0.18 0.26 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.11 
0.94 0.23 0.33 0.12 0.37 0.06 0.21 0.26 0.00 0.14 0.22 0.06 0.18 0.26 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.11 
0.95 0.22 0.34 0.13 0.37 0.06 0.21 0.27 0.00 0.14 0.23 0.06 0.19 0.27 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.11 
0.96 0.24 0.35 0.13 0.38 0.06 0.22 0.28 0.00 0.14 0.23 0.06 0.19 0.28 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.12 
0.97 0.24 0.35 0.13 0.39 0.06 0.22 0.28 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.86 0.20 0.28 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.06 0.12 
0.98 0.25 0.36 0.14 0040 0.06 0.23 0.29 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.06 0.20 0.29 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.06 0.12 
0.99 0.25 0.37 0.14 0041 0.06 0.23 0.29 0.00 0.15 0.25 0.07 0.20 0.29 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.07 0.12 
Panel A: Returns on investment when the OMM hedges 
_.vv v.vv ...., ..... "'" v.v,", ....,.""--;!I; V.V"'" v.v ..... v ...... .&. "".'&'U (f07 0:06 0:03 0:01 0:13 0:00 0:08 0:00 0:03 5:02 0.86 0.09 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.12 
0.87 0.09 0.20 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.02 
0.88 0.10 0.21 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.02 
0.89 0.10 0.22 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.02 
0.90 0.11 0.22 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.02 
0.91 0.12 0.23 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.02 
0.92 0.12 0.24 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.02 
0.93 0.13 0.25 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.02 
0.94 0.14 0.25 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.19 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.02 
0.95 0.14 0.26 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.03 
0.96 0.15 0.26 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.03 
0.97 0.16 0.27 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.21 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.03 
0.9~ 0.16 0.27 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.22 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.9 0.17 0.28 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.22 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.20 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.03 
...... 
t-.:) 
CJ1 
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The question is why with the Ol\Ud hedging, informed traders always decide to sell 
stocks when they receive bad news and never trade the option? Call options are good 
in a positive signal case (bull market). \\"hen the news are bad~ however, informed 
traders' expected profits are limited by the call's bid price. If there is no hedging, the 
bid price is still somewhat high, making it profitable for informed traders to sell the 
options and obtain the bid prices. However, hedging by the OMM makes the option 
spreads significantly wider (see Section 5.4.2), to the point where an option sale is 
not anymore profitable for informed traders. 
Now turn back to Black's point. If we only focus on the buy side (i.e., bu~r call 
vs. buy stock), returns from trading options are higher than from trading stocks, 
reflecting the leverage advantage of options. However, since we are dealing with call 
options and the probability of selling these by informed traders is zero, the returns 
from trading options on the sell side are smaller than the returns from trading stocks. 
Obviously, the right comparison should be between trading stocks versus trading call 
options when the signal is good and trading puts when the signal is bad. In this case, 
Black's argument remains valid, whether the OMM hedges or not. 
5.5 A market for several options when hedging is 
done in the underlying stock 
Unt il now, we have considered the case of a call option and the underlying stock. In 
reality, there is a range of option contracts and not just a single contract. Various 
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options provide greater flexibility and more opportunities for traders to meet their 
trading needs. In this and the next section, we extend the basic model to consider 
market making two related options. lO First, we consider the case of one OMM who 
makes markets for two options written on the same stock but with different exercise 
prices, and hedges his option trades in the underlying market. In the next section, 
there are two OMMs, each making a market. for one option on the same stock, and 
each hedging using the other option. 
Suppose there are two call options, denoted by C1 and C2 with exercise prices 
K1 and K2 where K1 < K2. Informed traders can trade C1, C2, or both. In par-
ticular, if informed traders receive a good signal, they could buy C 1 with probability 
p or C2 with probability (1 - p); if they receive a bad signal, they could sell C1 
with probability q or C 2 with probability (1 - q), where p and q are determined in 
equilibrium. Uninformed traders buy and sell C 1 and C 2 with equal probabilities 
. 
for exogenous reasons. The OMM continues to hedge in the underlying stock market 
when he receives an option order and perceives that he might lose money in his option 
position. 
lOWe also consider the extension where a monopolistic OMM hedges in the underlying market and 
compare it to the case of a competitive OMM. We calculate the stock and option spreads and analyze 
how informed traders would adjust their trading strategy. We find that option spreads are generally 
wider, but the stock spreads are wider or narrower depending on the parameter values. In addition, 
when the OMM is monopolistic, informed traders continue to trade stocks and options at relatively 
low level of signal precision (1-'), but leave the option market and concentrate on trading stocks as I-' 
increases. Furthermore, informed traders are more likely to trade stocks when I-' is high. Intuitively, 
the monopolistic option market reduces the incentive for informed traders to trade options. Although 
the OMM can now command higher option spreads, he loses the order flow. Overall, our findings 
remain qualitatively the same compared to the case of competitive option market making. 
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Examining the stock bid and ask prices, we have the following proposition: 
Proposition 5.3. The stock bid and ask prices have the same functional forms as 
in equations {5.2.3} and {5.2·4}, whether there is one or more call optIOns and the 
option market maker hedges in the stock market. 
Intuitively, the introduction of the second call option does not change the overall 
probability structure of the OMM's hedging trade. A second option allocates different 
probabilities of trading C1 and C2 (i.e., p and (l-p) in the case of option buy. or q and 
(1- q) in the case of option sale), but the combined probability of the OM~I's hedging 
trade remains the same, regardless of the number of available options. Consequently, 
the stock bid and ask prices have the same functional form. Of course, the exact stock 
bid and ask prices are different since the probabilities that informed traders allocate 
their trades between stocks and options (i.e., 1/ and w) change. 
Informed traders have an additional choice of trading the second option. Following 
the same rationale as in Section 5.2.4, informed traders, in trying to disguise them-
selves from the market makers, choose a mixed strategy of trading either the stock, 
option C 1 , or option C2 . This means that they expect to be indifferent between 
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trading either the stock or options. This gives the following equations: 
E[vIS = G] - Sa = 
p(E[(v - K 1)+IS = G] - C~) + (1 - p)(E[(v - K 2)+IS = G] - C~) (5.5.1) 
Sb - E[vIS = B] = 
where subscript a (b) indicates the ask (bid) price. The left of both equations are 
the expected profit of trading stocks and the right are the expected profits of trading 
options. 
In addition, informed traders are indifferent between trading option C1 or option 
Trading Option C1 
C~ - E[(v - K 2)+IS = B] 
, # 
V' 
Trading Option C2 
Collectively, equations (5.5.1)-(5.5.4) give the following proposition: 
(5.5.3) 
(5.5.4) 
Proposition 5.4. The bid-ask spreads of two call options C1 and C2 written on the 
same asset but with different exercise prices, satisfy· the following condition: 
Proposition 5.4 states that the difference in the spreads of two call options with 
different strike prices and written on the same asset is proportional to the difference in 
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the strikes prices K1 and K2 times a factor that is a function of the informed traders' 
private signal precision /-L. Since /-L > 0.5 and K1 < K2, we have C1 > C2, i.e., the 
relatively more in the money call option has wider spreads than the relatively less in 
the money call option. Intuitively, a call option with a lower strike price K is more 
sensitive to private information, and therefore it attracts more informed trading. This 
is consistent with the findings of Kaul et al.(2004) that informed traders participate in 
more liquid contracts that have a high level of noise and liquidity trading, in contrast 
to the conjecture that informed traders prefer OTM options (Black (1975)). 
Consider that when informed traders observe a good signal, they buy more C1 and 
consequently push up C~. If there is a bad signal, informed traders sell the underlying 
stock. This means that C1 > C2 . As an extreme example, when the informed traders' 
signal precision is 100% (/-L = 1), C~ = Sa -Kl, C~ = Sa _K2 and Cl = C~ = Sb-VL· 
It is easy to see that when informed traders receive a good signal, they buy more of 
option 0 1 and push up O~; when they receive a bad signal, they sell the stock (since 
Ol = O~ < Sb). Furthermore, the relation 0 1 - 0 2 = K2 - K1 indicates that the 
difference in exercise prices, K1 and K2, serves to compensate the OMM's expected 
loss from trading with more informed traders in the market for 0 1 than in the market 
for 0 2 . 
Next, we calculate the equilibrium spreads for the stock and for each option when 
two options are traded. We consider that K1 = 35 (the option is in the money) 
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Figure 5.3: Stock and option spreads when the OMM makes a market for 
two options and hedges in the underlying market Panel A shows stock spreads 
with the introduction of the second option. The solid line for stock spreads when two 
options (Kl = 35 and K2 = 40) are traded. The two dot lines are for stock spreads 
when each option is the only traded option. Panel B shows option spreads with the 
introduction of the second option. The solid line are for ATM option spreads when 
two options are traded. The dot line are for ATM option spreads when it- is the only 
traded option. 
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and K2 = 40 (the option is at the money). We then compare the stock and option 
spreads in this section to the case where each option is the only traded option, as in 
t~e previous sections. Figure 5.3, Panel A shows the stock spreads when two options 
are traded and when each option is the only traded option, respectively. Panel B 
shows the at the money option spreads when the option is one of the two options 
being traded, and when there is only one option traded. 
An interesting aspect revealed by these figures is that the introduction of the 
second option causes both the stock and the option spreads to narrow. Why? The 
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reason for the reduction in the spreads of the options is because of the convexity 
property of an option payoff. The OMM's hedging costs come from his hedge ratio. 
When the OMM trades two options, his cumulative hedge ratio, weighted by the 
probability of hedging each position (i.e., ~l and ~2), can be calculated as 
~effective = ~l X Pr(Net Long ~l) + ~2 X Pr(Net Long ~2) 
where Pr(Net Long ~1(2)) is the probability of a net long position in ~l or ~2. We 
can then compare it to the hedge ratios if the OMM only trades either option Cl 
or option C2 . The results show that this cumulative hedge ratio is smaller than the 
hedge ratio of either of the options, suggesting that the OMM has a smaller position 
to hedge. If we calculate the hedging costs explicitly by taking the spreads of the 
underlying stock, we can show that the OMM incurs smaller costs in hedging, and 
this translates into narrower spreads when the 0 MM trades the two options., 
The reduction in the stock spreads is due to less informational content in the 
OMM's hedging trade. As we have discussed previously, the OMM's hedging trade 
contains information. With certain probability, the OMM trades in the same direction 
as informed traders do if they trade in the underlying market. We can calculate the 
probability of the informed trading in the option market as the proxy for informational 
content in the OMM's hedging trade, which can be shown to be 
Q./l(W - 11). 
Numerical results suggest that there is less informational content in the hedging trade 
13:3 
when two options are traded than when there is only one option traded. The less 
threat of informed trading in the underlying market narrows the stock spreads. 
Finally, we can ask what happens to the expected cost of trading options when 
the second option is introduced. We define the expected cost of trading options as 
~ Pr(trading option i) x C i d ~ sprea 
i=1,2 
where Pr(trading option i) is the probability of trading option i , i.e., the net prob-
ability of a long position in option i; and C i d are the spreads of option C'. Nu-
sprea 
merical calculations show that the expected cost of trading options is smaller when 
the second option is introduced. Obviously, the reduction in option spreads helps to 
reduce this cost. In sum, the introduction of the second call option helps to reduce 
the cost of trading options for all market participants. 
5.6 A market for several options when hedging is 
done with options 
In this section there are two OMMs, each making a market for one option, and each 
hedging using the other option. For convenience, we denote Options Market Maker 
1(2) as OMMI (OMM2) who makes market for option C 1 (C2 ). Recall that Kl < /\-2, 
Let us focus on the informed trading strategy and the OMM's hedging strategy in 
the option market. Since 01Jll\ls do not trade in the underlying market. the functional 
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forms of stock bid and ask prices are the same as in the case where there is no hedging 
at all, as described by equations (5.3.1) and (5.3.2). 
We conjecture that in equilibrium, for (p, < 1), informed traders choose the mixed 
strategy of trading two options simultaneously: 
(1) On receiving good news, informed traders either buy stocks, or simultaneously 
buy C1 and sell C2 ; 
(2) On receiving bad news, informed traders either sell stocks, or simultaneously 
sell C 1 and buy C2 . 
Therefore, it is possible that both OMMs receive orders from an informed trader. 
Figure 5.4 shows the information structure when the OMMs hedge using options. 
Informed traders are indifferent between the two choices of strategies (1) and (2). 
For strategy (1), they are indifferent between buying stocks, and simultaneously buy 
C1 and sell C2 . For strategy (2), they are indifferent between selling stocks, and 
simultaneously sell C 1 and buy C2 . We have: 
Pr(Informed buy stock) { E[vIS = G] - Sa} 
= Pr(Informed buy C1){E[(v - K 1)+IS = G] - C~} 
+Pr(Informed sell C2){C~ - E[(v - K 2)+IS = G]} (5.6.1) 
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Figure 5.4: Information structure when OMMs hedges using options The 
figure shows the information structure when two OMMs hedge using options. The 
two strategies are: (1) On receiving good news, informed traders either buy stocks, 
or buy 0 1 and sell 0 2 ; (2) On receiving bad news, informed traders either sell stocks, 
or sell 0 1 and buy 0 2 . The options trading strategy in (2) is shown in brackets. 
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Sell C2 
and 
Pr(Informed sell stock){Sb - E[vIS = B]} 
= Pr(Informed sell C1){Cl- E[(v - K1)+IS = Bn 
+Pr(Informed buy C2 ){E[(v - K 2 )+IS = B] - C~} 
Equation (5.6.1) gives: 
J.Lv{E[vIS = G] - Sa} = J.L(1- v){E[(v - Kl)+IS = G] - C~} 
+(1 - J.L)(1 - w){Ci - E[(v - K 2)+IS = G]} 
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(5.6.2) 
(5.6.3) 
The last term in equation (5.6.3) describes the informed traders' short position in 
option C2 . One can see that when the precision of the signal is perfect (J.L = 1), this 
term disappears and the indifference condition reduces to buying stocks and buying 
only call option C1 . It is precisely because the signal is imperfect, that informed 
traders choose a mixed strategy in the option market by trading the two options 
simultaneously. Going long one option and shorting the other gives them more power 
and also allows them to hide their identity in the option market more effectively. 
Each OMMs hedges with the other, so each OMM receives orders from the other 
OMM, and in turn places orders with it. We conjecture that, in equilibrium, strategy 
(1) implies that OMM2 has a net short C2 position and sells C1 to hedge. After 
receiving OMM2's short C1 orders, OMM1 still has net long C1 position and therefore 
buys C2 to hedge. 
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Denote OMM2's net short position in C 1 as x. Market making competition implies 
that OMM2's zero expected profit condition is given by: 
(5.6.4) 
where .6,2 is OMM2's hedge ratio and is defined as: 
2 _ 8fs2 Pr(C2 Sell)E[(v - K2)+IC2 Sell] - Pr(C2 Buy)E[(v - K2)+IC2 Buy] 
.6, = 8fsl = Pr(C2 Sell)E[(v - K1)+IC2 Sell] - Pr(C2 Buy)E[(v - Kl)+IC2 Buy] 
(5.6.5) 
We have Pr(C2 sell) = Pr(C2 Informed sell)+Pr(C2 Uninformed sell) = ~[0J.L(1-
w) + 0(1 - J.L)(1 - w) + ~(1 - 0)(1 - ,8)] and Pr(C2 buy) = Pr(C2 Informed buy) + 
Pr(C2 Uninformed buy) = 0 + ~[~(1 - 0)(1 - ,8)]. 
Similarly, OMM1 has expected profits from the trading of C1 and his net hedging 
in C2, that is, 
=0 (5.6.6) 
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WehavePr(C1 buy) = Pr(C1 Informed buy)+Pr(C1 Uninformed buy) = 4[ojl(l-
v) + 0:(1 - jl)(1 - v) + ~(1 - 0)(1 - {3)], Pr(C1 sell) = Pr(C1 Informed sell) + 
Pr(C1 Uninformed sell) = 0 + 4[~(1 - 0:)(1- {3)], and the net hedging probability is 
given by Pr(C2 net hedging buy) = ~[0(1 - v) - x]. 
The equilibrium condition of strategy (2) also gives the zero expected profit con-
ditions for OMMI and OMM2, denoted, respectively as (A) and (B). 
The informed traders problem is to maximize their expected profits by mixing 
between strategies (1) and (2). Specifically, we have 
max v[E(vIS = G) - Sa] + W[Sb - E(vIS = B)] 
I/,W 
(5.6.7) 
Subject to (5.6.1), (5.6.2), (5.6.4), (5.6.6), (A) and (B) 
Figure 5.5 compares the equilibrium spreads of the stock, call option C1 and call 
option C2 , when the OMM hedges in the option market versus when the OMM hedges 
in the underlying market, as in the previous section. Panel A shows the stock spreads 
when an OMM hedges using the underlying stock versus when it uses the option 
market. Panel B shows the option spreads in the two different hedging cases. The 
figure reveals several interesting facts. First, when an OMM hedges with an option, 
the stock spreads are smaller than when the OMM hedges using the underlying. When 
the OMMs hedge with each other, they do not trade in the stock market and hence 
there is less informed trading in this market. 
Second, the spreads of the in-the-money option C1 are greatly reduced when the 
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Figure 5.5: Stock and option spreads when OMMs hedge using the under-
lying and the other options Panel A shows the stock spreads when an OMM 
hedges using the underlying market (dashed line) and when two OMMs hedge with 
each other using the other option (the solid line). Panel B shows the option spreads 
for in-the-money option (C1 ) and at-the-money option (C2 ). The dotted line is the 
spreads of C1 when an OMM hedges using the underlying market and the solid line 
is the spreads of C1 when two OMMs hedge with each other using the other option. 
The dotted line with asterisk is the spreads of C2 when an OMM hedges using the 
underlying market. and the solid line with asterisk is the spreads of. C2 when two 
OMMs hedge with each other using the other option. 
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OMM hedges with options compared to when the OMM hedges with the underly-
ing stock. C1 is the most information sensitive option, and attracts more informed 
traders. The lower spreads reflects the benefit of hedging using options rather than 
the underlying for OMMs. OMMI better hedges himself and transfers more hedging 
risk to C2• 
Third, the spreads of option' C2 are generally wider at high levels of signal precision 
(I') when the OMMs hedge with options than when they hedge using the stock. For 
l-!iJ 
OMM2, when both OMMs hedge, the incremental informed trading threat that results 
from OMMl's hedging trades dominates the gains he gets from also hedging, since 
option C 1 is the most information sensitive. Note also that the spreads of ("2 are 
increasing in the signal precision fL. Intuitively, the more precise the signal is, the 
greater the informed trading threat from the OMr-.n's hedging trades. 
Finally, the spreads of C 1 are smaller than the spreads of C2 . One would expect 
the opposite in our model, since the amount of informed trading is larger in the more 
information sensitive option C 1 . When both OMMs hedge with each other, Or-.lr-.n 
transfers much of the informed trading threat to OMM2 and achieves even smaller 
spreads. 
5.7 Empirical implications 
In the previous models of stock and option market making, market makers in each 
market set prices equal to the conditional expectations of the value of the security, 
given the order flow they observe. In contrast, our model focuses on the OMMs' 
hedging strategies and asks what is the effect of hedging in both markets, as well 
as on how informed traders place their orders. We show that the OMM's hedging 
contains information, which forces the SMM to set wider spreads in the underlying 
stock. In addition, the OMM sets wider option spreads to cover his hedging cost. As 
a result, the OMM's hedging increases the costs of liquidity provision in two markets. 
Thus. our model provides several testable implications regarding the spreads and 
1--11 
market participants' trading behavior: 
Implication 1. The OMM might hedge in the same direction that informed 
traders trade in the underlying market. Therefore, the Of\Hvfs hedging trades contain 
private information. 
Implication 2. Both stock and option spreads are significantly wider due to 
OMM's hedging. 
Implication 3. Hedging by OMMs affects the trading strategy of informed 
traders. In particular, informed traders trade more in the stock market as the per-
centage of informed traders in the total trading population increases. In addition, the 
precision of informed traders' private signal affects the informed trading intensity in 
the underlying market. 
Implication 4. Stock spreads decrease as the option's exercise price increase, 
when the OMM hedges. The precision of the informed traders' private signal affects 
the option spreads in an ambiguous way, and the final result depends on the option's 
exercise prices, as well as on the percentage of informed traders in the total trading 
population. 
Implication 5. When the OMM makes a market for several options with different 
exercise prices, the spreads for each individual option go down relative to the case of 
a single traded option. The stock spreads are also smaller when the Oi\IM makes a 
market for several options. 
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Recently there is growing body of empirical evidence that seems to support several 
of the implications in our model. For example, the study by de Fontnouvelle et al. 
(2003) of the behavior of bid-ask spreads and volume in option markets, during the 
competition for listing, finds that the option's delta and the underlying stock spread 
are significantly related to the size of the option spreads. The authors conjecture that 
the cost of hedging plays a role in setting option spreads. Analysis of informed trading 
in option markets by Kaul et al. (2004) shows that the underlying stock's spread has 
an important impact on the option spreads due to the hedging activities of OMMs. 
Adverse selection in the underlying stock spreads seems to explain a significant frac-
tion of the option spreads. Both studies find evidence consistent with Implication 2 
above. Finally, experimental research by de Jong, Koedijk, and Schnitzlein (2001) 
suggests that informed traders may favor ITM options. 
5.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we develop a model of stock and option market making to evaluate the 
effects of OMM's hedging on informed trading strategies and the subsequent change 
in the costs of liquidity provision. Informed traders strategically randomize their 
trades in both markets to exploit their private information. The OMM updates his 
estimates of future states from his observation of the option order flow and hedges in 
the underlying market, or in the option market. The competition in option market 
making implies that he makes a zero combined expected profit in both option market 
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making and hedging. 
Our model sheds some light on the complex practice of option market making. 
We find that with hedging, the OMM might inadvertently'trade in the same direction 
as informed traders would do. Hence the hedging trades contain information. The 
SMM (or other OMMs) responds to this increasing threat of informed trading b.Y 
setting wider stock (option) spreads. As the OMM takes stock spreads as given when 
he hedges he pays additional transaction costs when hedging that overweigh some 
recovery of information loss in making a market for informed traders, and this results 
in wider option spreads. In summary, the costs of liquidity provision in the two 
markets increase and both informed and uninformed traders face higher transaction 
costs. Although informed traders find it might be easier to hide their identity in the 
underlying market with OMM's hedging, the overwhelmingly increased transaction 
costs in the two markets make their private signal less profitable when compared to 
the case where the OMM does not hedge. 
With the introduction of several options, informed traders have additional choices 
to exploit their informational advantage. We consider two different hedging cases: (1) 
the OMM hedges in the underlying stock market, and (2) all OMMs hedge using the 
option market. When the OMM hedges using the underlying, we find that the Of\IM's 
hedging trade is less informative and both stock and option spreads are narrower. 
The reduction in option spreads is due to the convex structure of the option's payoff, 
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which helps to reduce the hedging costs. In the case of stocks, the less informative 
hedging trade eases the informational threat from the OMM's hedging trade, and this 
helps reduce the stock spreads. We then compare the equilibrium spreads between 
the second and the first cases. We find that when OMMs hedge using the option 
markets, the spreads of both stock and in-the-money options are greatly reduced, 
while spreads of at-the-money options widen slightly. Less informed trading in stocks 
and no informed trading threat from the OMMs' hedging trade help to reduce the 
stock spreads. For OMM1, hedging using options is more effective in transferring the 
threat of informed trading to the other option, leading to an increase in the spreads 
of that option. 
Chapter 6 
A silllple lllodel of horse race 
booklllaking 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a simple model of bookmaking in a horse race betting market. 
We are motivated to study horse race bookmaking as a way to understand the market 
making of state contingent claims such as options. Horse race bookmaking and option 
market making share many similarities. Shin (1992, p426-427) argues that: 
.. .In its simplest formulation, the market for bets in an n-horse race corre-
sponds to a market for contingent claims with n states of the world, where 
the ith state corresponds to the outcome that the ith horse wins the race. 
Moreover, the basic securities (Arrow-Debreu securities) which pay a dol-
lar if a particular state obtains and nothing otherwise, have their prices 
determined by the betting odds. Since odds are offered on each horse, all 
basic securities are traded ... 
L15 
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In addition, an option market maker's profits are contingent on the stock's final 
value. Suppose the option market maker deals with butterfly spreads instead of a 
single option, there is one and only one option of the spreads that will payoff at 
expiry. It is exactly the same in a horse race: there is one and only one horse that 
will win the race eventually. Furthermore, an option market maker wants to have 
some flat, positive positions over all option exposures, so that he could always have 
positive profits and avoid negative ones. In a horse betting market, a bookmaker sells 
liabilities over all horses and wishes to avoid large liability exposures. Since a horse 
betting market is an especially simple financial market, in which the complexity of the 
pricing problem is reduced, it provides a clear view of pricing issues which are more 
complicated elsewhere. It is perhaps surprising that the market making literature 
has not previously taken up this natural approach to modeling market making state 
contingent claims. 
A horse race betting market is one form of wagering markets, which are par-
ticularly simple financial markets in which many important economic issues have 
been analyzed 1. Investors' risk preference and market information efficiency are some 
examples of these issues. There is however a limited literature on horse race book-
making. In a series of papers, Shin (1991, 1992 and 1993) analyzes the price setting 
strategy when a bookmaker faces asymmetric information. Shin's analysis attributes 
to the well-known favorite-Iongshot bias. The favorite-Iongshot bias means that the 
ISee Sauer (1998) for a recent survey on the economics of wagering markets. 
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normalized prices on the favorites of the race understate the winning chances of these 
horses, while the normalized prices on the longshots exaggerate their winning chances. 
In our model, the bookmaker faces the risk of tr~ding with possible informed 
traders as well as the risk of an unbalanced book. The book is liable to become 
unbalanced because the betting demands are noisy and the bookmaker may not know 
the correct odds to quote. There is a sizeable body of evidence that points to the 
prevalence of insider trading in the market for bets (Crafts (1985), also in Shin (1993)). 
As an uninformed trader, a bookmaker therefore has an important job to extract 
information from insiders from his betting flow observations. Furthermore, whenever 
his book becomes unbalanced, the bookmaker wants to re-balance it so that the 
problem of having extremely high liability exposures can be alleviated. Even random 
shocks from noisy traders are costly to the bookmaker since his book could become 
less balanced. 
The bookmaker in this model revises his odds to mitigate the risk. He influ-
ences the public betting flow by raising the normalized prices for horses with high 
initial liabilities and lowering the normalized prices for horses with low initialliabili-
,ties. Interestingly, the normalized prices exhibit the favorite-Iongshot bias under our 
assumption of the constant standard deviation of the individual revenue. 
Allowing the bookmaker to set odds several rounds before the race starts gives us 
a clear view of the bookmaker's price setting strategy and its impact on the public 
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betting flow over time. The odds revision reflects the way that a bookmaker learns the 
noisy market demand. We first analyze the multistage odds setting under expected 
demands and then allow the stochastic demands affect the subsequent liabilities. In 
both cases of expected demands and stochastic demands, the bookmaker gets rid of 
the positive liability exposures over a few rounds of odds setting. The book generally 
gets more balanced over time and the normalized prices approach to the roundness 
of the book. Our model helps to understand the complexity of managing a series of 
state contingent exposures such as options for a single expiry date. 
It is worth noting that the horse race in our model is the British system where a 
bookmaker sets odds for difference horses prior to the race starts. It is not the system 
in the North America where odds are determined by the parimutuel method in which 
prices are proportional to amounts wagered. 
This chapter is organized in the following way. For ease of exposition, we first 
analyze the case where the noise in the betting demands is zero in Section 6.2. Section 
6.3 considers the first stage odds setting of the model with stochastic noise. In Section 
6.4 the odds in the subsequent stages are analyzed. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 A simplified model 
6.2.1 Assumptions 
For ease of exposition, we first look at the case where the public betting demands are 
deterministic functions of the odds. This is relaxed in the following section. 
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We consider an N-horse race in which each horse is indexed as i = 1"" ,N. 
Denote the bookmaker's subjective probability that the ith horse wins the race as Pi 
and the odds that the bookmaker quotes as qi, 0 < Pi < 1 and 0 < qi < 1 for all i. 
There is a one to one correspondence between the quoted odds and the prices of bets. 
For example, odds of k to 1 correspond to the price of l/ (k + l). 
The bookmaker faces two kinds of risks. The first risk is the uncertainty about 
his wealth on each horse i, and the second is the uncertainty about which horse wins 
the race eventually. In this simplified model, we consider a simpler formulation in 
which the bookmaker's wealth is deterministic. 
We assume that the bookmaker instantaneously knows the total money he has 
already received, denoted as M, and his existing liabilities, denoted as Li on horse i. 
Denote Wi as the bookmaker's current wealth on horse i, we have: 
(6.2.1) 
When horse i wins (state i occurs) eventually, the bookmaker's wealth on this horse 
is the difference between the money he has already collected and his liability on this 
horse. 
Given the bookmaker's subjective probability Pi and quote qi, we assume that the 
market demand function for horse i, denoted as Qi, is given by: 
(6.2.2) 
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where band c are some positive constants. Clearly, the higher the quote qil the lower 
the demand Qi. Note that Qi is also the bookmaker's current liability on horse i in 
this round of betting. 
Denote ~ as the bookmaker's revenue on horse i, we have ~ = Qiqi. The 
bookmaker's total revenue is the sum of his revenues over all horses. Using equation 
(6.2.2), we have: 
N 
L~ 
i=l i=l 
c+ab (6.2.3) 
where l:~1 Pi = 1 and l:~1 qi = a > O. By construction, the total revenue is con-
stant and independent of qi, as given by equation (6.2.3). The bookmaker's decision 
of different quotes qi affects his current liabilities on different horses through equa-
tion (6.2.2), it however does not affect his total revenue. Assuming a constant total 
revenue is the major simplification we make in this model. With this, we are able 
to focus on the bookmaker's liability management problem, our primary purpose in 
this chapter. However, the assumption of the constant revenue is not unrealistic. It 
is understood that a bookmaker's total revenue is relatively less volatile than his lia-
bility exposures over different horses. One can also think of this assumption from the 
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prospect of bettors rather than the bookmaker. We can imagine that overall, bettors 
put the same amount of money every round of betting. 
The sum of the odds on all horses L~l qi requires some explanation. In a betting 
market, Dutch books generally refer to the portfolios that guarantee a payoff of one but 
whose price is less than one. To avoid the existence of Dutch books, the summation 
of all odds L~l qi normally exceeds one and the difference between the sum and one 
is often called the over-roundness of the book. The over-roundness of the book gives 
the bookmaker some positive returns for providing the service. We simply assume 
L:~1 qi = a where a > 1.2 The value of a however is restricted by the competition 
among bookmakers. Our analysis is a partial equilibrium in which the competition 
results in the return of (a -1) for each bookmaker for providing the service. One could 
also imagine that this constrain is set by regulators that requires each bookmaker only 
has the specified return. 
Assuming the bookmaker has a negative exponential utility function, his expected 
utility of wealth over all horses is given by 
(6.2.4) 
where .A is the bookmaker's risk aversion parameter. 
2Shin (1992, 1993) also reqaires the similar assumption in his models. He interprets a as the b.ids 
posted by different bookmakers and each one submits his bids for monopoly rights to the bettmg 
market. The bookmaker who sets the lowest bids wins. 
The bookmaker's maximization problem is given by: 
max E[U] 
ql,···,qN 
N 
s.t. Lqi = a 
i=l 
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(6.2.5) 
The bookmaker sets odds (ql," . , qN) for different horses to maximize his expected 
. . . . 
utility of wealth over all horses, subject to his requirement of the roundness of his 
book. 
The bookmaker's maximization problem can be theoretically solved using the La-
grange method. The analytical solution is however difficult to obtain, partly because 
the bookmaker's subjective probabilities (PI,"" PN) enter into the maximization 
problem, and because his utility function has an exponential form. To focus on the 
economic intuitions, in the next section, we solve the problem numerically for a small 
number of horses. 
6.2.2 A numerical solution 
In this section, we solve the bookmaker's maximization problem (6.2.5) numerically. 
We first make assumptions of the parameter values in the model. Let's consider a 
6-horse race, so N = 6. We let the bookmaker's total revenue be 100. Consistent with 
empirical results, the roundness of the book is assumed to be 1.15, so the bookmaker 
gets 15% return on the odds he quotes.3 Let c, the constant part of the bookmaker's 
3Kuypers (2000) reports that, in football fixed odds betting the over-roundness of the book is 
remarkably constant at around 11.5% for all the major bookmakers. The average over-roundness in 
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Table 6.1: Parameter values used in the numerical solution This table reports 
the parameter values used in the numerical solution. N is the number of horses. 
L~I ~ is the total revenue. a is the roundness of the book. c is the constant part 
of the total revenue. A is the bookmaker's risk aversion parameter. PI, ... ,6 is the 
bookmaker's subjective probability of each horse winning the race. 
N 
6 
",N 
L...Ii-1 ~ 
100 
a 
1.15 
C A PI P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
50 0.1 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.02 
total revenue in equation (6.2.3), be 50. The value of b therefore equals b = lOO-c = 
a 
43.48. Let the bookmaker's risk aversion parameter be 0.1. Table 6.1 summarizes our 
assumptions of parameter values. We also need to specify the bookmaker's subjective 
probabilities Pi for all horses. The sum of all these probabilities needs to be 1. These 
probabilities are also reported in Table 6.1. 
We are interested in how imbalances in his book are corrected. We assume 
the bookmaker inherits some initial liability positions across different horses and he 
,wishes, by setting appropriate odds, to have a more balanced book in which extremely 
high liability exposures can be avoided. In this ~implified model,. the bookmaker only 
has one chance to re-balance his book. It will be, of course, more interesting to have 
a multi-stage framework in which the bookmaker has several rounds of opportunities 
to re-balance his book. It is, however, only interesting if we introduce stochastic com-
ponents in the bookmaker's wealth levels, which is the focus of the next two sections. 
the sample of 3382 games is 11.5% with a standard deviation of only 0.34. In horse races, the over-
roundness varies considerably among bookmaker's notional implied profit margin (average 25.63%) 
and internet betting exchanges (with a maximum of 5%) (Smith, Paton and Vaughan Williams 
(2006». . 
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Table 6.2: Bookmaker's quotes: deterministic demands This table reports the 
bookmaker's odds for different initial liabilities when the individual demands are 
deterministic. For horse i, Pi is the bookmaker's subjective probability of horse i 
winning the race; Li is the initial liability that the bookmaker's inherits; qi is the 
bookmaker's odds set for this round of betting; qdpi is the normalized price. Panel 
A reports the results when the bookmaker's initial liabilities are the same. In Panel 
B the initial liabilities are highly imbalanced. 
Panel A: Panel B: 
Same Initial Liability Different Initial Liabilities 
Horse i Pi Li qi qi/Pi L· l qi qdPi 
1 0.30 0 0.35 1.15 -20 0.24 0.81 
2 0.25 0 0.29 1.15 0 0.26 1.05 
3 0.20 0 0.23 1.15 30 0.36 1.79 
4 0.15 0 0.17 1.15 10 0.18 1.23 
5 0.08 0 0.09 1.15 0 0.08 1.05 
6 0.02 0 0.02 1.15 -10 0.02 0.92 
Since our simple one-shot model offers useful intuitions, we first analyze its results 
and use them as the basis for comparison with more complicated formulations. 
Here we consider two cases of the bookmaker's initial liability positions. In the 
first case, the bookmaker inherits a flat book in which his initial liabilities are the same , 
across all horses. In the second case, he inherits different liabilities across different 
horses. Table 6.2 reports the odds (qi) and the normalized prices (qdPi) for two initial 
liability (Li) distributions. 
First, when the initial liabilities are the same, as shown in Table 6.2-Panel A, the 
odds that the bookmaker quotes are simply the products of his subjective probability 
(Pi) and the roundness of his book (a). That is, the normalized prices are constant 
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across all horses and equal to 1.15. Intuitively, since the bookmaker already has a 
balanced book, his best option is to keep the same liability distribution and simply 
set odds to satisfy his required over-roundness of his book. 
Perhaps the more interesting case is the second one when the bookmaker inherits 
an imbalanced book, as showed in the Table 6.2-Panel B. Here the bookmaker inherits 
a highly unbalanced book. The initial liabilities range from a positive 30 to a negative 
-20. The optimal odds reflect the bookmaker's effort to re-balance his book, as shown 
by the ratios of qi/Pi, his normalized prices. Observe that the normalized prices are 
higher for horses with large initial liabilities (horse 3 and 4), and lower for horses with 
small initial liabilities (horse 1 and 6). That is, the bookmaker raises the prices for 
horses with larger initial liabilities and lowers the prices for horses with smaller initial 
liabilities. Since bets contribute to new liabilities on different horses, he effectively 
encourages more bets on horses 1 and 6 and less bets on horses 3 and 4. In this way, 
the bookmaker is able to achieve a more balanced book in which extreme liability 
exposures are avoided. 
6.3 Stochastic liabilities 
In this section, we introduce noise into the demand function (6.2.2). We assume 
that the bookmaker has stochastic demands for each individual horse but still has a 
constant overall revenue. That is, the bookmaker knows how much he would collect 
from all horses but is not sure about the exact amount from each horse. 
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For each horse i, we write the individual revenue Hi as: 
(6.3.1) 
where ai is the standard deviation of the noise and Ci is normally distributed standard 
random noise with zero mean and unit variance. Note the tilde sign indicates a 
random variable. The market demand function for each horse is given by: 
(6.3.2) 
In the numerical solutions, we examine the effect of two different structures of a's on 
the current liability positions. 
We assume that the bookmaker still has a constant overall revenue, the same as 
before. That is, 2::1 ~ = c+ab. Equation (6.3.1) effectively requires 2::1 aiCi = O. 
Therefore, for any two different horses i and j, we note that the random noises Ci and 
C j are not necessarily independently distributed. 
The bookmaker's wealth on each horse, Wi, is given by: 
(6.3.3) 
where M is the total money he has already collected, Li is the existing liability on 
horse i and Qi is the current liability. Clearly here Wi is now no longer deterministic 
but normally distributed. Let the mean of Wi be Mi and the variance be Vi. The 
1.)/ 
bookmaker's expected utility is given by: 
E[U] 
since e-,\wi is lognormally distributed. Computationally it is as easy to optimize this 
as it was for the deterministic case in the previous section. 
The bookmaker's maximization problem is given by: 
max E[U] 
ql,· .. ,qN 
N 
s.t. Lqi = a 
i=l 
(6.:3.4) 
Similarly as in the deterministic case, the bookmaker chooses odds ql,"" qN for 
different horses to maximize his expected utility of 'wealth, subject to his required 
roundness of the book. 
In what follows, we solve the bookmaker's maximization problem for two different 
a structures numerically. 
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Table 6.3: Bookmaker's quotes: stochastic demands with constant a This 
table reports the bookmaker's odds for different initial liabilities when the individual 
demands are stochastic. We assume here the standard deviation ai of the individual 
revenue ~ is constant. For horse i, Pi is the bookmaker's subjective probability of 
horse i winning the race; £i is the initial liability that the bookmaker's inherits; qi 
is the bookmaker's odds set for this round of betting; qdpi is the normalized prices. 
Panel A reports the results when the bookmaker's initial liabilities are the same. In 
Panel B the initial liabilities are highly imbalanced. 
Panel A: Panel B: 
Same Initial Liability Different Initial Liabilities 
Horse i Pi £. 1, qi qi/Pi £. 1, qi qdPi 
1 0.30 0 0.33 1.11 . -20 0.23 0.79 
2 0.25 0 0.28 1.11 0 0.26 1.03 
3 0.20 0 0.22 1.12 30 0.34 1.71 
4 0.15 0 0.17 1.14 10 0.18 1.22 
5 0.08 0 0.10 1.23 0 0.09 1.15 
6 0.02 0 0.04 2.22 -10 0.04 1.93 
6.3.1 First stage: constant a 
Here we assume the standard deviations (a's) of the revenue ~ of each individual 
horse (equation (6.3.1)) are the same and equal to 1.4 Table 6.3 reports the book-
maker's quotes when all a's are the same. Panel A reports the quotes when the 
bookmaker inherits the same initial liabilities and Panel B reports the quotes with 
different initial liabilities. 
First notice that in Panel A, when the bookmaker inherits the same initialliabil-
ities, qi/Pi'S are no longer the same as in the deterministic case (Table 6.2-Panel A). 
41£ we have constant (7'S, they must be quite small to avoid real possibility of negative revenue 
for some horses. 
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In particular, when the demand function becomes stochastic, the bookmaker's odds 
exhibit the favorite-longshot bias. That is, the bookmaker reduces the normalized 
prices for horses with the high chance of winning (horse 1 and 2) and increases the 
normalized prices for horses with the low chance of winning (horse 5 and 6). The 
favorite-longshot bias arises from this model because the constant a has a dispropor-
tional effect on the current liability for each horse. The effect is much stronger for the 
longshots (e.g., horse 6) than for the favorites (e.g., horse 1) since the noise is more 
significant in affecting the current liability of longshots. Recall that we have constant 
a's for the revenues and their effect on current liabilities is given by ~ (equation 
(6.3.2)). Since the longs hots have smaller q/s, they have relatively big ~'s. The 
longshots therefore get penalized and the normalize prices (qi/Pi) increase. 
Table 6.3-Panel B reports the bookmaker's quotes when he inherits different initial 
liabilities. Comparing to Table 6.2-Panel B, the normalized prices for horses 1, 2, 3 
and 4 are reduced and for horses 5 and 6 are increased. These changes partly reflect 
the favorite-Iongshot bias that we have just discussed. Notice that the normalized 
prices for horses 3 and 4 are still relatively high, reflecting the way that the bookmaker 
manages his liabilities is that he raises the relative prices for horses with high initial 
liabilities in an effort to reduce his liabilities over these horses. Of particular interest 
is that the normalized price for the longshot (horse 6) increases a lot, reflecting the 
stronger effect of the constant standard deviation of revenue on the least preferable 
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Table 6.4: Bookmaker's quotes: stochastic demands with proportional (I 
This table reports the bookmaker's odds for different initial liabilities when the indi-
vidual demands are stochastic. We assume here the standard deviation (Ii of individ-
ual revenue R is proportional to the bookmaker's subjective probability Pi of horse 
i winning the race. For horse i, Pi is the bookmaker's subjective probability of horse 
i winning the race; Li is the initial liability that the bookmaker's inherits; qi is the 
bookmaker's odds set for this round of betting; qi/Pi is the normalized prices. Panel 
A reports the results when the bookmaker's initial liabilities are the same. In Panel 
B the initial liabilities are highly imbalanced. 
Panel A: Panel B: 
Same Initial Liability Different Initial Liabilities 
Horse i Pi Li qi qi/Pi L-t qi qi/Pi 
1 0.30 0 0.35 1.15 -20 0.25 0.82 
2 0.25 0 0.29 1.15 0 0.26 1.06 
3 0.20 0 0.23 1.15 30 0.35 1.75 
4 0.15 0 0.17 1.15 10 0.18 1.23 
5 0.08 0 0.09 1.15 -0 0.08 1.06 
6 0.02 0 0.02 1.15 -10 0.02 0.93 
horse. 
6.3.2 First stage: proportional (]' 
Now we assume that (Ii is proportional to the bookmaker's subjective probability Pi· 
More specifically, we let (Ii = m x Pi and m = 6. Table 6.4 reports the bookmaker's 
quotes when (Ii is proportional to the bookmaker's subjective probability Pi· Panel A 
reports the quotes when the bookmaker inherits constant initial liabilities and Panel 
B reports the quotes with different initial liabilities. 
Table 6.4-Panel A shows that when the bookmaker inherits the same initial li-
abilities, the bookmaker quotes the same odds as in the deterministic case (Table 
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6.2-Panel A). The normalized prices for all horses are the same and equal to the 
roundness of his book (1.15). Intuitively, when (Ii is proportional to Pi, the standard 
deviation of the current liability Qi is proportional to Pi/qi (equation (6.3.2)). There-
fore, the variance of liability Qi is constant if the ratio of pi/ qi is constant. The ratio 
of pi/ qi is constant in this formulation, the same as in the deterministic case. The 
noise in fact does not affect the bookmaker's decision and he quotes the same odds 
as in the deterministic case. The normalized prices satisfy the bookmaker's required 
roundness of his book. 
Table 6.4-Panel B shows the odds when the bookmaker inherits different initial 
liabilities. Since in this formulation the standard deviation of the current liabilities 
Qi is proportional to the ratio of Pi/qi, the horses with high Pi/qi (or low qi/Pi, the 
normalized prices) get penalized. Comparing to the deterministic case in Table 6.2-
Panel B, clearly, previous bargains (low qi/Pi, the normalized prices) get penalized 
and their normalized prices increase (horses 1, 2, 5 and 6). Horses previously with 
high normalized prices (horses 3 and 4) see improvement in their prices and their 
prices decrease. We find that horses with high initial liabilities (horses 3 and 4) still 
have relatively high prices. Therefore the bookmaker still uses odds to influence the 
public betting flow to manage his book. 
6.4 Subsequent stages odds setting 
Since a bookmaker typically sets odds for several rounds before the race st arts. in thi:-; 
section, we examine the eff'ect of this multistage bets setting in the contf'xt of stochas-
tic demands that we have introduced in Section 6.3. It is worth noting that in the 
subsequent stages the bookmaker continues to maximize the expected utilit~· of ter-
minal wealth, without taking account of probable future trading opportunities. That 
is, the bookmaker is myopic. This section is divided into two parts. The first suhsec-
tion deals with the subsequent stages' odds in terms of expected demand funct ions. 
The second part introduces noise in calculating the demands. In each subsection, we 
proceed under our assumptions of the two a structures, i.e., the constant a's and the 
proportional a's. 
6.4.1 Expected demands 
Here we calculate the multistage odds in terms of the expected market demands. 
That is, we calculate the expected wealth from equation (6.3.3), which is eff'ectively 
obtained by taking the expectation of the market demand function (6.3.2). In any 
rounds of bets setting, given his initial liability positions, the bookmaker sets current 
odds and obtains his current wealth on each horse. His current wealth is essent ially 
the negative value of his liability for each horse and we take the negative value of 
the current wealth as the the initial liability in the next round. Since t he noise has a 
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zero mean, when we take the expectation of the demand function (equation (6.3.2)), 
the random noise itself does not affect the wealth, although the variance of noise 
affects the odds through. the bookmaker's maximization problem (6.3.4). Table 6.5 
reports the multistage odds under our assumption of two a structures. In each case, 
we let the bookmaker start with the same unbalanced book and see how his book 
evolves as he has five (5) chances to set his odds (from LO to L4). We also report the 
normalized prices qd Pi for every horse in each round of odds setting. Figure 6.1 shows 
the distributions of the book and the normalized prices. Numbers 1 - 5 indicate the 
first round to the fifth round of bets setting. Note that the bookmaking in this model 
is quite profitable. The bookmaker obtains positive wealth (negative liabilities) over 
all horses after two rounds of bets setting.5 
Constant a 
Table 6.5-Panel A reports the odds that the bookmaker sets when a's are constant 
and equal to 1. Note that negative liabilities correspond to positive wealth. So it is 
beneficial to the bookmaker to have only negative liabilities (positive wealth). We 
observe that after the first round of betting, the bookmaker's liabilities on all horses 
except horse 3 are negative. After the second round of betting, all his liabilities are 
negative. 
As we have discussed, constant a's introduce the favorite-longshot bias and it is 
5There is however no clear relationship between the normalized prices and the liabilities for 
different horses, possibly because that the risk component (Vi) of the bookmaker's utility function 
has a stronger effect than the endowment component (Mi) in his maximization problem. 
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Table 6.5: Multistage odds setting: expected demands This table reports the 
odds that the bookmaker sets for five rounds of betting. L indicates the bookmaker's 
liability positions over 6 horses. For horse i, LOi is the initial liability and L1i - L4; 
are subsequent liabilities; qi/Pi is the normalized price. SD is the standard deviation 
of respective liabilities position. Panel A reports the odds that the bookmaker sets 
when a's are constant. Panel B reports the odds when ai is proportional to Pi. 
Panel A: Odds with constant a 
Horse Pi LOi qi/Pi L1i qi/Pi L2i qi/Pi L3i qi/Pi L4i qi/Pi 
1 0.30 -20.00 0.79 -13.24 1.02 -20.80 1.10 -31.98 1.13 -44.29 1.13 
2 0.25 0.00 1.03 -7.88 1.11 -19.33 1.13 -31.70 1.14 -44.38 1.14 
3 0.20 30.00 1.71 2.68 1.32 -15.99 1.20 -30.89 1.16 -44.44 1.16 
4 0.15 10.00 1.22 -5.57 1.18 -19.57 1.16 -32.80 1.15 -45.79 1.15 
5 0.08 0.00 1.15 -12.95 1.15 -25.99 1.15 -38.90 1.15 -51.77 1.15 
6 0.02 -10.00 1.93 -40.60 1.69 -67.53 1.54 -91.63 1.45 -113.55 1.45 
SD 17.22 14.76 19.54 20.10 27.67 
Panel B: Odds with proportional a 
Horse Pi LOi qi/Pi L1i qi/Pi L2i qi/Pi L3i qi/Pi L4i qi/Pi 
1 0.30 -20.00 0.82 -15.68 1.03 -23.65 1.11 -35.03 1.14 -47.50 1.14 
2 0.25 0.00 1.06 -9.35 1.13 -21.51 1.14 -34.29 1.15 -47.25 1.15 
3 0.20 30.00 1.75 1.99 1.35 -17.41 1.22 -32.84 1.17 -46.74 1.16 
4 0.15 10.00 1.23 -5.87 1.19 -20.29 1.16 -33.86 1.16 -47.10 1.15 
5 0.08 0.00 1.06 -9.35 1.13 -21.51 1.14 -34.29 1.15 -47.25 1.15 
6 0.02 -10.00 0.93 -12.60 1.08 -22.62 1.12 -34.67 1.14 -47.38 1.15 
SD 17.22 6.11 2.16 0.76 0.27 
clearly shown by the normalized prices of qi/Pi in Table 6.5-Panel A. The normalized 
prices are generally higher for the longshot~ horse 6, and lower for the favorites, horse 
1. After five rounds of betting, the normalized prices are close to the roundness of 
the book (1.15) for all horses except horse 6. I 
As the bookmaker continues to re-balance his book over time, his book becomes 
less volatile in general. The standard deviation of his book decreases from 17.22 of 
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the initial book to 14.76 in the second round. After that, the standard deviation of 
his book gradually increases slightly. Close observation reveals that the increase in 
the standard deviations is due to the strong negative liability of horse 6 (the standard 
deviation of the liabilities on horse 1 - 5 is only 3.21 in the fifth round), which comes 
from the negati,ve initial liability and more importantly the huge variance of the 
current liability on horse 6.6 
Proportional a 
Table 6.5-Panel B reports the bookmaker's odds when ai is proportional to his 
subjective probability Pi. As we have discussed previously, compared to the deter-
ministic case, proportional a's of stochastic demands penalize the previous bargains 
and raise their prices but do not introduce the favorite-longshot bias. As shown by 
the results in Panel B, over several rounds, the bargains in the previous rounds al-
ways get penalized in the next round and as a consequence, all normalized prices are 
pulled towards the roundness of the book (1.15). Furthermore, the absence of the 
favorite-longshot bias helps the bookmaker to balance his book more quickly than in 
the case when a's are constant. The standard deviation decreases from 17.22 of the 
initial book to 0.27 in the fifth round. 
6Recall that the standard deviation of the current liability in equation (6.3.2) is ~. Since horse 
6 has the smallest odds (Q6), given the constant a's, it has the biggest standard deviation. 
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Figure 6.1: Distributions of books and normalized prices: expected demand 
functions These figures show the distributions of liability positions and normalized 
prices over 5 rounds of bets setting for 6 horses. Panel A, B (C, D) reports the 
distributions of liabilities and normalized prices when a's are constant (proportional 
to Pi'S). Numbers 1-5 indicate the 1st to 5th round of odds setting. 
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6.4.2 Noisy demands 
Now we calculate the true stochastic demands using equation (6.3.2). The noise (J"iti 
in the equation of individual revenue (6.3.1) now affects the bookmaker's current 
liabilities as well as the remaining liability in each round of bets setting. In Appendix 
C, we simulate the noise (J"iti that satisfies L~l (J"iti = o. Table 6.6 reports the 
odds that the bookmaker sets with noisy demands under our assumption of two (J" 
structures. Figure 6.2 illustrates the distributions of the book and the normalized 
prices. Numbers 1 - 5 indicate the first round to the fifth round of bets setting. 
Similarly to the case of expected demands, the bookmaker makes quite a lot of profits 
in this model. After two rounds of bets setting, the bookmaker obtains positive wealth 
(negative liabilities) over all horses. 
Constant (J" 
Table 6.6-Panel A reports the odds that the bookmaker sets with stochastic de-
mands when (J"'s are constant. The same as in the case of expected demands, after 
two rounds of bets setting, the bookmaker gets rid of all positive liability exposures. 
Comparing to the case of the expected demands,' the noise in the demands makes 
the overall book more volatile. For example, in the last round, the standard devi-
ation of the liabilities over horse 1-5 is now 10.36, compared to 3.21 in the case of 
the expected demands. The strong negative liability on horse 6 increases the overall 
standard deviations of the book over the last few rounds. 
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Figure 6.2: Distributions of books and normalized prices: noisy demand 
functions This figure shows the distributions of liability positions and normalized 
prices over 5 rounds of bets setting for 6 horses. Panel A, B (C, D) reports the 
distributions of liabilities and normalized prices when a's are constant (proportional 
to Pi'S). Numbers 1-5 indicate the 1st to 5th round of odds setting. 
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Table 6.6: Multistage odds setting: noisy demands This table reports the odds 
that the bookmaker sets for five rounds of betting. L indicates the bookmaker's 
liability positions over 6 horses. For horse i, LOi is the initial liability and L1i - L4i 
are subsequent liabilities; qi/Pi is the normalized price. SD is the standard deviation 
of respective liabilities position. Panel A reports the odds that the bookmaker sets 
when (T'S are constant. Panel B reports the odds when (Ti is proportional to Pi. 
Panel A: Odds with constant (T 
Horse Pi LOi qi/Pi L1i qi/Pi L2· qJp. t t t. L3i qi/Pi L4· qJp. t t .t 
1 0.30 -20.00 0.79 -13.55 1.01 -19.30 1.17 -33.96 1.16 -44.69 1.19 
2 0.25 0.00 1.03 -3.99 1.17 -18.25 1.19 -37.78 1.10 -47.10 1.19 
3 0.20 30.00 1.71 2.86 1.31 -20.93 1.15 -29.01 1.27 -47.16 1.20 
4 0.15 10.00 1.22 -12.19 1.06 -33.05 0.99 -44.24 1.03 -63.85 0.96 
5 0.08 0.00 1.15 -7.16 1.23 -30.99 1.11 -42.53 1.14 -67.62 1.01 
6 0.02 -10.00 1.93 -40.74 1.68 -58.41 1.66 -84.82 1.53 -100.03 1.53 
SD 17.22 15.07 15.18 20.10 20.78 
Panel B: Odds with proportional (T 
Horse Pi LOi qi/Pi L1i qi/Pi L2i qi/Pi L3i qi/Pi L4i qi/Pi 
1 0.30 -20.00 0.82 -17.66 1.00 -17.90 1.22 -32.72 1.20 -45.78 1.22 
2 0.25 0.00 1.06 -3.51 1.22 -19.87 1.18 -41.77 1.05 -48.23 1.17 
3 0.20 30.00 1.75 2.20 1.34 -23.11 1.13 -29.16 1.27 -47.70 1.18 
4 0.15 10.00 1.23 -14.45 1.09 -31.42 1.00 -42.47 1.04 -60.92 0.98 
5 0.08 0.00 1.06 -6.57 1.17- -23.87 1.11 -35.59 1.15 -54.08 1.07 
6 0.02 -10.00 0.93 -12.63 1.07 -20.72 1.17 -34.44 1.17 -47.02 1.19 
SD 17.22 7.11 4.74 5.20 5.81 
The noise also makes the normalized prices more volatile, as shown by comparing 
Figure 6.2-Panel B with Figure 6.1-Panel B. The favorite-Iongshot bias still exists in 
the constant (T case. The normalized prices are higher for the longshot (horse 6) and 
lower for the favorite (horse 1). 
With the stochastic demands the bookmaker has a more difficult job of making 
. , 
his book. In the deterministic case, the bookmaker worries about the balance of his 
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book and needs to deliberately set odds in such a way to influence the public betting 
flow to achieve a more balanced book. The bookmaker also worries about trading 
with informed traders since his subjective prediction of the winner of the race might 
be wrong. With the stochastic demand functions, even the random shocks in the 
demand functions are costly to the bookmaker, as these shocks complicate the signal 
in the betting flow information and and more importantly, they make the book less 
balanced. 
Proportional a 
Table 6.6-Panel B reports the multistage odds with proportional a's. As we have 
discussed, proportional a's penalize the previous bargains and raise their prices. The 
normalized prices are generally pulled towards the roundness of the book (1.15). 
Without the favorite-longshot bias, the liability positions are less volatile com-
pared to the case of constant a's. The standard deviations are reduced to around 5 
to 6 after five rounds of betting as compared to around 20 in the case of constant a's. 
Of course, the noise in demand functions makes both the book and the normalized 
prices more volatile compared to the case of expected demands (Figure 6.1, Panel C, 
D and Figure 6.2, Panel C, D). 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a simple model of horse race bookmaking. The bookmaker 
worries about trading with informed traders since the betting demands are noisy and 
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he may not know the correct odds to quote. He also worries about his unbalanced 
book since he may have high liability exposures over some horses. The noisy demands 
complicate the signal in the bookmaker's betting flow observation and make his book 
less balanced. Even random shocks from noisy traders are costly to the bookmaker 
since his book could become unbalanced. 
In our model, the bookmaker revises his odds to mitigate the risk. He influences 
the public betting flow by raising the normalized prices for horses with high initial 
liabilities and lowering the normalized prices for horses with low initial liabilities. The 
bettors find less attractive prices for horses with larger initial liabilities and therefore 
place smaller bets on these horses. Through this new round of betting, the bookmaker 
achieves a more balanced book. Allowing the bookmaker to set several rounds of odds 
before the race starts gives a clear view of the bookmaker's odds setting strategy and 
its impact on the public betting flow over time. 
Our model gives other interesting results. In particular, the favorite-Iongshot bias 
arises in our model naturally as a consequence of our assumption of the constant 
standard deviation of the revenue on each horse. Shin (1991, 1992, 1993) argues that 
the favorite-Iongshot bias arises from information asymmetry in betting markets. It 
is therefore not obvious whether the favorite-Iongshot bias could arise from specific 
model formulations or necessarily from information asymmetry as in Shin's model. 
More importantly, our model helps to understand the complexity of managing a 
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series of state contingent exposures such as options. A bookmaker in a horse betting 
market and an option market maker face similar problems of managing their state 
contingent exposures. In this model, the bookmaker has a clear idea of the expiry date 
of his state contingent claims (when the race finishes and the winner is declared). At 
any point in time before the race starts, the bookmaker knows exactly what his losses 
would be for every horses. This clear expiry date makes the bookmaker's operation 
considerably easier as compared to the problem faced by an option market maker. 
In reality, an option market maker faces a complicated problem of market making. 
He must use the order flow to estimate the true value of the underlying asset (or, more 
precisely, the true implied volatility of the options). He also tries to use the order flow 
on some options to influence the order flow of other options since option contracts 
are closely related securities. Furthermore, he must set bid and ask prices to flat his 
book (the portfolio of his option contracts) to avoid any large option exposures. 
Clearly, an option market maker faces a combination of the problems of our models 
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. In Chapter 4, we provides a model of how a market 
maker uses his knowledge of the correlated order flow information to improve his 
estimation of the unknown price process. In Chapter 6, we provides a model of how 
a bookmaker manages his state contingent claims which have a clear and fixed expiry 
date. In both models, the market maker and the bookmaker face noisy order flows or 
betting flows. ~rthermore, the market maker in Chapter 4 has a learning problem 
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to solve while the bookmaker in Chapter 6 knows a clear expiry date of his exposures. 
Of course, our model in this chapter is not a complete one for modeling option market 
making. But the combination of the insights from both chapters gives a more clearer 
picture of the complex market making problem that an option market maker faces. 
It will be interesting to extend the bookmaking model in this chapter to include 
the bookmaker's learning problem. The bookmaker must be able to learn the true 
probabilities of the horses wining the race from his noisy betting flow observation. 
Furthermore, it will be nice to have a model in which odds themselves change stochas-
tically. By incorporating these two issues, our model would provide a more complete 
model of market making state contingent claims. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
This thesis has studied four related topics on market making, an area of great impor-
tance to regulators, practitioners and academics. We are interested in the normative 
analysis of market making and in particular, market making options. fl.lodels in this 
thesis provide important insights of what option market makers are juggling with. 
especially the complicated problems they face and the nature of the risk they are 
exposed to. In this chapter, we briefly summarize the key findings of our work and 
indicates potential directions for future research. 
7.1 Summary and conclusions 
In Chapter 3 we develop and analyze a simple model of stock market making in which 
a monopolistic market maker solves both the problems of inventor~' management and 
asymmetric information. There are two distinctive features in this model. First, the 
market maker in this model is exposed to the inventory risk. He tril)s to manage 
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his inventory to an acceptable level. Second, the market maker is exposed to mar-
ket asymmetric information. Without knowing whom he is trading with, the market 
maker updates his estimates of the stock's true value through his order flow obser-
vation. In a Bayesian updating framework, our market maker's estimation problem 
can be summarized into a particular state-space form called the Kalman filter. The 
Kalman filter describes how the information in the market maker's order flow obser-
vation is impounded into his price setting process. We contribute to the literature 
by combining the inventory risk and asymmetric information into a simple dynamic 
setting and analyzing the properties under such a setting. 
In this model, the risk aversion of the market maker has an important effect on 
the market making profitability. With increasing risk aversion, both the means and 
the standard deviations of the market maker's expected cumulative profits decrease. 
Therefore the market maker in our model is willing to give up much of his profits to 
control the risk of ,his inventory positions. Inventory is risky and consumes capital. 
Our model provides a simple way for market makers to optimally process information 
to control inventory. 
The extension of the model to the continuous time provides useful insights into 
our stochastic system. The system of three state variables describes the process of 
how the market maker's estimation error changes his inventory positions and reduces 
his cumulative profits. In particular, the market maker deliberately biases his bid 
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and ask prices to move his inventory to the long run mean of zero. His pricing bias 
also greatly reduces the market maker's profitability. The market maker therefore 
has enormous interests to process information correctly, and under the assumptions 
in this model, the Kalman filter provides the optimal method to estimate the true 
pnce. 
Motivated by the problem of market making options at several different strikes, 
where the commonality can be quite extreme, in Chapter 4 we extend the single stock 
market making model in Chapter 3 to study the market making of multiple stocks. 
The market maker still does not know the each stock's true value but knows the return 
covariance structure of these stocks. In particular, our assumption of the stocks' 
return covariance structure in this chapter is intended to represent the correlation in 
volatilities, an important feature in option contracts. The market maker's knowledge 
of the return covariance affects his price estimations, which in turn affects the market 
demands. If the market maker learns information form the order flow of other stocks, 
his estimation of the prices of every stock improves. In particular, the better estimates 
help the market maker value his inventory positions more accurately, which reduces 
the risk of his inventories. Better estimates also help mitigate information asymmetry. 
The market maker's knowledge of the return covariance structure, together with his 
ability to use the correlated order flow information in his price estimation, improves 
his market making profitability. An interesting result from the model is that the 
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correlated market demands give rise to liquidity commonality, an important topic 
itself. Our paper provides another support to the empirical findings by Coughenour 
and Saad (2004) who claim that common market makers are one reason for liquidity 
commonality. 
In Chapter 5 we move our attention to the informational link between financial 
markets. We analyze the effect of an option market maker's hedging on the informed 
trading strategy and the subsequent changes in the costs of liquidity provision in 
stock and option markets. We find that with hedging, the OMM might inadvertently 
trade in the same direction as informed traders would do. Hence the hedging trades 
contain information. The SMM (or other OMMs) responds to this increasing threat 
of informed trading by setting wider stock (option) spreads. As the OMM takes stock 
spreads as given when he hedges he pays additional transaction costs when hedging 
that overweigh some recovery of information loss in making a market for informed 
traders, and this results in wider option spreads. In summary, the costs of liquidity 
provision in the two markets increase and both informed and uninformed traders 
face higher transaction costs. Although informed traders find it might be easier to 
hide their identity in the underlying market with OMM's hedging, the overwhelmingly 
increased transaction costs in the two markets make their private signal less profitable 
when compared to the case where the OMM does not hedge. 
With the introduction of several options, informed traders have additional choices 
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to exploit their informational advantage. We consider two different hedging cases: (1) 
the OMM hedges in the underlying stock market, and (2) all OMMs hedge using the 
option market. When the OMM hedges using the underlying, we find that the OMM's 
hedging trade is less informative and both stock and option spreads are narrower. 
The reduction in option spreads is due to the convex structure of the option's payoff, 
which helps to reduce the hedging costs. In the case of stocks, the less informative 
hedging trade eases the informational threat from the OMM's hedging trade, and this 
helps reduce the stock spreads. We then compare the equilibrium spreads between 
the second and the first cases. We find that when OMMs hedge using the option 
markets, the spreads of both stock and in-the-money options are greatly reduced, 
while spreads of at-the-money options widen slightly. Less informed trading in stocks 
and no informed trading threat from the OMMs' hedging trade help to reduce the 
stock spreads. For OMMl, hedging using options is more effective in transferring the 
threat of informed trading to the other option, leading to an increase in the spreads 
of that option. 
Motivated by the problems of market making state contingent claims, in Chapter 
6, we develop a simple model of horse race bookmaking. The bookmaker worries 
about trading with informed traders since the betting demands are noisy and he may 
not know the correct odds to quote. He also worries about his unbalanced book 
since he may expose to high liability positions over some horses. The noisy demands 
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complicate the signal in the bookmaker's betting flow observation and make his book 
less balanced. Even random shocks from noisy traders are costly to the bookmaker 
since his book could become unbalanced. 
In our model, the bookmaker revises his odds to mitigate the risk. He influences 
the public betting flow by ra~sing the normalized prices for horses with high initial 
liabilities and lowering the normalized prices for horses with low initial liabilities. The 
bettors find less attractive prices for horses with larger initial liabilities and therefore 
place smaller bets on these horses. Through this new round of betting, the bookmaker 
achieves a more balanced book. Allowing the bookmaker to set several rounds of odds 
before the race starts gives a clear view of the bookmaker's odds setting strategy and 
its impact on the public betting flow over time. 
Our model gives other interesting results. In particular, the favorite-Iongshot bias 
arises in our model naturally as a consequence of our assumption of the constant 
standard deviation of the revenue on each horse. Shin (1991, 1992, 1993) argues that 
the favorite-Iongshot bias arises from information asymmetry in betting markets. It 
is therefore not obvious whether the favorite-Iongshot bias could arise from specific 
model formulations or necessarily from information asymmetry as in Shin's model. 
More importantly, our model helps to understand the complexity of managing a 
series of state contingent exposures such as options. A bookmaker in a horse betting 
market and an option market maker face similar problems of managing their state 
180 
contingent exposures. In this model, the bookmaker has a clear idea of the expiry date 
of his state contingent claims (when the race finishes and the winner is declared). At 
any point in time before the race starts, the bookmaker knows exactly what his losses 
would be for every horses. This clear expiry date makes the bookmaker's operation 
considerably easier as compared to the problem faced by an option market maker. 
In reality, an option market maker faces a complicated problem of market making. 
He must use the order flow to estimate the true value of the underlying asset (or, more 
precisely, the true implied volatility of the options). He also tries to use the order flow 
on some options to influence the order flow of other options since option contracts 
are closely related securities. Furthermore, he must set bid and ask prices to flat his 
book (the portfolio of his option contracts) to avoid any large option exposures. 
Clearly, an option market maker faces a combination of the problems of our models 
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. In Chapter 4, we provides a model of how a market 
maker uses his knowledge of the correlated order flow information to improve his 
estimation of the unknown price process. In Chapter 6, we provides a model of how 
a bookmaker manages his state contingent claims which have a clear and fixed expiry 
date. In both models, the market maker and the bookmaker face noisy order flows or 
betting flows. Furthermore, the market maker in Chapter 4 has a learning problem 
to solve while the bookmaker in Chapter 6 knows a clear expiry date of his exposures. 
The combination of the insights from both chapters gives a more clearer picture of 
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the complex market making problem that an option market maker faces. 
7.2 Directions for future research 
Our objective in this thesis is to provide a normative analysis of how a market maker 
should behave in financial markets. In particular, we have developed different ap-
proaches to study the market making in an option market. Compared to stocks, the 
most distinctive feature of options is that they are closely related securities, i.e., a 
parameterized family of substitutable securities. Options with the same underlying 
asset but different strikes are some examples. It will be of interest to extend some of 
the modeling techniques used in this thesis to better characterize the complexity of 
option market making in practice. 
There are a number of ways in which our study can be extended. First, the 
Kalma.n filter algorithm that we have used in Chapter 3 and 4 has a nice structure 
capable of analyzing more complicated problems. Of particular interest is to apply 
the technique to study option market marking. How information is generated and 
disseminated at different strikes and how market makers manage the inventory of 
portfolios of different option contracts are interesting research topics. The Kalman 
filter provides a constructive way of analyzing these questions. In fact, our result in 
Chapter 4 provides the first step towards this direction. We have shown that the 
market maker obtains better estimates of the unknown price processes of multiple 
securities by considering the correlated order flow information through his Kalman 
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filter updating. 
Second, in Chapter 3, we assume that the market maker is myopic by maximizing 
his expected utility of per period of profit. This assumption simplifies the calculation 
since at any point in time, the market maker only cares about his profit and risk in the 
current period. An alternative formulation is that the market maker m~imizes his 
overall expected utility of per period profit over the entire time horizon. Comparing 
to equation (3.2.9), the alternative maximization problem is given by: 
00 
The market maker may have interesting intertemporal strategic behavior under this 
alternative formulation since the optimal bid and ask prices of the current period may 
affect his expected utility of the later periods. It is therefore worth investigating the 
market maker's optimal price setting strategy under this alternative formulation of 
his maximization problem. 
Third, in Chapter 5 we only consider the simplest hedging by an option market 
maker: the delta hedging. This hedging strategy only provides a temporary pro-
tection against small price movements in the underlying market. In practice, more 
complicated hedging strategies such as gamma and vega hedging have been widely 
used. It is of interest to study the effects of these hedging strategies on the informed 
trading behavior and how information is transmitted between the related markets, 
both theoretically and empirically. Furthermore, we only consider European options 
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which can be exercised at maturity. How the early exercise option of American options 
affects informed trading strategies remains to be analyzed. 
Finally, our model in Chapter 6 provides a clear view of how a bookmaker sets 
odds over time to balance his state contingent obligations. Given the similarities 
between option market making and horse race bookmaking, a horse race betting 
market provides a convenient channel to study option market making. It will be 
interesting to extend the bookmaking model in Chapter 6 to include the bookmaker's 
learning problem. The bookmaker must be able to learn the true probabilities of the 
horses wining the race from his noisy betting flow observation. Furthermore, it will be 
nice to have a model in which odds themselves change stochastically. Incorporating 
these issues would contribute to our understanding of how an option market maker 
should behave in the complex market making environment. 
Appendix A 
Proof of results in Chapter 3 
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1 
From equations (3.2.10), we obtain the expectation and the YariancE' of the profits as 
in equations (3.3.1) and (3.3.2). The coefficients fIt (bat' bbt ,fh) and ht (bat' bbt J)/) an' 
as follows: 
Substituting equations (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) back into the maximization problem 
(3.2.11), and taking first order conditions with respect to bat and bbt' we hay(' a 
system of linear equations as follows: 
Qo - [2n + A( 402 5 t + n2a~ + a~]bat + AajJ( 4S( + a~)bbt - Aaa~It = 0 
Qo - [2jJ + A( 4/f 5/ + jJ2a~ + a~]bbt + AOJ( 4St + a~)bat - /\,3a~It = 0 
184 
Solving the above equations through substation, we obtain 
6at = K{[2,8 + A,8(a + ,8) (4St + (}~) + A(}~]Qo - Aa(}~(2d + Aa.~.)Jt} 
= AltQo - A 2,!t 
6bt = K{[2a + Aa(a + ,8) (4St + (}~) + A(}~]Qo + A(3(}~('20 + A0"1)Jt } 
= BIt Qo + B2Jt 
where K = [4a,8 + 2A(a(}~ + (3(}1) + A2(}~(}1 + (4St + (};)(2AOd2 + 2Aa2(3 + A2.i-J2(}1 + 
A2a2(}~)]-1 is a positive function of St. 
The bid and ask prices are given by 
Substituting 6at and 6bt gives the results. o 
A.2 Proof of Corollary 3.2 
The total bid-ask spread is the difference between the bid and and ask prices and has 
the following expression: 
where K has the same expression as in the Proof of Proposition 3.1 and is a positive 
function of St. o 
lSli 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3 
The pricing bias (PB) is obtained as follows: 
cr~) (4),03 + 2).2 (J2 cr2 ) 1 is a posi ti ve function of St and )._ o 
A.4 Proof of Corollary 3.4 
Denote the constant spread as 2m where m is a positive number, then bid and ask 
prices has relationship as at - bt = 2m. The pricing bias therefore is bt + m - Pt-
Following the same line of calculations to maximize the expected utility of per 
period profit, we obtain the optimal PB' as 
where /'l,t = [2( a + (3) +).( 4( a + (3)2 (St + cr~) + cr1 + cr~l is a positive function of St - 0 
Appendix B 
Simulation of random variables 
that has a covariance matrix V in 
Chapter 4 
In this section, we show how to simulate n random variables Tj with the following 
covariance matrix: 
a+b be be2 ben - 2 ben - 1 
be a+b be ben - 3 ben - 2 
be2 be a+b ben - 4 ben - 3 
V= 
ben - 2 ben - 3 ben - 4 a+b be 
ben - 1 ben - 2 ben - 3 be a+b 
i.e., where Vi,j = a8i,j + be1i - jl (using Kronecker delta notation: 8i ,j = 1 for i = j, else 
0), and a, b are positive. 
Consider variables generated as: 
00 
Tj = Vj + k L eSUj_s 
s=o 
where lij t"V N(O, a), Ui t"V N(O, 1) 0re all independent. and i\. i') are also independent. 
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Then, 
00 
r-r -= iP + k 2 ""'" 02s+li-jl,u? - - - + cross terms ~ J ~ mm(~,J)-S 
s=o 
leading to 
00 
a8ij + k2 L 02s+li-jl 
s=o 
k 2 1--1 a8 .. + Ol-J ~J 1 - 02 
by choosing k = Jb(1 - ( 2 ) 
At first it appears that we need to generate an infinite number of u/s (for i = 
n, n - 1, ... ,2,1,0, -1, -2, ... , -00) in order to do this. 
Fortunately closer inspection reveals that it is not so bad. We generate the sum 
required for the first random variable as: 
00 
- ""'" ns -WI = ~u UI- s 
8=0 
as a single drawing from N(O, 1!82). 
The variables can therefore be generated as: 
j-2 
Tj Vj + k(ej-liih + L esuJ _ s) 
s=o 
Taking into account the standard deviations of Vj and WI, the general form of \'miahl('s 
j-2 
- - r:: - k ( 1 ej -1 - L es - ) Tj - yavj + Ul + Uj-s J1- e2 s=o 
where Vl" .. ,n and Ul, .. "n are all independent N(O, 1). We generate 2n random variables 
to do this. 
This can be interpreted as a decomposition of the covariance matrix V into a 
square root form V = ee' + D, where D = aI and C is a (n x n) matrix in the form 
of: 
k 0 0 0 y'1-(}2 
k(} k 0 0 y'1_(}2 
k(}2 ke k 0 0 y'1_(}2 
k(}n-l ken - 2 ke k y'1-(}2 
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Alternatively, let V = CC' where C is a (n x 2n) matrix in the form of: 
k 0 0 0 Va 0 0 0 v'1-82 
k(} k 0 0 0 Va 0 0 v'1_(}2 
k82 k(} k 0 0 0 Va 0 ~ 
0 
k(}n-l k(}n-2 k(} k 0 0 0 Va v'1_(}2 
Appendix C 
Simulation of shocks in Chapter 6 
In this section, we show how to simulate the shocks in the individual revenue function 
(6.3.2) that satisfy L~l (JiCi = O. 
We write Vi = (JiCi' We wish to simulatei\, ... , VN with the standard deviations 
We simulate: 
N 
Vi = .jr;Ej - ri L FiEj 
j=l 
(C.O.I) 
where ri is a constant and Ei is the normally distributed noise with mean zero and 
variance V. Equation (C.O.I) gives L~l Vi = 0 as long as L::1 ri = 1. The variance 
ofl'i is given by: 
N 
var(vi) = (ri - r; L rj)V = ri(I - ri)V 
j=l 
We require ri - r; = ~ for i = 1, "0' N and L~l rj = 1. 
Given the assumption of (Ji'S, we can solve for V and ri· The shocks in equation 
(6.3.2) can be simulated by using equation (C.O.I). 
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